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Abstract 
There are currently 27 indigenous groups with self-government agreements with the Government 
of Canada, and many more with other types of governance agreements. All have faced lengthy 
negotiation processes and institutional barriers in achieving success in self-government. Despite 
increasing interest in the topic, research on the impacts of self-government at the community 
level is still limited, and relatively little has been written about the evolution of self-government 
in Newfoundland and Labrador. Scholars and policymakers continue to debate the benefits of 
self-government. This thesis conducts a comparative analysis of two case studies. The first, 
Miawpukek First Nation, is a Mi’kmaq community on the island of Newfoundland that 
resembles a self-governing community in terms of policy but has no formal agreement. The 
second, Nunatsiavut Government, is based on a formal self-government agreement and serves 
the Labrador Inuit. The thesis first analyzes the data to demonstrate the statistical benefits of self-
government agreements, comparing the data to that of the two cases. The thesis then uses 
rational choice institutionalist and culturalist institutionalist approaches to analyze findings from 
46 semi-structured, elite interviews conducted with residents of the two communities, together 
with supporting documentation, such as policy studies and media reports. The thesis concludes 
that the success of both governments in improving outcomes for residents is not a result of 
formal agreements with the Crown or of access to resource revenues. Instead, the combination of 
a well-organized, accountable local government, innovative policy initiatives tailored to 
community needs, and the financial resources to deliver them, is the key to success in 
governance. 
Keywords: Governance, Self-government, Indigenous communities, policy outcomes, multilevel 
governance, corporate governance, land management, resource management 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
The last 15-20 years have seen important developments in self-government (SG) for a 
number of indigenous groups in Canada. Indigenous governance has taken a particularly 
intriguing pathway for indigenous groups in Newfoundland and Labrador (NL), a late joiner to 
Confederation. Due to unusual circumstances surrounding confederation, indigenous groups in 
NL have had markedly different experiences with SG compared to groups elsewhere in Canada 
(Dickason, 2009, Bartels and Bartels, 2005; Wetzel, 1999; Brice-Bennett, 1977). One group in 
particular, the Labrador Inuit, have attained a Comprehensive Land Claim Agreement (CLCA), 
or Modern Treaty, which created the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area, or Nunatsiavut (meaning 
“Our Beautiful Land” in Labrador Inuttitut). The agreement has a self-government chapter 
creating a regional government, called Nunatsiavut Government (NG) and also includes a new 
fiscal financing arrangement and greater powers over an array of policy areas. Another group, 
called the Miawpukek Mi;kmaq First Nation (MFN), a Mi’kmaq band with a reserve on the 
south coast of Newfoundland, and the only Indian reserve on the island of Newfoundland, still 
sits at the Final Agreement stage in its SG agreement, but has nonetheless developed a number of 
important innovations, both in policy and administrative governance, that resemble those of a 
self-governing community (MFN website, 2018; APTN news, 2017). 
Canada’s Indigenous communities have walked a generations-long road in asserting their 
inherent right to SG, facing institutional and political barriers along the way. The pursuit of SG 
stems largely from a collective desire to build community capacity, preserve language and 
cultural heritage, improve community outcomes, and heal past ills (Panagos, 2008; Cornell and 
Kalt 2007, Coulthard, 2008). For indigenous groups of Newfoundland and Labrador, the pursuit 
of SG began with a fight for recognition of indigenous status, after an era of economic neglect in 
which indigenous identities were denied. (Bartels and Bartels, 2005; Roache, 2017; Heritage 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 2018). After a long political battle for official recognition as 
indigenous groups that was set on the national backdrop for the current shift toward recognition 
of indigenous rights, NG and MFN have both succeeded in both expanding their political 
autonomy and improving community outcomes. Both cases emulate similar success in SG, and 
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the associated improvements to community outcomes, found in an increasing number of 
indigenous communities across Canada (Government of Canada website, 2018). Although this 
success is not found uniformly in any region, and each indigenous group has had its own unique 
struggle for self-determination and recognition of rights, examining specific cases, like NG and 
MFN, reveals a number of best practices and lessons learned that could be useful for other 
communities.  
1.2 Research puzzle 
NL has historically been an unusual environment for indigenous advocacy and 
subsequently for the evolution of SG in indigenous communities. As noted by numerous authors 
(e.g. Bartels and Bartels, 2005, Brice-Bennett, ed. 1977, Dickason, 2009), the Labrador Inuit had 
to go about proving their ancestry and land use before making a claim, while the Mi’kmaq of 
Newfoundland have had to fight for recognition as First Nations groups by the provincial and 
federal governments. Each of these groups followed its own path, first toward recognition of 
indigenous status and land rights, and then in commencing negotiation of modern treaties or SG 
agreements, specific funding agreements, land management agreements, and cultural rights 
(Alcantara, 2007, 2008, 2013, Bartels and Bartels, 2005). Other communities and groups in NL 
have achieved varying degrees of self-determination as they continue negotiations with the 
provincial and federal governments, though only the Labrador Inuit have finalized a CLCA or 
SG agreement at present. These groups include the Qualipu Mi’kmaq Nation, a landless band 
consisting of over 25,000 Mi’kmaq residents across NL, the Innu Nation in Labrador, which 
consists of two main communities, Sheshatshiu and Natuashish, and NunatuKavut, which 
consists of several Inuit-Métis communities in southeastern Labrador. Each of these communities 
has had unique struggles related to membership, recognition of identity, and in securing a SG 
agreement (Alcantara, 2007, 2008, 2013; Hanrahan, 2012).  
There is a diverse, emerging literature on the evolution of more established self-
governing and quasi-self-governing regions in other parts of Canada, such as Nunavut, Nunavik, 
and the James Bay Cree1. Recent performance of newly-minted self-governing communities in 
NL is much less documented, and so too is governance in First Nations that still lack official SG 
                                                
1 For example, see White, 2006; Légaré, 1998, 2008; Alcantara and Whitfield, 2010; Wilson and Acantara, 2012 
Alcantara and Nelles, 2014. 
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agreements, such as MFN. These communities have had to wade through NL’s turbulent history, 
only recently seeing meaningful acknowledgement of indigenous presence, identity, and rights in 
the Province. Despite the recency of these advancements, both MFN and Nunatsiavut have, like 
many indigenous communities in Canada, made considerable gains in terms of key community 
indicators, such as housing and employment2. Both have also begun to address cultural issues, 
such as language shift, in their policies (Macdonald, 2015, MFN website, 2018; NG website, 
2018). In other words, this ability among indigenous groups to promote greater autonomy and 
prosperity is based upon decades of work (Wilson, 2008; Wilson & Alcantara, 2012), yet MFN 
and NG have both managed to erect transformative policy and governance structures relatively 
quickly in recent decades. In addition, MFN came under the Indian Act in 1987, at a time when 
many communities were beginning to try to leave it (Alcantara and Davidson, 2016, Dickason, 
2009, Wetzel, 1995). Despite the restrictive, colonial nature of the Indian Act, which will be 
described in Chapter 2 (Coulthard, 2007, Alfred and Corntassel, 2012), MFN has increased its 
autonomy and improved outcomes during this time. 
The success of MFN and NG in a relatively short time poses a research puzzle. The 
historical path dependency that has institutionalized poverty and hardship in many indigenous 
communities is well understood (eg. Alcantara & Davidson, 2015, Coulthard, 2007; Cornell, 
2007). Many of the same authors also highlight the ways in which Indigenous groups manage 
these challenges and work to produce favourable results (Wilson & Alcantara, 2012, Alcantara 
and Davidson, 2015, Campbell, Fenge, & Hanson, 2011) but little of the literature truly 
highlights the departures from institutional path dependency that have occurred in the last few 
decades, particularly for MFN and NG. Only recent literature has begun to focus more heavily 
on local governance, rather than resource development or other external factors, which adds to 
this puzzle. Numerous authors have noted the importance of natural resources and development 
pressure in the development of indigenous communities (Alcantara, 2008, 2013; Panagos & 
Grant, 2013; Parlee, 2015). The literature is less conclusive regarding local autonomy in 
governance, such as advocating for cultural rights, or how such efforts can succeed with or 
                                                
2 Based on data from Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC)’s Community Wellbeing Index (CWB), 
published in 2015. The website is currently in transition. In 2017, the Trudeau Government announced the 
dissolution of INAC and the creation of two new distinctive ministries, Indigenous Services Canada, and Crown-
Indigenous Relations and Northern Development Canada. Since then, content is being copied to the new website but 
is still available through INAC. 
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without local resource availability. This thesis examines how groups like MFN and NG have 
improved community outcomes through the development of local governance, despite 
institutional constraints, particularly due to the Indian Act and recalcitrance at other levels of 
government.  
1.3 Research questions and argument 
This thesis seeks to understand the evolution of SG in individual communities over time, 
and how this evolution contributes to well-being within communities, by investigating the 
following research questions: How has Indigenous governance in Canada evolved over time, 
especially in the past two decades? What explains the successes of certain governance structures 
and policies, introduced in self-governing communities, in achieving higher socio-economic 
outcomes?  By examining the current state of governance in two case studies, this thesis works to 
add to the literature on SG within Canadian indigenous communities, particularly how SG helps 
enable the improvement of governance and policy outcomes within those communities. Each 
case study uses qualitative and quantitative data to analyze modes of governance via three key 
policy areas: employment, housing, and language and culture revitalization. The thesis argues 
that the two communities have succeeded in improving outcomes – according to measurable 
indicators and a thematic analysis of interviews - because they have policies and governance 
structures that are innovative, home-grown, and bottom-up. These communities have shown that 
SG can succeed in improving local outcomes with or without local resource bases or significant 
own-source revenues (OSR).  
1.4 Theoretical framework 
The theoretical approach used to answer the research questions strikes a balance between 
Rational Choice Institutionalist explanations, Culturalist explanations, and a Historical 
Institutional approach, the latter of which is most prevalent in the literature and is focused on 
institutional path-dependency. I argue that a multifaceted approach to understanding SG in 
indigenous communities is necessary in order to properly characterize their success. Previous 
studies examining similar research questions have focused mainly on Historical Institutionalist 
approaches (Bear Robe, 1992, Cornell and Kalt, 2007, Abele and Prince, 2006) or Rational 
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Choice Institutionalist approaches (Alcantara, 2008, 2014). This is because most Institutionalist 
approaches, whether Historical or Rational Choice, focus most strongly on the institutional 
constraints in which communities have operated over time, mainly those imposed by other levels 
of government and the Indian Act (eg. Alcantara, 2013; Wilson and Alcantara, 2012; Légaré, 
2008; White, 2006). These constraints have created path-dependency and deepened the poverty 
found in many communities today. It is impossible to accurately discuss the emergence of SG in 
indigenous communities in Canada without understanding the history that underpins current 
conditions, but it is important to avoid overlooking the achievements of individual communities 
in the wash of history.  
Some literature discusses how communities, as rational actors, work within those 
constraints to achieve the best possible outcomes (Alcantara, 2013; Alcantara and Davidson, 
2015, Alcantara and Nelles, 2014, Papillion, 2011, Rodon, 2014). These authors capture some of 
the emergent phenomena in SG, such as multilevel governance (MLG) or inter-jurisdictional 
cooperation, and thus broaden our understanding of the complex matrix of processes that makes 
up modern indigenous SG in Canada. Some older models of SG have been mentioned less in 
contemporary literature, such as Treaty Federalism, which at one time was considered to be the 
most viable mode of indigenous governance that would increase local autonomy and improve 
local outcomes (Bear Robe, 1992).  
The problem with using only one theoretical approach at a time in understanding recent 
developments in indigenous governance in NL, especially in in-depth case studies such as those 
conducted in this thesis, is that this can lead to too much focus on ambient institutional factors, 
while casting whole communities as single rational actors with discreet behaviours and choices, 
rather than diverse groups of actors. Historical institutionalist perspectives, for instance, focus on 
past decisions and conditions and risk backgrounding recent innovative developments, many 
having occurred over the last decade or two. Such an approach may overlook the agency of 
contemporary self-governing communities or groups in determining their futures. Using only 
Rational Choice institutional approaches to examine phenomena like MLG could obscure some 
cultural or historical factors that are also important in a well-rounded understanding of SG 
(White, 2006; Andersen and Johns, 2005, Bartels and Bartels, 2005). A multifaceted approach 
that offers a more thorough analysis could help to explain why emerging governance practices 
and structures in communities also influence current outcomes. Here, greater emphasis is placed 
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upon the New Institutionalist approaches, with particular focus on rational choice and cultural 
explanations, rather than historical, institutional path-dependencies alone. This shift in emphasis 
helps us focus on how communities innovate – not only within institutional constraints – but also 
in their attempt to break away from them. 
Evaluating governance at the community level requires us to define it, then construct a 
template for analysis. Structure for the analysis of governance in the two case studies is provided 
by the Five Principles of Good Governance (hitherto the Five Principles) used by the Institute on 
Governance (IoG, 2018). These principles are based on the Principles of Governance created by 
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Five Principles include legitimacy 
and voice, direction, performance, accountability and transparency, and fairness. Analyzing the 
five elements of governance requires a working definition of governance in indigenous 
communities: managing of public and private resources, both material and immaterial, for the 
betterment of beneficiaries, via the operation of policies, procedures, and local institutions, 
within a defined set of parameters and a defined territory or jurisdiction, and with a clear 
mandate (Institute on Governance, 2019; Fukuyama, 2013; Aucoin, 2012).  
1.5 Methods 
This thesis combines quantitative data taken from the Community Well Being Index 
(CWB) from the Indigenous and Northern Affairs (INAC) website (Government of Canada, 
2017) with findings from 46 semi-structured, elite interviews and presented in two case studies. 
The case studies are: NG, which serves the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area in northern Labrador, 
and the MFN, which serves the Mi’kmaq community of Conne River3 in the Coast of Bays 
region of southern Newfoundland.  These cases were selected because they are both in NL, 
where, as mentioned, the political environment surrounding the pathway toward SG for 
indigenous communities is unique in Canada, meaning that both cases have experienced similar 
external political pressures (i.e. provincial and federal policies affecting indigenous groups in 
NL). The two communities differ greatly in terms of internal contextual factors –culturally, 
economically, and politically, yet they have both expanded their political autonomy. Both have 
also produced policy strategies in similar areas, including housing, employment, and cultural 
                                                
3 Since 1987, the reserve is officially listed as Samiajij Miawpukek, though colloquially most still call it Conne 
River today. MFN refers to both the community government and the reserve.  
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revitalization, and have produced favourable results4. This set of circumstances constitutes a 
valuable opportunity for comparison, which, using the Most Different Systems method (MDS) of 
comparison, allows a comparison of outcomes. Similar trends in outcomes over time, positive or 
not, between the two cases can be attributed to the success in SG, or governance that resembles 
SG.  
In order to trace tangible change within the two cases, differences in outcomes are 
measured accross a defined time marker identified for each case. For NG, governance outcomes 
are analyzed before and after 2006, the first full year of formal SG for Nunatsiavut. For MFN, 
outcomes are examined both before and after 1987, the year MFN received official recognition 
as a First Nations band and began receiving greater financial resources, which assisted in policy 
implementation. The information used to determine change across the two time-markers comes 
from a variety of sources. Quantitative information is taken from the CWB (Government of 
Canada, 2019), and through other records on housing and employment, available for each 
community through an access to information request. Qualitative data comes from a series of 
semi-structured, elite interviews with elected officials, government employees, and community 
members to obtain more detailed information on conditions both before and after the established 
time markers. 
The research design proceeds in two stages. First, I offer a quantitative analysis of policy 
outcomes in self-governing communities. This analysis establishes a clear empirical basis for the 
claim that not only is SG positively correlated with improved community outcomes in 
indigenous communities across Canada, but that both NG and MFN are success stories in terms 
of their ability to improve policy outcomes over time, even relative to other communities with 
SG. This is done using a longitudinal analysis of CWB data, which are available for each census 
year beginning in 1981 and cover 4 metrics: highest education level, mean family income, 
housing quality and availability, and labour force participation.  
Next, I conduct a case study of each chosen community, using the MDS method and 
consisting of an analysis of governance in each case, which includes a review of 3 policy areas: 
housing, employment, and cultural revitalization. These policies were chosen because they are 
featured in the CWB, and because both NG and MFN have important policies that address these 
areas (MFN website, 2018; NG website, 2018, Anderson & John’s, 2005). The case studies 
                                                
4 Shown by higher CWB values over time, Government of Canada, 2019. 
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examine the findings from 43 semi-structured interviews with 46 participants (14 in MFN and 32 
in Nunatsiavut), together with public policy records from each of the two communities in three 
chosen policy areas. Using a rational choice instututionalist and culturalist framework that 
includes analysis of the Principal Agent model and the Five Principles, I draw conclusions from 
my cases that answer the research questions. I first acknowledge the considerable contextual 
differences between the communities of the Miawpukek Mi’kmaq and the Labrador Inuit. I then 
trace similarly favorable developments in local policy directions found in each community back 
to the achievement of better community representation (both cultural and democratic) in order to 
discern a workable understanding of what contributes to success in SG in a community.  
1.6 Thesis overview 
Chapter 2 examines literature on the evolution of governance in indigenous communities 
in Canada, including the progress toward SG over the past few decades, and the institutional 
landscape of SG today. Despite many exciting new developments in indigenous governance in 
Canada, relatively little is written on the state of SG in newly minted self-governing groups or 
groups with recent moves toward SG, specifically NG and MFN5. The chapter begins by 
introducing the historical institutionalist perspective of indigenous governance, then defines path 
dependency, illustrating its impacts on SG. The chapter then proposes a combined theoretical 
model using Rational Choice Institutionalist and Culturalist approaches when trying to 
understand recent or future developments in indigenous SG. Finally, the chapter defines 
governance itself and proposes the Five Principles as a template of analysis. I ultimately note that 
while acknowledging both the importance of historical path-dependencies that have shaped 
communities is important, a holistic understanding of governance must be employed when 
examining governance.  
Chapter 3 describes the research design, introduced above, in greater detail. This chapter 
begins by identifying and justifying the case selection, then proceeds by describing data 
gathering, including how interviewees were recruited, and how key documents, such as policy 
records, were sourced. Lastly, the method of analysis is identified, which involves both the 
                                                
5 The Miawpukek First Nation (MFN) currently sits at the Final Agreement stage, but the community has not ratified 
it. This dissertation argues, however, that although MFN does not have an official self-government agreement, it 
nevertheless has many characteristics of a self-governing community in terms of its governance and policy 
outcomes. This will be further clarified in chapter six. 
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framework for evaluating governance, borrowed from the IoG and the UNDP; and Thematic 
Network Analysis, a method of coding qualitative data. Chapter 4 provides a quantitative 
analysis of SG outcomes, which empirically demonstrates that communities that are defined as 
self-governing do, in fact, demonstrate greater improvement of key indicators, such as housing, 
than those that are not self-governing, according to CWB data (Government of Canada, 2017, 
2019). This chapter further argues that the two case studies chosen for this thesis are, in fact, 
success stories for SG in that they have succeeded in improving indicators, and done so 
favorably compared to other SG communities shown in the Index.  
Chapters 5 and 6 will detail the qualitative results of my semi – structured interviews 
(some one-on-one, some conducted in groups) with community members (including ordinary 
community members, elders, local government employees, and elected officials) in my two case 
communities. I combine data gathered from interviewees with a review of policy records and an 
overview of democratic institutions (to provide proper context) to confirm my hypotheses. The 
data gathered are run through a Thematic Network Analysis (described in Chapter 3), which 
provide an analytical framework through which to answer the research questions. These chapters 
draw on an array of source material for analyzing governance, including interviews, media 
reports, legislation, policy reports, and records of decision (Hansards).  
Chapter 7 presents a final comparative analysis that compares and contrasts the two 
cases. This final chapter argues that, although this study is limited in scope, it provides robust 
evidence to suggest that the success enjoyed by each of the two cases presented in improving 
outcomes is due to SG, or structures that resemble SG, and that innovative and home-grown 
policy solutions explain this success. The cases thus offer potentially useful insights for other 
communities. I further conclude that as communities receive greater autonomy to manage their 
affairs, they tend to form governments that better represent the diverse needs of their 
communities, and ultimately such governments better address community needs in comparison to 
band councils or ‘mini-municipalities’ operating with limited powers under the jurisdiction of the 
Indian Act. This chapter also concludes that such arrangements are important for language and 
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Chapter 2: Institutional friction, rational choice, and the 
Five Principles of Governance: a review of the literature.  
2.1 Introduction 
This thesis employs a combined theoretical approach that relies mainly on new 
institutionalist theories, looking to rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and 
culturalism, combining them to help explain how some current indigenous SG structures differ 
from what went before.  Some communities have managed to adopt new political structures that 
have enabled them to improve outcomes. This thesis challenges longstanding historical 
institutionalist narratives on SG in Canada by highlighting the importance of focusing on 
strategic choices within communities. The chapter begins by framing the historical and 
contextual circumstances that surround self-governing communities (section 2.2.1). It proceeds 
by defining the new institutionalist approaches (sections 2.2.2-2.2.5), explaining their relevance 
to conducting a case study of SG in specific indigenous communities, and offers a working 
definition of path dependency. I also identify the gradual institutional change that allowed the 
present iteration of SG to begin to unfold (section 2.2.6). The chapter then juxtaposes two largely 
opposing viewpoints on indigenous rights and SG: The classical liberal and the post-modern or 
critical approaches, identifying why neither can properly be used to examine SG in specific cases 
(Sections 2.3.1 & 2.3.2). I then proceed to a discussion of Multilevel Governance and Treaty 
Federalism (Sections 2.3.3 & 2.3.4), examining their important contributions to our 
understanding of SG. I further explain the choice of a combined approach to examining SG in 
my chosen cases, showing why each approach found in the literature would be inadequate on its 
own (Section 2.3.4). Finally, I present a working definition of governance (Sections 2.4.1), based 
upon the Five Principles (Institute on Governance, 2018), to be used as a template for analysis in 
the remaining chapters. Lastly, I define indigenous SG in Canada, showing the pathways it can 
take in individual communities (Section 2.4.2), then propose a more comprehensive definition of 
SG in Canada (2.4.3).  
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2.2 History and the institutionalisms  
2.2.1 History matters: examining path dependency in Canada.   
 One of the overarching concerns expressed in much of the literature pertains to 
historical institutional developments, such as historical treaties, and the enduring presence of 
colonial paternalism on the part of the Crown that has frustrated efforts to revitalize traditional 
indigenous modes of governance. This is noted by authors such as Coulthard (2007, 2014), 
Cornell and Kalt (2007), Rusco (2006), Alfred (2005), and Purtusati (1997). Coulthard (2007, 
2014) notes that, even as polities move toward better recognition of indigenous land rights and 
rights to SG, paternalistic policy frameworks continue to restrict what local indigenous 
governments can do with their money and the policy frameworks they can pursue. This 
restrictive institutional makeup tends to produce unfavorable political results and thus 
unfavorable community outcomes, such as poverty, a lack of resources or insufficient water or 
sanitation infrastructure. By restricting decision-making power, these institutions continue to 
frustrate efforts to address these problems, entrenching path dependency, though many groups 
try to fight it (Coulthard, 2007, 2014, Dickason, 2009).  
Path dependency is defined as the tendency for institutions to develop along a particular 
path, and, due to the high cost of deviating from that path, institutions tend to resist change (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996). Centuries of a change-resistant colonial government, with institutions such as 
a majoritarian Westminster parliament and a centralized welfare state are cemented in place, and 
the cost of restructuring this system to better accommodate indigenous modes of governance is 
thought to be immense. As a result, indigenous communities choose pathways that are adapted to 
this broader institutional framework, and they, too, become path-dependent. The fiduciary 
relationship between colonial governments and indigenous communities that has become 
institutionalized over the last few centuries, especially in the Canadian context, continues to 
impede the development of robust governance structures in indigenous communities. Much of 
the literature problematizes this phenomenon, with many calling for it to be ultimately 
deconstructed or abolished if indigenous groups are to truly attain workable SG structures and 
meaningful self-determination (Alfred and Corntassel, 2012; Coulthard, 2007).  
Alfred (2005) reminds us that SG is not a concept created in modern times in order to 
advocate for greater self-determination for indigenous peoples, rather SG for indigenous peoples 
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precedes colonization, and was disrupted by colonialism. An important example of this is the 
formation of the Iroquois Confederacy, a powerful political and cultural union consisting of six 
distinct Iroquis Nations (The Mohawk, Onondaga, Oneida, Cayuga, Seneca, and later the 
Tuscarora peoples), formed long before the arrival of Europeans in central Canada (Dickason, 
2009). The Iroquois Six Nations were an important force in colonial policy for centuries, with 
many European settlements careful to maintain favor with Iroquois leadership. This historical 
reality seems to imply that meaningful SG has not only been integral to the health and survival of 
indigenous communities, but also reflects the pre-colonial cultural heritage of those 
communities. When historical iterations of indigenous SG were replaced by a fiduciary 
arrangement between indigenous communities and the crown (Dickason, 2009), it created 
“asymmetrical, non-reciprocal forms of recognition” (Coulthard, 2007, 2014, 439). This 
asymmetrical relationship was accompanied by a legacy of colonial oppression that has 
manifested economically; as seen in small reservations on poor quality lands (Dickason, 2009), 
often with inadequate water resources and boil water advisories (Daley et al, 2015). The 
relationship has also manifested in such developments as a highly misguided and destructive 
Indian Residential Schools System (IRSS) that lasted several generations and left deep scarring 
within indigenous communities (Frideres, 2009; Metatawabin, 2014; Coulthard, 2007, 2014). 
These developments have culminated in further entrenching of hardships path-dependency for 
indigenous peoples in Canada.  
2.2.2 Path Dependency and the Indian Act 
History has an ongoing impact on the political makeup of indigenous communities, 
which is rooted in the Indian Act of 1876. Though designed for the “benefit” of First Nations 
(FN), the Indian Act was harmful. The Act created a legal definition for “Status Indian”, still in 
use today, which defines the population the Act administers. This “sterile, legal definition” 
(Coulthard, 2001, pg. 439) exists at odds with the notion of Indigenous identity explored by 
Coulthard (2007, 2014), Corntassel (2008), and Alfred (1999, 2005), even as it has acted to 
shape identity in legal terms. The notion of both indigenous identity and membership within a 
particular group have become salient in recent negotiations and advocacy efforts6. Wolfe (2006) 
                                                
6 For instance, for both Labrador Inuit and Newfoundland Mi’kmaq, controversy has arisen over how status or 
membership is determined. Thousands across the province continue to fight for recognition in the Qualipu Band, 
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problematizes the notion of status in its legal iteration, arguing that the very existence of such a 
concept is designed to exclude, and ultimately eliminate. The very existence of indigenous 
groups in North America has been treated as an inconvenience to governments and settler 
society, and that the two groups continue to have a complex relationship (King, 2012). Wolfe 
notes that the genocide of indigenous groups in settler societies like Canada operates not only 
physically, culturally, and spiritually, but also legally, by eliminating indigenous people through 
denial of status. Even as “Status Indians” continue to live in Canada from one generation to the 
next, particular stipulations in the Indian Act or other legislation could strip away status from 
certain individuals even as it granted it to others7. Membership is critical in that it both grants 
access to treaty benefits under the Act and affects sense of belonging, and it will be discussed 
further in the case studies.  
The Indian Act placed a federal bureaucrat in charge of FN bands in each region, who 
decided how communities would be funded and how funds would be spent (Dickason, 2009; 
Frideres, 2011). The impact of this practice was that decisions were made according to the 
priorities of the current federal government, often with little sensitivity to specific needs of 
communities. When this arrangement ended in the 1970’s, band councils continued to operate 
with limited autonomy in generally impoverished communities, where there was little incentive 
for long term planning. It is little wonder, then, that for decades local councils were rarely able to 
overcome patterns of poverty, and this has impacted their ability to attain SG (Alcantara and 
Davidson, 2015. 557).  
Indigenous groups must be cooperative, even appeasing the crown, while remaining 
internally cohesive in land claims and SG negotiations with the crown. The result tends to be 
mutually agreeable but suboptimal (Alcantara, 2008, 2014). This set of institutional constraints is 
a neo-colonial force in modern indigenous governance, and explains why indigenous groups 
                                                                                                                                                       
while many who identify as Labrador Inuit feel left out in the aftermath of their 2006 CLCA. This will be discussed 
further in chapters 5, and 6, as both cases continue to struggle with what to do about membership. See Bartels and 
Bartels (2005); Patrick, 2013.  
7 The now repealed Section 12 of the Indian Act, for instance, stripped an indigenous woman of status if she married 
a non-indigenous man. Although the clause was abolished in 1987, thousands of the descendants of those whose 
status was stripped continue the fight for their right to be recognized today. With the Passage of Bill S3 by Canada’s 
Parliament, which would reinstate Indian Status for many of these descendants, many hope that past injustice will be 
reversed for their families. It remains unclear how the new legislation will be implemented.  
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often feel constrained even as they work towards desirable outcomes. Further, since the 1970’s8, 
when old patterns of paternalism began to change (Dickason, 2009, Bob, 2010) modern treaty 
negotiation still rewards cooperation with the Canadian state (Alcantara, 2008, 2014). This 
cooperation offers greater legislative and political authority for indigenous groups, but has 
tended to further cement path dependency by replicating past patterns of negotiation and 
compromise seen previously. This is of paramount importance for our purposes because although 
this paper ultimately argues that modern SG agreements are a clear improvement from what went 
before, they still exist within a settler context. True SG, and ultimately meaningful self-
determination, remain on the horizon as the Canadian state continues to move tortuously toward 
reconciliation with indigenous groups. For the purposes of this paper, meaningful SG is a 
concept best understood through the examination of governance at the community level.  
A critical reading of Canada’s colonial history supports the understanding that history has 
shaped institutions in Canada, and this has in turn created constraints and challenges in the 
governance of indigenous communities. Indigenous communities, individuals, entrepreneurs, and 
negotiators, meanwhile, have, as rational actors, attempted to manage or push against these 
constraints in pursuing their own betterment. The ultimate goal of these efforts is a model of 
governance that is rooted in a nation - to - nation relationship between indigenous peoples and 
the crown. (Government of Canada, 2019; Alfred, 2005, Alfred and Corntassel, 2012). Cornell 
and Kalt (2007) refer to this as the “nation-building” model, which is preferable to the neo-
colonial model characterized by paternalism and path dependency. By gaining the control they 
need to develop their own policy initiatives, self-governing indigenous communities can reverse 
path dependency at the local level and improve social and economic outcomes. 
2.2.4 Historical institutionalism and path dependency 
Historical institutionalist explanations of governance outcomes are common in the 
literature. A Historical Institutionalist framework places the institutions that structure society at 
the center – supposing that the institutional makeup of a policy guides the behavior of competing 
                                                
8 In 1973, the Canadian Government invited those indigenous communities that did not have existing treaties with 
the Crown (such as the old numbered treaties that govern many FN communities), to negotiate modern treaties with 
the Crown. Among the first to begin the process were the Inuvialuit in the Western Canadian Arctic (Inuvialuit 
Agreement, concluded 1984), and the James Bay Cree, Naskapi, and Quebec Inuit (James Bay-Northern Quebec 
Agreement, completed 1975). The Inuit of Nunavut were soon to follow (concluded 1993). See Alcantara and 
Davidson (2015). 
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actors and tends to determine outcomes. Institutions are “formal or informal procedures, 
routines, norms, and conventions embedded in the political structure, which shape or constrain 
their activities and thus influence their choices and their outcomes” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, 398). 
A central tenet of a this approach is that path dependency is crucial in understanding the 
experience of indigenous groups, or their governance structures, because it helps explain why the 
institutions of federalism tend to resist change (Papillon, 2011). Path dependency also sometimes 
explains the governance decisions indigenous groups take after negotiating a modern treaty, and 
these agreements often determine key policy frameworks (Alcantara and Davidson, 2016). This 
in turn explains why indigenous groups have often been forced to continue to develop under sub-
optimal conditions (Dickason, 2009). The difference between the two approaches described 
above are nuanced in much of the literature, and many authors will use either approach 
depending on the circumstances of a specific case. In taking a historical institutionalist approach, 
numerous authors have shown that many of the choices made by some self-governing 
communities rest on historical experiences and institutional constraints typically understood as a 
product of an existence within an enduring colonial environment (Cornell and Kalt, 2007, 
Dickason, 2009).  
Wilson and Alcantara (2012), for example, illustrate how several components of the 
James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA), the first such agreement made in modern 
times, were determined in large part by institutionalized patterns of interactions between the 
Federal and provincial governments and the Inuit and James Bay Cree. The authors further note 
that the JBNQA, in turn, “set the stage for the political and economic evolution of Inuit self-
government in Nunavik after 1975” (pp. 787, 2012). Similarly, Alcantara and Davidson (2015) 
note that the Inuvialuit of the Northwest Territories, though they were quick to negotiate and 
settle one of Canada’s first modern treaties, completed in 1984, have yet to reach a final 
agreement for self-government, and, in addition, the region continues to struggle economically. 
Institutional factors such as institutional layering are the likely culprit form the lack of a SG 
agreement. The federal government did not allow CLCA agreements to include SG until much 
later. For the lagging economy, the authors blame a low degree of synergy between the Inuvialuit 
Regional Corporation and local governments and industry, together with ambient factors such as 
lack of resource development in the area. Because the land claims agreement does not contain 
specific language on the subject, there continues to be a lack of legal certainty regarding resource 
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development for many indigenous communities. This historical institutionalist analysis does not 
completely discount the Inuvialuit negotiators as rational actors, in that they do make choices, 
but these choices are shown to be constrained by both history and circumstances. The literature 
on indigenous government shows us that both historical institutionalist and rational choice 
institutionalist explanations can capture different parts of the complex process of constructing 
and operating indigenous governance institutions, but clearly history has influenced outcomes, 
specifically by preventing some communities from improving outcomes over time.  
2.2.5 Rational Choice Institutionalism  
Rational Choice Institutionalism is also an important framework for analyzing 
governance.  This approach rests on the core theoretical assumption relied on in this thesis: that 
indigenous communities are rational actors that engage in distinct processes of negotiation both 
internally and with other communities and other levels of government in order to craft 
governance structures and secure resources for the betterment of their residents. Rational choice 
institutionalism, as defined by Hall and Taylor (1996), is a framework in which individual actors 
are considered rational entities, acting within institutions. It also holds that actors use, or work 
within, institutions, to the best of their ability, in order to maximize their outcomes. Institutions 
exist and persist because they create greater certainty around what is likely to happen, and they 
structure the array of choices and preferences that may be pursued. Another important element of 
rational choice institutionalism, identified by authors such as Delreux and Adriansen (2017), is 
the principal-agent problem. This problem is created by the fact that a particular actor, called the 
principal, may delegate its activities to another actor the agent, to act on its behalf. This may be 
done voluntarily or due to institutional requirements, such as the democratic process. Because 
there is incomplete flow of information between them, the agent is able to act in its own interest, 
to the detriment of the principal. For this reason, the principal will seek to use institutions to 
control the behavior of the agent.  
This framework can be robustly applied to indigenous groups in Canada in their push for 
SG, and in their interactions with the Canadian state, through their governance activities. As 
most of the literature illustrates, indigenous groups are often constrained from governing their 
communities or using resources as they would prefer, but they tend to engage in various 
activities within those institutional constraints in order to maximize their outcomes, and have 
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often come up with innovative methods for doing so (Alcantara and Davidson, 2016; Alcantara 
and Nelles, 2014, 2016; Papillon, 2011; White, 2006). Indigenous groups have interacted with 
other levels of government through structured processes, both through land claims negotiations 
and in their governance processes (Alcantara, 2008, Alcantara and Davidson, 2016), and have 
worked toward discreet outcomes. Further, indigenous groups have sought to manage the 
principal-agent problem. Traditionally, the principal-agent problem exists because, under the 
constraints imposed by Federalism and by the Indian Act, the welfare of indigenous groups, the 
Principal in this case, is placed in the hands of provincial and federal governments, the agent. 
Because governments and government officials tend to act in their own interests, electoral or 
otherwise, and because the process historically lacked transparency (Assembly of First Nations, 
2018), indigenous groups have not historically had their needs well served (Dickason, 2009; 
Frideres, 2011). Under a modern self-government agreement, specific Indigenous governments 
become the agent, with their beneficiaries as principals, and through adequate transparency and 
participation, are hopefully better able to serve residents. Indigenous groups thus act within 
patterns of institutionalized processes to assert the needs of their people, then seek and gain 
control over policy instruments needed to address those needs. What emerges is a structured 
negotiation between different jurisdictions and levels of government about how different aspects 
of life, from culture to land and resources, are to be governed.  
As Alcantara and Davidson (2016) note, echoed by Scholz (2006), “a move to successful 
negotiation is necessarily precipitated by an implicit agreement between the parties to reach a 
collective, yet individually suboptimal, outcome” (Alcantara and Davidson, pp. 557, 2016). The 
same holds true for the implementation of governance structures by indigenous communities and 
in their agreements with other jurisdictions (Alcantara and Nelles, 2014, 2016; Papillon, 2011). 
Alcantara and Nelles (2016) perform an in-depth analysis of four instances of relationships 
between indigenous communities and neighbouring municipalities, each of which represents a 
different relationship type. In one such example, the Teslin Tlingit Council and the Village of 
Teslin in the Yukon exhibit a high degree of synergy that is rooted in institutionalized 
cooperation on a number of issues, which led to a series of key decisions and agreements, geared 
towards the improvement of conditions and safety for residents. Conversely, low interaction and 
non-cooperation – the relationship between Sault-St Marie, Garden River, and Batchewana, is 
also rooted in a longstanding institutionalized lack of need or ability to cooperate. This suggests 
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that both decision-making and community outcomes are impacted by the institutional landscapes 
that surround communities, and that both communities and individuals are rational actors that 
attempt to maximize benefits to community, band, or group members.  
Though robust, the rational choice institutionalist interpretation of indigenous governance 
is not without flaws. For instance, as Hall and Taylor (1996) note, Rational choice theory relies 
on what many consider to be a simplistic understanding of human motivation, and, though the 
approach can have strong predictive power about both preferences and outcomes, these are often 
sensitive to small changes in ambient conditions (pp 950-951). Thus, despite its strength in both 
explaining behaviour and predicting outcomes, a rational choice institutionalist approach to 
understanding governance must leave room for nuance. This means that accounting for historical 
influences, cultural realities, and diverse voices is important in examining why certain 
communities have attained SG, how they have arranged their governance apparatus, and how 
they have shaped their economic and social futures. Some authors, however, do not focus on 
institutional change or stasis in their discussion of indigenous rights or self-government, instead 
looking to a classical liberal or postmodernist understanding. Rather than examine the degree to 
which indigenous governance is able to thrive within Canadian federalism, or become an integral 
part of it, many argue that true indigenous SG is incompatible with Canadian federalism. Some 
argue that true liberation of indigenous groups can only occur outside of Canadian federalism 
(Alfred and Corntassel, 2005; Coulthard, 2007; 2014), while others argue that full sovereignty 
for indigenous groups is unachievable or untenable (Flanagan, 2000, Cairns, 2000). Each of 
these approaches offers a particular perspective on indigenous governance that aids in our 
understanding of the current institutional makeup, but is less helpful in analyzing how 
governance operates in a particular place and time.  
2.2.6 from Path Dependency to Critical Juncture 
As Hall and Taylor (1994) note, the path dependency that tends to stifle institutional 
change can only by countered by a significant shift, or ‘critical juncture’ (Hogan, 2019), where 
one or more critical decisions by important decision-makers cause path-dependent institutions to 
move to a different path. For Indigenous peoples in Canada, this shift began with a growing 
volume of legal action in the 1960’s and 70’s and culminated with the passage of the 
Repatriation Act of 1982, when indigenous land rights were added to the Canadian Constitution 
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under Section 32. As noted by Puig (2010), Jackson and Warren, (2005), Gudynas (2011), this 
change coincided with growing unrest among indigenous groups throughout the Americas. The 
unrest was in response to growing social and cultural dislocation as a result of renewed policies 
of land theft and assimilation that accompanied the global shift toward neoliberal policy agendas. 
A clear example of this came in 1990, with the with the Mohawk Uprising in Oka, Quebec, a 
response to territorial disputes between the Mohawk First Nation at Oka, and local authorities. It 
happened again in 1994 with the uprising of the Zapatista Liberation Army (EZLN) against the 
Mexican government in Chiapas, Mexico, beginning on the day that NAFTA was signed (Bob, 
2005). In indigenous communities throughout the western hemisphere, groups were taking action 
in response to culture loss, land loss, or a lack of consultation during resource development on 
indigenous lands (Dickson, 2009; Panagos and Grant, 2013; Bob, 2005). These movements 
helped to generate public support for indigenous rights internationally (Bob, 2005), which have 
helped to drive the shift from politics of repression to the ‘politics of recognition’ identified by 
Alfred and Corntassel (2012).  
Institutional changes in the institutional alignments within Canada coincide with the 
growing advocacy efforts for indigenous rights and self-determination happening globally. 
Beginning in the late 20th century, indigenous groups across the world have increasingly 
mobilized to make calls for recognition of their rights to land, culture, and SG (Bob, 2005, Puig, 
2010). In 2006, 143 member states of the United Nations ratified the United Nations Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), in which Article 4 affirms the indigenous right 
to self-determination and SG (2006, p. 8). While UNDRIP is more symbolic rather than directly 
impacting Canadian domestic policy (see McDonald & Wood, 2016), it represents the 
culmination of a global structural and discursive shift towards greater recognition of indigenous 
rights. This has helped to underpin the pathway to SG for indigenous communities in Canada. In 
2018, the Parliament of Canada passed Bill C-262, which marks an official commitment by the 
Government of Canada to implement UNDRIP within domestic laws.  The culmination of these 
changes has ultimately led to new patterns of relationships between indigenous groups and the 
Canadian state. The shift toward a politics of recognition, in particular, helps underpin a push for 
constitutional change that some argue have led to better consultation and collaboration with 
indigenous communities on matters of policy from resource development to service delivery. 
This would include, for instance, Canadian mining companies working on or near ancestral 
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aboriginal lands (Panagos and Grant, 2013). Essentially, policy frameworks moved from a 
paradigm of ‘free entry’ (406), where companies were able to develop lands without any consent 
from indigenous occupants and without ensuring that resource development benefitted the local 
population, to a paradigm of proper consultation that purportedly exists today. Panagos notes that 
it is still too soon to be certain whether these policy changes will lead to better outcomes.  
2006 is also the year that 143 member states United Nations ratified UNDRIP. While the 
ratification of UNDRIP in 2006 is more symbolic than directly influential in terms of its effects 
on Canadian domestic policy (see McDonald & Wood, 2016), it represents the culmination of a 
global structural and discursive shift towards greater recognition of indigenous rights, that helped 
to underpin the pathway to SG for indigenous communities in Canada.  
Many authors, including Coulthard (2007, 2014), Alfred (2005), and Cornell and Kalt 
(2007) cast doubt on the notion that the modern relationship between indigenous communities 
and colonial governments has seen meaningful change commensurate with the current paradigm 
shift toward consultation and recognition. They argue, for instance, that resource development 
often has negative impacts on communities and can solidify, rather than alleviate, colonial 
relationships (Sachs and Warner, 2001). The problem of resource development highlights the 
need for more in-depth case studies on governance, such as those being conducted in this thesis, 
and an in-depth investigation is needed to determine the costs and benefits of development for a 
community. This problem also highlights the necessity that self-governing indigenous 
communities, as rational actors, have the power to transform their social landscapes over time 
through innovative policy agendas. Some authors disagree on whether this is possible in 
contemporary Canadian federalism.  
2.3 Moving Beyond the Institutionalisms 
2.3.1 The critical-postmodern perspective 
Coulthard (2007, 2014) critiques the colonial nature of the Canadian policy landscape. 
Mining policy historically failed to facilitate adequate consultation or respect land rights, as 
described by Panagos and Grant (2013), but even the current policy landscape is centered on 
what Coulthard calls the politics of ‘recognition’. This critique focuses on the idea that modern 
shift toward recognition of rights are a tokenistic gesture that does not truly empower indigenous 
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communities. The critique of current systems of redress for the injustices suffered by indigenous 
peoples, from the modern land claims system to the welfare system, is derived from Fanon’s 
famed deconstruction of the master-slave relationship (Coulthard, 2007; Fanon, 1952, 1963), 
which asserts that liberation from the mental enslavement inherent in colonial relationships 
cannot be achieved through peaceful collaborating with the colonial system. Alfred and 
Corntassel’s reading of Fanon holds that tokenistic gestures of postcolonial restitution found in 
Canada are not sufficient to decolonize and can actually perpetuate patterns of colonial 
oppression. For example, the modern treaty, or CLCA negotiation process originally required 
extinguishment of aboriginal title9, or the ancestral legal claim to traditional lands that had not 
been ceded in prior treaties, in exchange for a set of more clearly defined rights, such as 
harvesting rights (Alcantara and Davidson, 2016, Alfred and Corntassel, 2012, McDonald). The 
problem with extinguishment is that land rights should always have been honoured, and losing 
title to gain other rights is seen by some as a step backward. 
This body of work, described as a post-modern, critical, or, as Alfred has sometimes put 
it, anarcho-indigenist perspective (2010), offers a more skeptical reading of current process of 
modern treaty negotiation. Alfred (2005) defines anarcho-indigenism as an ethos centered on 
peaceful resistance to the hegemony of the colonial state, combined with the resurgence or 
reclamation of an indigenous identity and a refusal to accept the modern liberal-capitalist order. 
Alfred and Corntassel (2005), and Coulthard (2007, 2014) suggest that modern treaty negotiation 
and the politics of recognition are merely gestures designed to further silence indigenous groups 
while continuing to rob them of traditional lands. Ultimately, true liberation for indigenous 
peoples, some argue, is incompatible with a liberal, capitalist order (Coulthard, 2007, 2014; 
Alfred, MacDonald, 2011). Wilson and Alcantara (2012) respond to this notion in their 
examination of Inuit corporate governance, which occurs when an Inuit land claims corporation 
is responsible for directing economic activities, such as resource development, for a region. They 
                                                
9 In 1973, after a landmark case befor the Supreme Court of Canada affirmed the continued existance of Aboriginal 
title, Indigenous groups that did not have prior treaties with the Crown were invited to negotiate CLCAs, or modern 
treaties with the federal government. Some of these agreements would include a SG agreement. The legal concept of 
extinguishment is controversial, and has been under intense criticism, most recently in a (2018) report by the 
Standing Committee on Indigenous and Northern Affairs (INAN), which found that aboriginal title is inalienable 
and can never be extinguished, and that extingushment was a neo-colonial tool designed to remove rights (INAN, 
2018; Alcantara, 2009, 2014).  
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argue that the success enjoyed by Inuit regional development corporations at both creating 
economic opportunities for Inuit, while also safeguarding Inuit control in economic 
development, shows that indigenous success in economic governance is not fundamentally at 
odds with capitalism. This idea is echoed by Newhouse (1993), who argues that, since it has 
become impossible for Indigenous groups to live completely outside of modern capitalism, that 
they will ultimately be influenced by it, and develop their own governance structures within it. 
Newhouse further notes that most indigenous groups were traditionally entrepreneurial, and that 
classical liberal capitalism is not incompatible with traditional indigenous life.  
Most authors agree that a focus on past oppression and victimhood is a poor pathway to 
indigenous revitalization, and that a focus on empowerment is necessary (Alfred and Corntassel 
2005). This is important because the institutional frameworks embedded in Canadian federalism 
have helped to perpetuate patterns of community poverty and administrative ineffectiveness of 
local governments and federal bureaucrats alike that have burdened indigenous communities. In 
the decades following the repatriation of Canada’s constitution in 1982, community 
empowerment has become more salient for indigenous groups. This includes communities 
having both a seat at the table in resource development and provincial and federal policymaking 
and in decision making at the community level. This process of empowerment, rather than 
victimhood is evident in both inter-jurisdictional arrangements between indigenous and non-
indigenous communities (Alcantara and Nelles, 2014), and in new modes of governance, such as 
multilevel governance (Papillon, 2011), or Inuit corporate governance (Wilson and Alcantara, 
2012). It may be possible, then, that indigenous empowerment could happen within Canadian 
federalism. How can this lead to better political and cultural outcomes? Proponents of indigenous 
SG argue that empowerment within Canadian federalism is the best way to facilitate better 
outcomes for indigenous communities. 
2.3.2 Classical liberalism and indigenous governance 
Not all authors who have commented on the intersection between indigenous governance 
and modern liberal capitalism have had favorable attitudes toward the expansion of indigenous 
governance. Some argue that indigenous sovereignty and SG are contrary to the best interests of 
indigenous peoples and the Canadian state. In First Nations? Second Thoughts, Flanagan (2000) 
challenges what he calls “aboriginal orthodoxy”, which he defines as the belief that the prior 
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existence of indigenous peoples in the Americas entitles them to particular considerations, such 
as land rights, harvesting rights, and SG. Flanagan argues that the ills of colonialism are the 
inevitable result of the superior technological and cultural advancement of Europeans over 
indigenous peoples of North America (whose technologies are described as “Neolithic”). 
Flanagan further argues that current attempts at redress for colonial abuses that focus on 
recognition of rights are doomed to fail, and that the just way forward is the dismantling of these 
policies in favor of full integration of indigenous peoples into the Canadian state. Flanagan’s 
vision for indigenous governance can arguably be read through a classical liberal lens, one that 
privileges individual freedom and opportunity over group rights, and holds that the best way to 
alleviate human suffering is to ensure the equality of opportunity of all individuals, which is 
solidified by equality before the law. The classical liberal perspective espoused by authors such 
as Flanagan (2000), and Cairns (2000), evokes the writings of enlightenment thinkers, such as 
Locke, Hobbes, and Mill, whose ideas stressed that the role of government was to prevent chaos 
and violence and to promote the rights of the individual.  
As Christie (2002) notes in his review, the neatly presented, simplistic view presented of 
aboriginal peoples and their struggle with colonialism by authors like Flanagan (2000), and to a 
lesser extent, Cairns (2000), seems sensible only if one ignores the persistent realities of modern 
colonialism, the ongoing effects of which would not be erased by simply trying to forget a 
troubled past to pursue a future of equality. The ultimate violence of colonialism, Christie 
suggests, was not perpetrated “not by way of guns and steel, but through control of thought and 
action - through sustained efforts to have Aboriginal peoples come to think and act like the 
colonizers” (2002, 192-3). If this is true, then the simple ‘integration’ or assimilation of 
indigenous peoples into Canada’s liberal, capitalist order would not alleviate colonial violence, 
but instead would only replicate it. In this view, then, only meaningful self-determination would 
alleviate the harm caused by colonialism, as Coulthard (2007, 2014) and Alfred (199, 2005) 
assert.  
Cairns (2000) advances a more nuanced narrative in Citizens Plus: Aboriginal Peoples 
and the Canadian State, in which he argues that indigenous groups cannot hope to be able to win 
the support of non-indigenous Canadians, or to effectively govern their communities, by 
attempting to pursue what he calls a “parallel” governance structure, which others have referred 
to as a “nation-to-nation” approach (Abele and Prince, 2006). Rather, Cairns argues, they will 
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have to accept limited governance within the confines of Canadian Federalism in order to be able 
to function as viable communities. Cairns echoes Flanagan’s charge that the best path forward 
for indigenous peoples lies in their acquiescence to Canada’s institutional landscape in its current 
form, or their integration within society, coupled with the abolition of any special status or any 
financial assistance from the Canadian state. Cairns espouses the “middle ground” between full 
assimilation and indigenous sovereignty. In his review, Christie (2002) rejects this view of 
indigenous aspirations, and raises the possibility that authors like Cairns and Flanagan are not 
truly concerned with the uplifting of indigenous peoples, nor the restoration of their dignity in 
the wake of colonial violence. Rather, as the writings of Coulthard (2007, 2014) and Alfred 
(1999, 2005) suggest, these types of arguments aim to replicate the colonial order.  
While Cairns and Flanagan stress integration and assimilation, Newhouse (2000) focuses 
on the politics of adaptation. Newhouse asks how traditional indigenous values, such as wisdom, 
humility, and sharing, can be applied in a modern capitalist context, and attempts to describe an 
indigenous society in which capitalism is adapted to fit into an indigenous worldview. This 
involves taking a broader view of community development and wealth distribution than is 
typically discussed in the context of a liberal capitalist order (2000; 59). Newman’s argument is a 
blended culturalist and classical liberal approach, which contrasts with those of Cairns and 
Flanagan, who stress the primacy of the individual and shun the notion of culturally appropriate 
forms of capitalism. Newman also contrasts with Alfred and Corntassel (2005), who stress the 
importance of indigenous resurgence, rather than adaptation, as the key to indigenous survival. 
Coulthard (2007, 2014) holds that indigenous survival is fundamentally at odds with modern 
capitalism. Coulthard (2007, 2014), Alfred (1999, 2005), Flanagan (2000), and Cairns (2000) all 
agree on one key point: That indigenous resurgence and indigenous self-determination stand at 
odds with modern capitalism and the Canadian state. The latter two simply hold that assimilation 
is the path forward, while the former favor indigenous resurgence. This assertion places them at 
odds with the works of Newhouse (2000), Alcantara and Nelles (2014, 2016), and Wilson and 
Alcantara (2012), all of whom have suggested that modern liberal capitalism, if properly blended 
into indigenous cultures, can produce benefits to indigenous communities, and are thus not 
fundamentally at odds with the well being of indigenous communities.  
This debate pertains to our research question, because the relationship between 
indigenous communities and modern capitalism or modern federalism are central to the question 
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of whether, and how, policy and governance can be mobilized to the betterment of indigenous 
communities within a federalist, capitalist system. Put another way, the research questions ask:  
if indigenous communities have suffered at the hands of a capitalist, colonial system, how might 
their relationship with that system differ today from what went before? If Indigenous 
communities have been able work within a federalist, capitalist system to enact policies that 
benefit their people, how have they been able to do so? Section 2.3.3 further examines two 
proposed models in which indigenous groups might work within modern federalism to pursue 
their own policy initiatives and transform their communities.  
2.3.3 Multilevel Governance and Treaty federalism  
Each of the perspectives mentioned so far have been concerned with whether – and how - 
Indigenous communities establish SG within their communities, or with how their SG 
agreements or implementation influence outcomes. Cornell and Kalt (2007), as well as Alcantara 
(2008), Papillon (2015), and Rodon (2014), discuss both the ambient institutional determinants 
of both whether or not communities achieve SG (See Alcantara, 2007, 2008, 2013), and some of 
the new ways in which communities govern, and whether or not such governments are successful 
in achieving their policy goals. Several authors, such as Papillon (2015), Wilson, Alcantara, and 
Rodon (2015), and Alcantara and Nelles (2014, 2016) are concerned with the rising importance 
of multilevel governance (MLG) for the governance of indigenous communities. MLG refers to 
the complex network of political, social, and economic linkages between local and regional 
indigenous governments and non-indigenous local governments, federal, provincial, and 
territorial governments, other organizations, and international entities, in the creation and use of 
public policy or the control of territory and resources. MLG includes the rise of Inuit corporate 
governance in the Canadian arctic. Wilson and Alcantara (2012) discuss the importance of Inuit 
development corporations not only as political and economic actors in Inuit affairs, but as 
transformative agents in helping prepare Inuit regions for SG. They do this by creating economic 
infrastructure, in the form of services and economic development, which foster the building of 
local and regional capacity10.  
                                                
10 When Inuit regions formally begin SG they often enter into complex power-sharing relationships with regional 
development corporations, where jurisdictional ambiguities, and conflicts over allocation of funding, are common. 
For instance, in Nunavut, most resource royalties are managed by the Nunavut Tuungavik Corporation, but public 
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The study of MLG is concerned with the ways in which local or regional governments 
cooperate, or how they collide, with other levels and orders of government, or with organizations 
outside of government, as they negotiate their specific policy-making powers, and the scope of 
those powers. Studying MLG ultimately means examining the activities of a network of 
indigenous organizations and governments and their interactions with the Canadian state 
(Wilson, Alcantara, and Rodon, 2015). As Alcantara and Nelles (2014) argue, however, MLG is 
more narrowly defined as “a process of political decision-making in which governments engage 
with a broad range of actors embedded in different territorial scales to pursue collaborative 
solutions to complex problems” (Wilson, Alcantara, and Rodon, 2015, 46). MLG is important in 
contemporary scholarship because it takes a more complex and nuanced view of indigenous 
governance, treating it as an ecosystem of actors, rather than a discreet, adversarial interaction 
between indigenous groups and the Canadian State. Alcantara and Nelles (2014) argue that the 
presence of MLG can be identified through three criteria: actors, scales, and the nature of the 
decision-making process. This is useful as it provides a discrete understanding of where MLG is, 
and is not, occurring.  
The study of MLG espouses a broader view of governance that is largely absent in the 
study of Treaty Federalism, an important model of indigenous governance developed in the late 
20th century that is no longer widely discussed in its original form. Treaty federalism is a concept 
that explicitly defines negotiated treaties, historical or modern, between indigenous groups and 
other sovereign entities as constitutional documents (Bear Robe, 1992). The concept emerged in 
response to the proliferation of modern treaties, and the re-emergence of indigenous 
governments as modern political entities with discreet powers. Its proponents called for newly 
negotiated CCLCs, like the historical treaties of the 19th and early 20th centuries, to be treated as 
constitutional documents between two sovereign powers that clearly defined areas of jurisdiction 
or shared responsibility.  
The concept faded as violations of negotiated treaties became more common, and 
complex networks of legal and political processes ensued. Today’s institutional arrangement is 
better described in terms of MLG as this reflects the reality that treaties are not likely to be fully 
honoured or implemented on their own, and networks of partnerships, legal frameworks, and 
                                                                                                                                                       
services are the responsibility of the public government (Government of Nunavut). This causes disagreement over 
how the monies controlled by the corporation should be used to benefit Inuit.  
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corporate arrangements help to solidify indigenous governance power (Wilson, Alcantara and 
Rodon, 2015). This complex institutional landscape shapes the ongoing evolution of policy and 
governance in indigenous communities, particularly at the moment when a community 
transitions to SG, meaning that understanding this landscape is crucial to understanding whether, 
and how, a move to SG has yielded positive policy outcomes in a community.  
2.3.4 Finding Common Ground  
This chapter argues that two viewpoints found in the literature are juxtaposed with 
institutionalist explanations: the classical liberal and critical perspectives. The classical liberal 
interpretation holds that indigenous peoples should be treated as individuals, equal before the 
law, and able to exercise their rights as individuals, while not receiving special rights or 
considerations (see Cairns, 2000, and Flanagan, 2000). This vision is best facilitated by the full 
integration of indigenous communities within Canadian federalism. As identified earlier, this 
viewpoint fails to adequately account for the ongoing influence of history in indigenous 
governance (Alfred and Corntassel, 2005, Cornell and Kalt, 2007, Bissonnette, 2006, Coulthard, 
2007, 2014), and thus it fails to propose a viable solution, since ignoring history and treating 
indigenous peoples as individuals is unlikely to address ongoing colonial ills (Christie, 2002; 
Coulthard, 2007, 2014). The postmodern, or critical perspective takes an opposite approach, 
holding that indigenous groups will need to continue to assert their right to self-determination, 
that they cannot achieve true freedom by cooperating with the Canadian state, and that their 
interests are at odds with liberal capitalism Canadian federalism (Alfred and Corntassel, 2005; 
Coulthard, 2007; 2014).  
In contrast to the opposing understandings of governance presented above, blending 
rational choice, historical, and cultural institutionalisms provides a more helpful framework for 
complex analysis of specific cases that have been able to establish functioning governments. The 
blended approach helps us to understand both the behavior of different groups as rational actors, 
in the negotiation process and in the process of governance, and also the importance of history 
and path-dependency in determining the often-narrow array of options communities face in 
determining how to govern. A culturalist institutionalist approach, which holds that individuals 
and communities cannot be separated from their cultural background (Taylor and Hall, 1996), is 
also helpful. A culturalist approach helps us understand why it is necessary for communities to 
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prioritize cultural revitalization, rather than simply focus on material concerns. Research has 
showed that a sense of cultural continuity is crucial to overall well-being, and thus cannot be 
discounted by policymakers (Chandler and Lalonde 1998). While these three approaches can 
often be at odds, offering seemingly conflicting interpretations of human motivation, they can be 
used in tandem in an effort to understand indigenous governance more complexly. It is also 
crucial to acknowledge the importance of MLG, understanding that disparate, non-governmental, 
and often informal or semi-formal political cooperatives are as important as official political 
channels in shaping governance. Governance is shaped by a complex networks of actors, so 
weaving the concept of MLG into an institutionalist framework is essential for capturing a 
complete understanding of governance, particularly how diverse actors have impacted the ability 
of local governments to improve outcomes over time.   
2.4 What is Governance?  
2.4.1 Defining and Analyzing Governance 
Governance is typically understood as the operation or activities of governing, while 
government is the apparatus that enacts governance, including people or institutions (Fukuyama, 
2013). Government, whether that of a state, or a local self-government, would therefore be an 
instrument of governance. Fukuyama defines governance as “a government’s ability to enforce 
rules and to deliver services” (p. 350) a definition accounting only for the activities of 
government. Fukuyama justifies the definition by highlighting an interest in “infrastructural” 
rather than despotic power. His analysis is thus applicable to SG despite his focus on state 
governance, since he is concerned with bureaucratic capacity and freedom, more so than raw 
executive power. Further, Fukuyama suggests that there is a relationship between governance 
and democracy. He also points out the connection between governance as implementation and 
the normative ends of government. It is difficult to disentangle good government from effective 
government, and yet few would claim that effective tyranny is good governance. This insight is 
also valuable, because modern governance for Canada’s indigenous communities so often 
amounts to implementation of land claims, thus the affirmed rights of the group become an 
underpinning of community governance. Fukuyama’s most important discussion relates to 
capacity, and its connection with bureaucratic output. Noting a parabolic relationship between 
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bureaucratic autonomy and quality of governance, he further connects these to government 
capacity. The greater the capacity, the more autonomy boosts government quality. Capacity in 
this case would, of course, be determined by fiscal resources, institutional makeup, and expertise. 
For an indigenous government, this could include taxation and resource revenues, an institutional 
arrangement that works for the community, and an ability to build a capable bureaucracy. 
Autonomy and capacity are each important determinants of governance effectiveness.  
Aucoin (2012) and Fukuyama (2010) each note the rising importance in Westminster 
Parliaments, particularly since the 1980’s, of governance through public administration rather 
than public policy. By discussing the threat of politicization of the roles of traditionally non-
political public servants, Aucoin highlights an important determinant of the successful operation 
of governance – the quality of public servants, and the preservation of their political impartiality. 
This phenomenon coincides with the critical juncture discussed earlier and it, too, has helped 
lead to new opportunities for indigenous communities. Such developments signal that although 
policy that addresses community concerns is important for indigenous communities in Canada, 
attention to the operation and arrangement of government is also necessary. Bevir, Rhodes, and 
Weller (2003) outline a changing role of the public sector, and the shifting emphasis toward what 
they call New Public Management – or the rising emphasis on the administrative capacity of 
public servants. They highlight the impact of globalization and the hollowing out of the state, 
which could affect the funding arrangements and political autonomy of indigenous SG in 
Canada. As global economies increasingly integrate and governments meld, indigenous 
governments may struggle to safeguard cultural heritage and administrative autonomy. The risk 
posed by globalization underscores the importance for indigenous governments to promote 
policy capacity and safeguard political autonomy. 
A working definition of governance supports the creation of a framework with which to 
determine whether and how local governance institutions succeed in carrying out processes or 
functions of governance for communities. The Institute on Governance provides a valuable 
model for defining and analyzing governance that focuses on serving communities and building 
policy capacity. 
“Governance determines who has power, who makes the decisions, how other players 
make their voices heard, and how account is rendered. Governance is how society, or 
Evolving Governance Merrell 42 
groups within it, organize to make decisions” [emphasis added] (IoG, Defining 
Governance, 2018). 
The IoG definition steps beyond government by highlighting both the need for wider 
participation and accountability, and how society as a whole organizes in order to pursue policy. 
The IoG stresses 3 core items to consider when evaluating governance: the decision-making 
process itself, who influences decision-making, and their accountability to the public. In this 
thesis, determining good governance will turn on the Five Principles introduced in Chapter 1, 
based on the principles of the United Nations Development Programme: legitimacy of voice, 
direction, performance, accountability, and fairness. These principles serve as a scaffold when 
evaluating governance, whether through policy or administration, within indigenous 
communities. They are especially useful because they are geared toward capacity-building.  
Legitimacy of voice is defined as the degree to which members of the public have a 
voice, or control in decision making that affects their lives. It can be measured by asking whether 
the public have input into the policy process, where power is located, how conflicting interests 
are managed, and whether policy is locally determined. Direction has to do with the strategic 
direction a government is taking, and is further divided into two categories: strategic vision on 
policy and strategic vision on good government. The former is concerned with whether those in 
power have a clear vision for shaping the machinery of government, while the latter is concerned 
with whether there is a clear vision on the direction of policy. The word Strategic is used here to 
describe a decision process that includes long term planning and considers diverse challenges. 
Performance refers to the actual “success”, or progress of a government in both achieving 
strategic objectives and serving its people. It is divided into two parts: effectiveness of 
representative democracy, and the delivery of policy. An evaluation of representativeness, 
followed by an analysis of three key policy areas is used to measure effectiveness. 
Accountability and Transparency, the fourth theme, are determined by measuring the 
accountability of government to the public11, and the degree to which the public has access to 
both government officials and information about the activities of government. Lastly, Fairness, 
which is divided into equity and rule of law, is measured. Equity refers to equal opportunity for 
                                                
11 Accountability is further determined by the presence of sanctions and controls on the activities of government 
officers, and the presence of democratic pressures. Spicer (2017) proposes a model for measuring accountability of 
local governments, to one another and to the public, by quantifying these factors using a scoring system. 
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all irrespective of demographic attributes, while rule of law creates public confidence that rules 
will be applied fairly across the population.  
Governance literature thus points to a working definition that focuses on the enactment of 
government, and the management of resources – natural, human, and political. Although this 
dissertation focuses on the notion of government through policy that addresses community 
needs, the case studies also give attention to administration, or the structure and operation of 
policy delivery. The project of empowering indigenous SG is partly concerned with re-
indigenizing the constitutions and institutions that deliver policy, and this process is evident in 
the people and mechanisms of delivery12. In light of this, Fukuyama’s model of analysis, based 
on capacity and government autonomy, applies to SG in Canada. Indigenous communities are 
constrained by the Canadian state in terms of policy options, but also must act within their 
respective capacities. A tension is created where the bureaucratic red tape in the model, usually 
imposed by the Federal Government, would constrain the executive purview of the local 
government, whereas an increase in capacity would push autonomy, and discretionary power, 
further. Simultaneously, greater autonomy creates new opportunities to build capacity in 
communities. Considering the salience of the accountability dimension of governance evaluation 
(IoG, 2018; Wilson & Alcantara, 2014), this tension between imposed red tape and perfect 
discretion for indigenous SG becomes difficult to navigate. Indigenous governments must have 
the autonomy to operate, innovate, and enact homegrown policy alternatives, but must also be 
sufficiently accountable to the local community.  
2.4.2 Examining Indigenous Governance 
Abele and Prince offer a useful model for understanding SG in Canada, outlining four 
basic pathways to SG for indigenous communities. Each of these pathways, except the fourth, is 
shaped and constrained by institutional arrangements within Canadian Federalism. The first 
pathway, called the “mini-municipalities” approach, involves band councils functioning with a 
similar scope of powers to that of small incorporated municipalities. Typical powers at this level 
could include basic public works, municipal revenue-raising powers such as property taxation, 
and community programs. Under the authority of the Indian Act, bands typically do not have tax-
                                                
12 For instance, Nunatsiavut practices Inuit-style consensus government in its Assembly, and also requires the 
Assembly President to speak Labrador Inuttitut; both policies are emblematic of NG’s mandate to preserve Inutittut 
language and Inuit culture (NG website, 2018). 
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raising powers unless they create a land code13. As Abele and Prince note, most communities 
operating this way would not want it as an endpoint, since it offers only limited autonomy, and 
would prefer to change pathways, despite institutional barriers in doing so. Figure 2.1 shows a 
visualization of this model blended with the principal-agent model, showing that an indigenous 
community government is both a principal and an agent, but acting with limited power to change 
outcomes. In this figure, the solid arrows denote power or authority while the dotted arrows 
denote influence. MFN is closest to this form of government, but it has a much more elaborate 
policy agenda and greater control of health and education than municipalities normally would.  
Figure 2.1: The principal-agent relationship and “mini-municipalities” 
	 Reciprocal	
influence	 	 Top-down influence 	
Community	
Members	 	 First	Nation/Inuit		community	government	 	 Provincial	and	federal	
governments	
	
	 	 	 	 	 	
Principal	 	 Agent		 Principal		 	 Agent	
The next level, “adapted federalism” involves an indigenous polity being integrated 
within the federal system, as exemplified by the creation of the territory of Nunavut. This type of 
government functions much as a territorial government does, with limited provincial powers and 
often dependence on federal transfers. “Adapted federalism” allows a limited scope of 
indigenous autonomy and permits a recognition of rights approach under the Government of 
Canada’s Inherent Right Policy14. The first two pathways fit seamlessly into Canadian federalism 
in its current form. Figure 2.2 shows the relationship, again blended. Note the relatively greater 
local power. NG fits best into this category, as it is a regional government with quasi-provincial 
powers. However, because it is a regional government within a province, it could exist on the 
line between a municipality and a territory, or between a territory and another order of 
government, depending on how much influence it is able to exercise.  
                                                
13 Under the First Nations Land Management Act, which sets out provisions for communities under the Indian Act to 
negotiate a land code with the federal government, allowing them to fully govern their own lands.  
14 The Inherent Right Policy was a policy first launched by the Government of Canada in 1995 to guide SG 
negotiations with indigenous communities. It is conceptually rooted in the idea that indigenous groups have the 
inherent right to govern themselves, and is legally rooted in section 35 of the Constitution Act of 1982, which 
guarantees recognition of treaty rights to indigenous peoples.  
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Abele and Prince next describe a third order of government, “trilateral federalism” in 
which the interests of indigenous groups across the country are represented by several national 
organizations, such as the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) and Inuit Tapirisat Kanatami (ITK). 
This regime would grant these organizations an array of powers, in terms of lawmaking and 
enforcement, revenue-raising, and service delivery, that equal or supersede provincial powers, 
thus transforming them into a third order of government. This model is a desirable option 
because it gives indigenous groups a large powerful organization to act on their behalf, but is 
difficult to attain as it requires a significant alteration of federalism. Lastly, Abele and Prince 
discuss the Nation–to-Nation arrangement that is advocated in much of the literature, both in 
Canada and internationally (Abele and Prince, 2006; Cornell and Kalt, 2006; Cornell, 2015). The 
latter two components of the Abele and Prince typology better match the second approach to 
indigenous governance discussed by Cornell and Kalt (2007), the Nation-building model, 
because they afford greater autonomy and a better path to self-determination for indigenous 
groups. Per the discussion of path dependency above, changing course while already on one of 
these pathways can be daunting, but some groups may attempt to adopt a new pathway if the 
current path is undesirable. Figures B1 and B2, appended, show the latter two arrangements. 
Alcantara and Davidson (2015) discuss the dichotomy, found in indigenous governments 
in Canada, between public governments and limited-membership governments. Public 
government describes a situation such as Nunavut, where an Inuit-dominated government 
administers a whole territory, serving all residents, Inuit or not. A First Nation, such as MFN, 
would be considered “limited membership” since it provides services predominantly for band 
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members and only band members may vote. Nunatsiavut, on the other hand, would be 
considered a hybrid between the two, since it provides a full range of services to Labrador Inuit 
Land Claims beneficiaries within the land claims area, but also provides limited services to 
beneficiaries living outside of the claims area, and provides some services to non-beneficiaries 
living both within and outside of the land claims area. Only beneficiaries, whether living inside 
or outside the Settlement Area, may vote in NG elections. “Public government” is sometimes 
preferable to “limited membership”, but only in a relatively large political unit and only if the 
indigenous population found there is sufficiently large, otherwise, As Rodon notes, “indigenous 
political power becomes too dilute to democratically address unique indigenous needs” (2014, 
pp. 252).   
2.4.3 Toward a comprehensive definition 
This dissertation favors a more comprehensive definition of Indigenous SG than that 
offered by the Government of Canada (2019). The latter considers a community to have SG if it 
has a formal SG agreement with the Crown, which is said to provide “greater autonomy and self-
reliance for communities than would be permitted under the Indian Act” [emphasis added]. The 
federal Government also emphasizes a fiscal financing arrangement for SG that is partly based 
on own-source-revenue. (Government of Canada website, 2017).  Instead, this thesis favours an 
understanding of SG that respects local initiatives and includes such elements as intra-
jurisdictional relationships, described by Alcantara and Wilson (2014), Inuit corporate 
governance, such as in Nunavik and the Inuvialuit Settlement area (Wilson & Alcanatara, 2012), 
MLG, environmental governance and resource development, and also more informal modes of 
government, as components of SG.  I promote a definition that captures the operationalization of 
governance in a community, though the analysis focuses on particular policy elements. Further, 
although I use the term SG, the dissertation also challenges the use of the term as such. SG 
would intuitively refer to any duly elected government in a federalist system that has authority 
over an array of policy areas, but currently the literature on indigenous SG refers only to those 
communities that have some form of SG agreement. Given that the term is not applied to non-
indigenous communities in Canada, this paper thus advances the idea that indigenous SG is 
simply indigenous government.  
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Despite the important role of public administration in governance, this thesis 
acknowledges the salience of government by policy. There is a strong basis in the literature for 
understanding Indigenous SG through either a policy lens or a public administration lens. 
Alcantara and Wilson (2014), for instance, highlight the importance of intra-jurisdictional 
relations in understanding governance in Inuit communities. By examining the relationship 
between the Government of Nunavut and Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI), the authors 
highlight a critical tension in Canadian arctic governance: the overlapping responsibilities of 
public governments and ethnic organizations that specifically represent, for instance, Inuit. The 
choice to implement public government in Nunavut has a lasting impact on the evolution of SG, 
since NG controls public funds and expenditures, while NTI controls funds from the Land 
Claims agreement. Likewise, the decision by Nunatsiavut Government (NG) to form a 
membership-based government will have a lasting impact on the evolution of SG there. 
Conversely, Daley et al. (2015) and Cater (2015), both conduct a discussion that is more policy-
based. Daley et al, discusses the impacts of failing water and sanitation systems and associated 
health concerns in various arctic communities15, while Cater examines the impacts of mining 
policy, an important topic in the field of environmental governance. These two articles examine 
governance as it relates to policy delivery. 
The two case studies in this dissertation, though they differ substantially, have a few 
salient policy areas that overlap. Both have challenges regarding housing and employment, 
which they have implemented innovative solutions to address. Like most indigenous 
communities in Canada, both communities also have concerns about language and culture 
retention, with both Labrador Inuktitut and the Newfoundland Mi’kmaq dialect in serious danger 
of language shift, (Andersen and Johns, 2005, Jeddore, 2000). Later empirical chapters will 
outline the apparatus of policy delivery as well as policy itself, by including community 
members’ remarks on the structures and processes of local government, as well as those 
concerning government activities. Their thoughts on policy implementation and outcomes will be 
at the fore, however, because policy outcomes are the real substance of a government’s 
accomplishments. 
                                                
15  There have been water crises in both case studies. Conne River has a compromised water sanitation system and 
had a boil water advisory for over two years, although that was lifted in 2018. Hopedale, in Nunatsiavut, has serious 
water distribution problems due to the unyielding bedrock and freezing temperatures, the combination of which 
causes frequent line breaches and shutdowns.  
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2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the literature on the evolution of indigenous SG in Canada, 
showcasing numerous theoretical approaches to examining SG. We began by introducing the 
institutionalisms, as they form the baseline for analysis of SG. Rational Choice Institutionalism 
was presented as the central mode of analysis for indigenous SG, as it offers a robust analysis of 
the behavior of indigenous groups as rational actors and as agents of their communities. 
Historical institutionalism focuses on how group behavior is shaped by the institutional 
constraints imposed by history, which has created a sense of path dependency. Two other 
theoretical frameworks were examined and juxtaposed: postmodern or critical, and classical 
liberal, but these perspectives are less useful in understanding community governance. MLG is 
identified as an important development in indigenous governance that could have significant 
potential for transforming many communities. The shortcomings of the institutionalisms are then 
presented in view of Culturalist explanations of the behavior of indigenous groups, which offers 
an alternative rationale for the push for SG that centers on the need for cultural revitalization in 
developing a sense of nationhood. Culturalists argue that it is important to examine cultural 
influences on the structure and activities of governments, not simply their economic priorities. 
Governance is defined as the ability of a government to enforce rules and provide services, as 
well as have legitimacy of voice and provide representation. With this definition in mind, the 
Five Principles are identified as useful in the analysis and evaluation of governance structures. 
Lastly, Indigenous SG in Canada is defined and analyzed, which generates a typology that 
highlights the methods and pathways of SG found in the literature. Ultimately, a more 
comprehensive definition of SG than that used by the Government of Canada is proposed, which 
focuses on the inputs and outcomes of governments, rather than the official agreements they 
have in place.  
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes how the data used in this thesis are gathered and analyzed, how I 
justify and execute my case selection, and the metrics I use to answer my research questions. I 
end the chapter with a review of the three hypotheses and a description of how they are 
operationalized in the coming chapters.  
3.2 Research design 
This thesis combines empirical analysis of data on social indicators and a qualitative 
analysis using the comparative method. This combined method is useful because statistical 
analysis provides an empirical foundation for claims made about the social and economic 
benefits of SG, while the comparison of two in-depth case studies allows a richer understanding 
of how changes happen in particular cases across time. The research design proceeds in two 
stages. First, a quantitative analysis shows improvements in key socio-economic indicators in 
each of the communities examined, presented in Chapter 4. This quantitative analysis is followed 
by comparative case studies that each conducts a qualitative analysis of governance in the two 
cases (Chapters 5 and 6). Chapter 4 provides a longitudinal analysis using data from the 
Community Well Being Index (CWB), which consists of five scores, presented for each census 
year beginning in 1981 (Government of Canada, 2017). This is done to demonstrate that 
communities that practice SG improve outcomes faster than those that do not across an 
established time- marker. The five scores are based on education level, household income, 
employment, and housing, and the final score is a combined “community well-being” score. 
Chapter 4 uses a longitudinal analysis, using data from the years 1981, 1996, 2001, and 2016. 
Examining these indices longitudinally allows indicators to be empirically traced and can point 
to improvements in community policy outcomes. The chapter also draws on INAC’s (2017) list 
of self-governing indigenous communities, to establish which of the indigenous communities 
listed in the CWB can be considered self-governing for the purposes of this analysis.  
The case studies featured in chapters 5 and 6 employ Mill’s Most Different Systems 
method, examining the major contextual differences between the communities of the Miawpukek 
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Mi’kmaq and the Labrador Inuit, and then tracing the similarly preferable governance outcomes - 
as described by participants and through examination of policy outcomes. To measure the 
presence of positive community outcomes over time, I use a separate time-marker for each case:  
1987 for MFN and 2006 for NG. Through semi-structured elite interviews, combined with other 
sources, the case studies trace improvements in policy outcomes after the respective time-marker 
as compared to before it. The richness of this interview data helps to explain the improvements 
in housing, employment, income, and language and culture retention found in each case. 
Performance in three key policy areas is measured to help determine SG success in the two 
cases: language and culture revitalization, employment, and housing. These policy areas were 
chosen because they are, historically, salient issues in each of the communities visited for the 
study, and because NG and MFN each have policy agenda to address these three areas. 
Indicators for employment and housing are also featured in the CWB.  
Both MFN and Nunatsiavut have, like many indigenous communities in Canada, suffered 
from language loss (Hot, 2009, Andersen and Johns, 2005; Jeddore, 2000), and have experienced 
culture loss as a result of colonial laws (Metatawabin, 2014, Dickason, 2009, Bartels and Bartels, 
2005, Heritage Newfoundland and Labrador, 2018). The issue is particularly salient in the case 
studies due to the legacy ignorance and erasure of indigenous identity during Newfoundland’s 
colonial period, which led Newfoundland’s indigenous population being at elevated risk of 
culture loss and language shift (Andersen & Johns, 2005; Wetzel, 1995; Bartels & Bartels, 
2005). Both MFN and NG have comprehensive housing strategies designed to address issues 
with housing shortages, and both have divergent but sensible plans in place to improve 
employment outcomes. Of course, there are other salient policy matters present in indigenous 
communities, such as health care and education, but NG has not yet drawn down its mandated 
powers to operate healthcare services and schools (Alcantara, 2018; Labrador Inuit Constitution 
Act, NG, 2005; Government of Canada, 2017). More on the three policy areas, the time-markers, 
and the definition of good governance (IoG website, 2018) as modes of analysis will be 
discussed in section 3.5.  
3.3 Case Selection  
The selection of the two cases conforms to the Most Different Systems (MDS) 
methodology often used in comparative studies. Derived from John Stuart Mill’s Method of 
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Agreement, the MDS design requires two cases that differ greatly from one another contextually, 
yet both experience favorable results through SG when compared with other communities, 
implicating some common factor between them (in this case practices associated with SG). The 
cases constitute a natural experiment which, using the MDS, allows a comparison of outcomes. 
Despite great contextual differences, MFN and Nunatsiavut have been able to achieve similarly 
favorable results, and have done so through successful strategies such as housing programs. In 
the chosen cases, the successful strategies in question would be greater autonomy in governance 
and more home-grown initiatives in the three areas of inquiry: language and culture 
revitalization, housing, and employment.  
Despite being indigenous communities in the same province, MFN and the communities 
in Nunatsiavut differ greatly. Nunatsiavut communities are near-arctic communities, making 
their challenges similar to those faced by arctic communities across Canada: Limited 
infrastructure, high shipping costs, unreliable weather, and disproportionate effects from climate 
change causing significant environmental disruption (Durkalec et al., 2015; Brinkman et al., 
2016; Nunavut Climate Change Center, 2018). All of these factors create or exacerbate issues 
like inadequate healthcare delivery and food insecurity. MFN only received Indian status in the 
1980’s (Bartels and Bartels, 2005), but is formally administered under the Indian Act today.16 
Although it lacks the characteristics of an arctic environment, its remoteness still limits access to 
certain services. Labrador Inuit communities differ greatly from MFN both linguistically and 
culturally, since the former are arctic-dwelling Inuit communities and the latter is a Mi’kmaq 
community whose members are Status Indians. MFN also has road access, making it more 
accessible than communities on Labrador’s north coast, but it still faces the numerous challenges 
associated with being a remote community, such as the cost of food and other goods. While 
Nunatsiavut has had a modern treaty and a SG agreement with the Crown since 2005, MFN 
currently sits at the un-ratified Final Agreement stage, despite advancements in Housing, 
employment, and education policy. The communities differ in terms of resource access; 
Nunatsiavut is the beneficiary of an impacts-benefits agreement (IBA) with, the operator of 
Voisey's Bay Mine, has large-scale harvesting rights along the Labrador coast. MFN, meanwhile, 
has a limited resource base on reserve land and is lacking in its own source revenue. Nunatsiavut 
                                                
16 Nunatsiavut, on the other hand, is an Inuit government. Recall that the Inuit are not Status Indians and are not 
administered under the Indian Act.  
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consists of numerous communities, with a total population exceeding 2000 (NG website, 2018), 
while MFN is a single FN band, with an on-reserve population of 920 (MFN website, 2018; 
Government of Canada, 2018). These key contextual differences, in politics, culture, climate, 
infrastructure, and size, are important because they can show how two cases that are contextually 
divergent can still sometimes utilize similar governance strategies in key policy areas in order to 
improve indicators.  
The two cases thus differ greatly, but with key commonalities: Both have implemented 
SG practices17 that have produced favorable results (NG website, 2018; MFN website, 2018; 
CWB, 2018). Both have generated strategies and seen improvements in the 3 policy areas listed 
above. Despite having largely divergent paths forward, the two cases have utilized similar policy 
instruments to foster improvements, suggesting that similar strategies could be utilized elsewhere 
to address similar types of problems. Additionally, the two communities are a sensible pair for 
analysis because despite vast differences, they are both situated in the province of Newfoundland 
and Labrador, a late joiner to confederation, giving them a historical experience that is quite 
unique from their counterparts’ experiences in the rest of Canada. 
3.4 Data collection 
3.4.1 Interviews 
A series of semi-structured, elite interviews (scripts found in Appendix C) form the 
primary data source for each case study. Because they are in-depth, guided, and open-ended, 
semi-structured interviews are an effective tool in generating the richness necessary for a case 
study. Writes Lynch:  
“Well-conducted interviews give access to information about respondents’ experiences and 
motivations that may not be available in the public or documentary record; they allow us to 
understand opinions and thought processes with a granularity that surveys rarely achieve; and 
they add microfoundations to events or patterns observed at the macro level. (2013, pp, 37). 
                                                
17 Recall that Conne River, the name of the community situated within the Miawpukek First Nation reserve, has so 
far done so informally. There is an Agreement in Principle for SG, but it is currently suspended. In recent decades, 
Conne River has often operated outside the Indian Act and pursued its own approach to local government.  
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The attributes described above are especially crucial here as the documentary record on 
both history and governance in small, remote communities is often incomplete. Such 
communities also have unique experiences in the evolution of their governance structures. When 
analyzed with the TNA method described in section 3.5.4, these interviews provide robust, 
granular evidence of the evolution of governance in the communities under study.  
Political scientists commonly assume that qualitative analysis is best for depth and 
meaning, while quantitative is preferable for reliability and broad generalization. Gallagher call 
this “a false dichotomy. Accurate measurement requires understanding the meaning, and context, 
of the social phenomenon one is studying. Conversely, the ability to convey meaning is more 
powerful when one can make confident statements about how far and wide one’s findings travel 
and the limitations or constraints of the research” (2001, 181). Gallagher thus makes a robust 
case for the mixed-methods approach used in this thesis. As Gallagher notes, semi-structured 
interviews are most effective when used with triangulation, defined as the process of using 
alternative sources of information to supplement or corroborate the primary set of information. In 
keeping with the mixed approach, this thesis not only uses media and government reports as a 
source of primary data to inform the policy analysis, but also as a fact-checker for the interviews. 
This is effective because some factual claims made by interviewees in this study are inaccurate, 
yet participants’ overall feelings about their communities are still important.  
Non-random sampling was used to recruit interviews for the interviews. Random 
sampling is generally not required for designs that are interpretivist, or descriptive in nature, and 
instead a process of selecting or approaching certain individuals who would have specific 
knowledge (in this case on governance) is appropriate (Lynch 2001; King, Keohane and Verba, 
1996). Participants were recruited in collaboration with both NG and MFN, which enabled me to 
use both purposive recruiting and snowballing. I began by sharing an invitation to participate in 
the study on local message boards and online. I also used word of mouth to attract participants. 
Each person I interviewed was asked to suggest additional individuals who might like to 
participate and those individuals were invited to contact me if they wish. Through this technique, 
I was able to interview a total of 46 participants: 14 in Conne River, and 32 in Nunatsiavut. 
Nunatsiavut is sampled more heavily because the population is larger than that of Conne River, 
and Nunatsiavut Government is a complex regional government as opposed to a community 
government. Table 3.1 shows a breakdown of information on the interview recruiting process, 
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including the total population of each community, how many agreed to an interview, how many 
government vs non-government officials were at the time of interview. Additionally, all values 
are broken down by gender to demonstrate that care was taken to achieve reasonably gender-
representative results.  
3.4.2 Other data 
Other data used for this study include laws, such as NG’s Elections Act, Agreements, 
such as the LICLA, media reports, and data from the CWB (Government of Canada, 2019). The 
case studies use policy documents, such as the Impact Benefit Agreement for the Voisey’s Bay 
site, internal records on housing and employment programs for each case18, obtained through an 
access to information request. Another source of data is Hansard or records of decision for each 
government, available publicly through the respective websites (MFN website, 2018; NG 
website, 2018). Information from these sources will be woven together  
Table 3.1: participants recruited, by gender, occupation, and community19 










(NG) Male  1230 22 11 11 
 Female 1130 10 6 4 
 Total  
2360 (Statistics 
Canada, 2016) 32 17 15 
Miawpukek First 
Nation (MFN) Male 510 7 3 4 
 Female 445 7 2 5* 
 Total  
960 (Statistics 
Canada, 2016) 14 8 5 
  Grand total 3320  46 25 20 
* One of the women interviewed identified herself as an elder.  
                                                
18 For instance, documents from the Torngat Housing Corporation, an arms-length subsidiary of NG that administers 
programs such as the low-income housing initiative, or the housing program administered by the MFN Housing 
records 
19 Values for total population and by gender are taken from Statistics Canada’s (2016) Census Profiles on Samaijij 
Miawpukek (Conne River) and Nunatsiavut Settlement Area, respectively.  
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3.5 Data Analysis 
3.5.1 Three policy Areas 
Three policy areas will are studied in detail: cultural revitalization, housing programs, 
and employment programs. By measuring the effectiveness of policies in these areas, and 
showing statistically how they have contributed to improving indicators, and done so to a greater 
degree than what came before, SG effectiveness is demonstrated. The three policy areas will be 
evaluated according to the Five Principles of Good Governance (FPGG, IoG website, 2018), 
derived from the eight principles (UNDP Bureau for Development Policy, 2011) used by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). These principles were introduced in Chapter 
2, and their application is described below. This same system is used in this thesis to evaluate 
governance as a whole. Table 3.1, below outlines challenges for each community in each of the 
three policy areas, and notes how the areas are being addressed, thus identifying a way in which 
SG effectiveness can be measured in each case. 
Table 3.2: A policy framework in three chosen policy areas, by case study. 




- Problem: Mi’kmaq language almost extinct 
in Conne River (Jeddore, 2000) 
-  
- Problem: Labrador Inuktitut below 25% fluent 
speakers in Nunatsiavut (Statistics Canada, 2017). 
- Solution: Band controls school. Language 
training provided until Grade 3 (MFN 
website, 2018). Annual Pow Wow. 
Supporting teachers in immersion training.  
- Solution: Language Nest program available in 
Nain and Hopedale until Grade 3 (NG website, 
2018). Community Freezer initiatives provide wild 
caught food to those in need.  
Employment - Problem: Limited local industry to employ 
members.  
- Problem: Limited local industry to employ 
beneficiaries.  
- Solution: Employment Assurance Program 
achieved 100% part-time employment (MFN 
website, 2018, member interviews, 2018) 
- Band owns and operates fishing licenses and 
vessels. 
- Solution: Skills-based job training for local 
industry (eg. Voisey’s Bay Mine)  
- IBA with Vale, ltd. requires at least 50% of mine 
employees be Inuit (NG website, 2018). 
- NGC has numerous capital investments, must hire 
Inuit.  
Housing - Problem: Housing crisis on many reserves – 
crowding, waiting lists, limited resources to 
build new homes or repair damaged homes. 
- Problem: Waiting list for housing, severe shortage 
in some communities. 
- Solution: MFN Housing Authority. Pay-
what-you-can housing plan, grants and loans 
for first time buying or repairs.  
- Solution: Provide low income housing (through 
TRHA), working with federal government to 
increase funding, pilot projects to provide 
specialized housing, Assisted Living Program for 
complex needs.  
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3.5.2 The time-markers 
The time-markers selected for each case presented in this study are critical for measuring 
changes in policy outcomes over time. The 1987 marker for MFN is significant because it is the 
year MFN officially received status as a First Nation and began receiving additional resources to 
dedicate to its policy initiatives (see section 5.2.2). 1987 also marks the beginning of SG 
negotiations between MFN and the federal government20. The 2006 marker for NG is significant 
because it is the first full year that Nunatsiavut Government was in operation as a government21. 
The quantitative analysis presented in Chapter 4 demonstrates that the presence of SG is 
associated with stronger improvements, across both time markers, in the 5 metrics measured in 
the CWB, and that both Nunatsiavut and Conne River have outperformed the communities with 
SG across their respective time markers. Both case studies show that these two moments in time 
are associated with key policy innovations that helped to improve outcomes in the respective 
community. The combined approach, using a quantitative analysis and two case studies, 
generates a better understanding of what contributes to successful governance. Table 3.2, below, 
displays the relevance of the time-marker to each case study. 
Table 3.3: Measuring change in governance outcomes before and after SG  




Newfoundland Mi’kmaq formed the 
Federation of Newfoundland Indians in 
1975, fought for recognition as First 
Nations band, constructed sawmill, layed 
the foundation for policy development to 
come.  
Labrador Inuit formed the Labrador Inuit 
Association (LIA) in 1975. Begin to 
advocate for policies to better the lives of 
Labrador Inuit. In 2005, LIA finalizes 
LILCA with provincial and Federal 
governments, creating NG. 
Time-marker 1987: Received recognition as a First 
Nations Band.  
2006: Nunatsiavut becomes self-
governing 
After time-marker Began negotiations for SGA with the 
federal government. Implemented 
innovative policy initiatives to expand 
housing quality and availability and 
employment income. Launched Mi’kmaq 
language program at local school 
(Interviews, MFN website, 2017) 
NG begins to set up governance 
structures and pass laws. Launched 
employment training strategy and 
housing strategies, and Language Nest 
programs. (Interviews, NG website, 
2017) Enforces IBAs, harvesting laws. 
                                                
20 A final agreement was reached in 2013 (Government of Canada, 2017). 
21 The ratification of the Labrador Inuit Land Claims Agreement (LILCA) that created NG occurred just prior, in 
December of 2005. Finalization of the Agreement was many years in the making, and the fact that it coincides with 
UNDRIP is emblematic of a growing global consensus on indigenous rights among many nations, international 
groups, and the legal community.  
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3.5.3 Five Principles of Good Governance  
 As introduced in chapter 2, the Five Principles are: Legitimacy and Voice, Direction, 
Performance, Accountability, and Fairness. These principles are further underpinned by three 
guiding principles: who has voice in decision-making, how decisions are made, and who is 
accountable. Together these principles can be used to establish a compelling narrative as to 
whether or not good governance is happening in a particular system – in this case, community 
and regional governments. The ability to determine the presence of good governance thus 
underpins a 3-point argument that answers the research questions:   
1: At the community level, The presence of SG helps to foster good government, as 
evaluated through the Five Principles 
2: By establishing good government, self-governing communities better address community 
needs than they did 1-2 decades ago, before they were self-governing. 
3: Communities are able to improve outcomes by practicing good government, and not 
solely through own-source revenue from resource development or local industry.  
3.5.4 Thematic Network Analysis 
These three hypotheses are confirmed through analysis of whole governance structures, 
and of 3 specific policy areas, by applying Attride-Stirling’s (2001) conception of Thematic 
Network Analysis (TNA) in order to find meaningful ways to code qualitative data from 
interviews, media sources, and policy output in our two case studies. To this end, the main 
themes within this TNA will be the Five Principles introduced earlier, thus permitting these 
principles to become a template for analysis. Much of the literature notes that, although TNA is 
chiefly a qualitative coding technique, it can be considered quantitative in the sense that it treats 
words like a sampling pool and detects numbers of particular words that fit into particular 
concept categories. Such a coding technique has the ability to measurably draw characterizations 
of certain concepts out of blocks of data such as interviews or news media clippings. For 
example, a researcher can measure the number of times media says a certain word or phrase 
about a particular government action. Alternatively, one could measure how often the media is 
positive or negative about a particular action, and so on. The key is we are using words or 
phrases and relating them to particular concepts to form webs that can be thematically analyzed 
in a manner that is partly quantitative and partly not.  
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Guest, McQueen and Namey describe the use of text in qualitative/thematic analysis as a 
“proxy for experience” as opposed to an object of analysis (2012, 9). This essentially means that 
by drawing themes and other meta-information out of text, we are attempting to recreate, and 
connect with, the experiences of participants. This is why our qualitative analysis will go beyond 
simple text analysis (reconstructing narratives or analyzing conversation). In addition to these 
basic analyses of the narratives, this research will also thematically define the narratives. As a 
more interpretive form of coding, the technique will involve significant engagement by the 
researcher. The other advantage to this technique, also noted by Guest, McQueen and Namey 
(2012, 7) is that it lends itself well to an exploratory, rather than a confirmatory, research design. 
My project will incorporate aspects of both.  
I begin with several hypotheses (which would be a confirmatory feature) but the coding 
method is exploratory. That is, I constructed the exact terms and concepts to be coded into my 
thematic networks as I gathered data from constitutional analysis, policy records, and semi-
structured interviews. Such a technique allows for an adaptive research design that is both 
sensitive to community needs and able to target research goals in a precise but qualitative way. 
This is because although data are qualitative in nature22, it will contain quantitative elements. 
These elements include both the empirical analysis of INAC’s CWB data, while controlling for 
style of government, and the numerical treatment of themes drawn from interview data, found in 
the TNA. The process produces results that are at once descriptive, textured and nuanced. 
Indigenous local governance being the complex, changing, living process that it is, pure 
empirical analysis alone is not a sufficiently descriptive method.  
For the thematic network, I establish an over-arching theme, “SG as good government”. 
Thus, the “Global themes” established are derived from the IoG’s model described above. I 
subsequently introduce “organizing themes” and “basic themes” for my research, which are 
organized according to how they fit into the “global themes” The full TNA for this thesis is 
shown below, as per Attride-Sterling’s proposed design (2001, 388-89). Figure 3.1 illustrates a 
sample layout for a TNA. The TNA ultimately demonstrates whether or not good governance is, 
indeed, occurring in the two selected cases, and particularly whether each government addresses 
                                                
22 King, Keohane, and Verba (1994) describe qualitative inquiry as an attempt to understand phenomena in 
relational and evaluative way that establishes causality through determining causal mechanisms and examining them 
comparatively, rather than through empirical analysis. Pg. 84 
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the three chosen policy areas. The TNA, when taken in conjunction with numerical indicators, 
answers our research questions by demonstrating how. 
Figure 3.1 Structure of a Thematic Network.  
 
Source: Attride-Sterling, 2001, pp. 388 
 
 
The five global themes along with corresponding organizing themes used to form 
thematic networks for the purposes of this study are listed in Table 3.4 below.  
  
Evolving Governance Merrell 60 
Table 3.4: Thematic network for evaluating local governance 
Global theme Organizing theme Basic theme 
Legitimacy 
and voice 
Participation ● All community members have a voice. 
● Community members are politically engaged. 
Consensus 
orientation 
● Internal mediation of conflicting interests is effective. 
● Multilevel governance is skillfully managed. 
Power is local or 
regional 
● Drawing down of powers benefits community. 
● Public sees an important role for local government. 
● Culture is incorporated in decision-making. 
● Policy instruments are “home-grown”. 
Direction Strategic vision 
on good 
governance 
● There is strategic plan for the operation of government. 
Federalism is modified to fit community needs. 
● Democratic institutions reflect culture/local needs. 
Strategic vision 
on policy 
● There is a plan to address public concerns.  
● Cultural practices/identities are preserved. 
● Tradition and modernity are balanced. 
● Objectives are strategic/long-term. 
Performance Responsiveness ● Policy directions address community needs. 
● Members feel their concerns are heard and acted upon. 
Effectiveness and 
efficiency 
● Language loss is reduced. 
● Cultural practices are actively fostered. 
● Housing: reduced crowding/waitlists and improved quality. 
● Reduced unemployment/rising incomes. 
● Integrating cultural priorities with material priorities.  
Accountability Accountability ● Institutions function democratically (or not). 
● Government is sensitive to public preferences/needs  
● Public confidence in elections/elected members 
Transparency ● Public is aware of/ understands government activities 
● Policy/governance information is accessible 
● Public understands government structure/policy agenda 
Fairness Equity ● All members/beneficiaries have a fair chance to influence 
● Policy benefits distributed equitably and according to need 
Rule of law ● Public has confidence rules will be enforced 
● Rules are effective at maximizing welfare 
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The “basic themes” for these networks are salient themes derived from the interview 
transcripts, and have been categorized according to the Five Principles. Each trasncript is then 
analyzed to determine whether the informant agrees or disagrees with that theme at the time of 
the interview, as well as how they feel about it qualitatively. Each theme is considered with 
broader contextual factors within the community. The TNA technique determines not only what 
it is true (or most true) out of the various themes presented, but also the salience of particular 
themes relative to others. By determining both what was said pertaining to different themes – and 
how many people said it – I determine the overall attitude among local community stakeholders 
and leaders regarding particular themes. I also note how these elements are treated by provincial 
and federal government departments and the media. Thematic analysis enables us to understand 
what is going on in a community and the direction it is taking in terms of governance. By 
revealing what themes are important in analyzing governance and why, the analysis helps to 
answer our research questions: How does the operation of government in the community differ 
from what went before, and what explains any successes in policy? 
3.6 Conclusion 
This Chapter has shown the research methods for the study presented in this dissertation. 
The design begins with a quantitative analysis of community indicators to empirically defend 
both the case selection and the relationship between SG and improved policy outcomes. Next, 
two case studies are presented, each of which is made up of a review of the respective 
constitutions for the two governments, and of policy records and records of decisions for the two 
cases. These elements are placed within a Thematic Network Analysis, which is based upon the 
Five Principles of Good Governance, in order to evaluate not only government as a whole but 
performance in specific policy areas. From this, a narrative is created detailing the state of SG in 
each of the two cases.  
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Chapter 4: Measuring self-government success  
An analysis of Community Well-Being Index data for the Miawpukek First Nation and 
Nunatsiavut Government.   
4.1 Introduction 
As introduced in chapters 1 and 2, part of the impetus for indigenous communities to 
increase their autonomy and develop their own governance structures is the desire for control of 
resources and to develop their own programs to address their unique set of complex social issues 
such as poverty and housing. Ultimately, communities desire greater control over their economic 
futures (Cornell, 2015; Cornell and Kalt, 2007; Papillon, 2015).  Much has been written about 
the evolution of indigenous governance structures and practices in Canada, including individual 
communities’ level of control over their own economic futures (Alcantara and Davidson, 2016; 
Alcantara and Wilson 2014; Papillon, 2015, Rodon, 2014). Much, too, has been written about the 
economic and social impacts of economic development, especially resource development, on 
indigenous communities in Canada (Panagos, 2013, Cater, 2015; Bernauer, 2011). Less has been 
written directly linking the presence of SG in a community to its social and economic indicators. 
This chapter examines the results from the 2016 Evaluation of the Impacts of Self-Government 
Agreements Final Report carried out by the Evaluation, Performance Measurement and Review 
Branch of INAC23, which determined that, on average, both CLCAs and SGAs have positive 
effects on certain social and economic indicators in indigenous communities. Section 4.2 gives 
an overview of the socioeconomic situation in indigenous communities, while 4.3 discusses how 
the impacts of SG are measured. Section 4.4 presents a longitudinal, comparative analysis of 
CWB findings in the two communities. The section also compares the results of the findings in 
the INAC report with the CWB figures for the two case studies to show that they are, in fact, 
experiencing positive impacts as a result of achieving SG. Sections 4.5 and 4.6 discuss the results 
and limitations of the analysis.  
                                                
23 Recall that, after the publication of this report in early 2016, The Trudeau Government separated INAC into two 
departments, Crown Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada (CIRNAC) and Indigenous Services Canada 
(ISC) which each have a separate role in supporting the SG aspirations of indigenous communities.  
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4.2 Understanding the socioeconomic impacts of self-government 
The data on social and economic indicators in indigenous communities in Canada are 
clear: Most indigenous communities in the country sit significantly below the Canadian average 
scores for numerous indicators, such as those used in the CWB (Government of Canada, 2019). 
For example, 25% of indigenous people in Canada live in poverty, compared to 14% of the 
general population (Statistics Canada, 2019). A recurring question in the literature on governance 
in indigenous communities is how it could address issues of systemic poverty and other 
socioeconomic gaps. Further, these observers ask whether greater autonomy or authority for 
these communities would generate more locally appropriate policy instruments necessary 
(Frideres, 2011; Cairns, 2000, Flanagan, 2000, Cornell and Kalt, 2007). Numerous authors have 
examined the economic and social travails of particular self-governing communities according to 
certain modes of analysis. Alcantara and Davidson (2015), for instance, ask why the semi-
autonomous (though not officially self-governing) Inuvialuit have not moved past the Final 
Agreement level in its self-government negotiations, and why the region continues to lag 
economically. Alcantara and Nelles (2014, 2016) examine the economic and social benefits and 
drawbacks found in specific local agreements between indigenous communities (some self-
governing, some not) and non-indigenous communities. Papillon (2015), Alcantara, and Spicer 
(2016), and Rodon (2015) examine MLG, its impacts on indigenous local and regional politics, 
especially in Inuit self-governing regions. Through this work, these authors assess the economic 
and social benefits of the strategies developed through this cooperation between non-
governmental entities (such as IEDCs), and indigenous, provincial, territorial and federal 
governments.  
Absent from much of this literature is an examination of the overall economic impacts of 
SG agreements across Canada, compared to non-indigenous governments. In addition, no one 
has used the CWB data to compare specific cases, such as MFN or NG, against all self-
governing communities’ accross Canada. Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada, in a (2016) 
report from the Evaluation, Performance Measurement and Review Branch, demonstrates that 
having a SG agreement is associated with improved outcomes, through a number of metrics 
derived from the community well-being index. There is an even stronger association between 
attaining a CLCA and better outcomes, and communities that have both are best off. Other 
authors have conducted surveys of large numbers of communities related to particular areas of 
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SG. For example, Fallon and Paquette (2012) offer a thematic analysis of First Nation SGAs and 
their performance in delivering on education within communities.  
4.3 Measuring the impacts of self-government 
In the case studies to follow, this thesis highlights the Government of Canada’s (2016) 
CWB data for two of the policy areas discussed in this thesis: employment (listed as labour force 
participation in the CWB), and housing. This chapter will also look at the other available metrics, 
income, education, and overall Community Well Being metric, all of them provided by the 
Government of Canada’s Community Wellbeing Index (CWB). The metric on housing 
determined by a measure of crowding, where a linear regression with a negative coefficient is 
used to generate a score (where a greater rate of crowding yields a lower score). The metric 
related to employment is a simple measure of labor force participation, taken as a percentage of 
the whole labour force, excluding seniors and those who are unable to work. The metric on 
education, presented as a percentage calculated through an equally weighted combination of high 
school graduation rates and post-secondary graduation rates. Lastly, there is a score for income, 
which is calculated through a logarithmic regression based on per capita income in each 
community.  
In this chapter I conduct a longitudinal examination of the CWB data for MFN and 
Nunantsiavut. I then cross-reference this change with the averaged national data provided by the 
Government of Canada. The figures for Nunatsiavut are taken from the Government of Canada’s 
CWB datasets for 1996 and 2016. These datasets were chosen because they are evenly spaced 
before and after the 2006 time marker identified in Chapter 3, and, by using data from 2016, 
offers the most up to date data available. Additionally, by measuring change over 20 years, this 
analysis uses a time period of the same length as the Government of Canada’s evaluation of the 
impacts of SG (2016). For MFN, the figures are taken from the CWB Datasets for 1981 and 
2001. These years were chosen to capture the changes that took place for MFN before and after 
the 1987 time marker. The percent change between the earlier year and the later year is measured 
for each metric, then compared to the average change over the same period for all First Nations 
communities and all non-indigenous communities, as determined in the Report on Trends in First 
Nations Communities, 1981-2016 (Government of Canada, 2019). The Government of Canada’s 
(2016) report evaluating impacts of SG agreements on indigenous communities shows SG to 
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have a positive effect, on average, on the changes in CWB metrics from1996 to 2016. These 
figures are compared to those from MFN to show that MFN has experienced even stronger 
improvements over a 20 year period than self-governing First Nations, on average. For 
Nunatsiavut, the analysis is the same except the CWB figures for the five Nunatsiavut 
communities are combined in a weighted average, by census population, and are compared to the 
average change in the metrics for all Inuit communities shown in the Report on Trends in Inuit 
communities, 1981-2016 (Government of Canada, 2019).  
4.4 Impacts of SG on MFN and Nunatsiavut 
Descriptive statistics are shown below, in table 4.2 for MFN and 4.4 for NG. Tables 4.1 
and 4.3 show background information for comparison. All tables show the percent change found 
over the time period indicated, for each of the 5 metrics: education, labor force participation, 
housing, income, and overall CWB scores, taken from INAC’s CWB datasets for 1981, 1996, 
2001, and 2016. Increases in a metric over time signify improvement in that metric. 
4.4.1 Miawpukek First Nation24 
Table 4.1 offers context for the changes observed in the MFN case study. It shows 
averaged CWB scores for all First Nations Communities versus those of non-indigenous 
communities for 1981 and 2001, showing the percent increase observed for each score. Table 4.2 
displays the same analysis for MFN specifically, offering percentage changes between 1981 and 
2001. For comparison, it also displays the average change for all FN communities. Lastly, it 
displays data that shows how SGAs have, on average, impacted temporal change in CWB scores 
compared to the average scores for FN communities. 
 
                                                
24 MFN, or Conne River, is listed in INAC’s CWB records as Samiajij Miawpukek, the community’s official 
designation under the Indian Act, in all census years after 1981, in which it is simply called Conne River. The 
official name was changed to Samiajij Miawpukek in 1987 when the community received official status as a reserve 
under the Indian Act. This thesis uses the term Miawpukek First Nation as it is the community’s preferred name in 
official public communications. That title is also presented on the community website in Mi’kmaq Miawpukek 
Mi’kamawey Mawi’omi. 
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Table 4.1 Community well-being in FN versus non-indigenous communities 
 
CWB Metric 
CWB scores in 1981 and 2001 and percent change 
First Nations 
communities25 









1981 2001 1981 2001 
Income 35.1 46.1 11 31.33 58 65.1 7.1 12.24 
Education 14.1 31.4 17.3 122.69 28.4 41.3 12.9 45.42 
Housing  63.2 71.9 8.7 13.77 91.2 94.6 3.4 3.72 
Labour force 
participation  
67.5 70.1 12.6 3.85 80.5 83.2 2.7 3.35 
CWB overall 45 54.9 9.9 22.0 64.5 70.7 6.2 9.61 
 
The CWB data show significant gaps, in all metrics measured, between FN communities 
and Non FN communities. FN communities have experienced greater improvement over the 
same time period, however. The narrowest gap in scores is for education, with a 14 point gap for 
1981, and a 10 point gap for 2001, while the widest gap was for housing, a difference of 28 for 
1981 and 22 for 2001. For both FN and non-indigenous communities, education saw the most 
significant gains made, by percent increase over this time period, over a 45 per cent increase for 
non-indigenous communities, and over a 122 per cent increase for First Nations communities. 
Labour force participation, on the other hand, saw the slowest growth for both categories - it 
already had a high rating for non-indigenous communities, at over 80 points in 1981, increasing 
less than 3 points over 20 years, while it sat at under 68 points in 1981 for indigenous 
communities and grew to just over 70 points. The data thus show significant gaps in well-being, 
which SGAs attempt to close through SG. 
                                                
25 All values were derived from the CWB datasets for the respective census years, with the First Nation communities 
values isolated. 
26 All values were derived from the CWB datasets for the respective census years, with the non-indigenous 
communities values isolated. 
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average CWB gains, all 
communities with SG 




Income  29 59 30 103.45 11 +5  +7  
Education  9 47 38 422.22 17.3 -28 - 
Housing  40 87 47 117.5 8.7 +5 - 
Labour force 
activity 
50 73 23 46.0 12.6 +6 - 
CWB overall 32 66 34 106.25 9.9 +5 +3 
 
MFN has seen the most significant gains in its education scores, at over 422 per cent. 
Note, however, that this is largely due to an extremely low score (9 points) in 1981. Significant 
gains have been made in both labour force activity and income (46 per cent and over 103 per 
cent respectively), and housing also saw significant gains. In all categories, gains made in in 
Conne River far exceed the average gains made by FN communities across Canada over the 
examined time period. SG and CLCA effects were also significant for each CWB metric except 
education. This was determined based on the regression conducted by INAC. Values from that 
regression are listed as a measure of growth between the 1996 and 2011 census, and figures 
listed are relative to expected growth values for FN communities over that period. For instance,   
for income and CWB overall, SG promotes an average CWB score 5 points higher, or about 10 
percent for each metric, after a 15 year period, than indigenous communities in general. For 
labour force activity, the SGA-driven benefits are higher, averaging a 6 point benefit, or about an 
additional 8 per cent above average gains for FN communities. Housing also saw an average gain 
of 5 points with a SGA. As table 4.2 shows,  
                                                
27 All values listed for self-government agreements and CLCAs are derived from a regression conducted by 
Indigenous and Northern Affairs Canada’s Evaluation, Performance measurement and Review Branch. It isolates the 
impact of SGAs and CLCAs on CWB scores. These values indicate elevated performance beyond what would be 
expected based on average changes over the same period, listed for FN communities and non-indigenous 
communities.  
28 “-“ indicates that there was no significant effect for this metric. 
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4.4.2 Nunatsiavut  
Similar to the discussion for First Nations above, significant improvements have been 
observed for Inuit Communities between 1996 and 2016, particularly in income and education, 
with CWB seeing more modest improvement and housing and labour force participation seeing a 
slight decline. Note that this is partly due to the fact that the latter three metrics were higher for 
Inuit communities to begin with than for First Nations communities. Labour force participation 
and housing saw the negative gains for Inuit communities, with nearly a 3 percent and 7 percent 
decreases, respectively. As above, figures for non-indigenous communities over this time period 
were already much higher to start with, and remained higher as of 2016 despite only modest 
increases. Figures found here display gap between Inuit and non-indigenous communities that is 
nearly as significant as between non-indigenous communities and FN communities.  
Table 4.3: Community well-being in Inuit versus non-indigenous communities 









1996 2016 1996 2016 
Income 52.4 67.8 15.4 29.39 93.1 94.6 1.5 1.61 
Education 28.5 35.5 7.0 24.56 38.6 55.6 17.0 44.04 
Housing  71.3 66.2 -5.1 -7.15 93.1 94.6 1.5 1.61 
Labour force 
activity  
77.9 75.6 -2.3 -2.95 81.7 84.1 -2.4 -2.94 
CWB overall 57.5 61.3 3.8 6.61 68.9 77.5 8.6 12.48 
 
Table 4.4 contains data for the 5 communities inside the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area, 
or Nunatsiavut: Nain, Hopedale, Makkovik, Postville, and Rigolet. The data are averages 
weighted by population. Income is the strongest gain made for Labrador Inuit over the period 
observed, with a 45 percent increase, compared to a 30 percent average increase for all Inuit 
communities. The trend continues for other categories, where Nunatsiavut achieves modest 
gains, while Inuit communities, on average, saw a decline in labour force activity and housing. 
Nunatsiavut, however, saw a 2 percent gain in labour force activity and a 20 percent gain in 
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housing availability. The CWB gains for SGAs listed in this table are the same as above, since 
the regression conducted in the Government of Canada (2016) report on the impacts of SG 
measured the impacts of all SGAs and CLCAs, Inuit or FN. This chapter measures the gains 
made in CWB indicators for each case study against the average gains among communities with 
SGAs, finding that the gains experienced Nunatsiavut communities are significantly greater in 
magnitude than those of self-governing communities on average.  
Table 4.4: Improving policy outcomes in Nunatsiavut 
 
CWB metric 














average CWB gains, all 











Income  48.7 69.4 20.7 42.65 1.5 +5  +7  
Education  31.7 42.8 11.1 35.10 17.0 - - 
Housing  63.3 76.6 13.3 20.95 1.5 +5 - 
Labour force 
activity 
69.2 70.6 1.4 2.02 -2.4 +6 - 
CWB overall 53.3 65.0 11.7 23.0 8.6 +5 +3 
4.5 What these findings mean for our case studies 
Although the degree of impact of SG and CLCAs varies based on the indicator examined 
and results vary considerably across communities, the data show a strong positive relationship 
between having an SGA and significantly higher CWB scores for indigenous communities. As 
discussed in the report on Evaluation of the Impacts of Self Government (Government of 
Canada, 2016, 22), the figures on SG were significant after controlling for various community 
factors, such as natural resource development. In every indicator measured for each of the 2 case 
studies, changes over the time period of observation were positive, and exceeded the averages for 
all FN or Inuit communities, respectively. Improvements in the CWB figures from MFN and 
Nunatsiavut also exceeded those found for for SGAs and CLCAs, on average, shown in the 
Government of Canada report (2016).  
                                                
29 Values listed here are derived from a regression formula that isolates the impact of SGAs and CLCAs on CWB 
scores. These values indicate elevated performance beyond what would be expected based on averages listed for FN 
communities and non-indigenous communities.  
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4.5.1 MFN 
The data support the claim that MFN, though it doesn’t hold an official SGA, has seen 
gains in community well-being that are considerably greater in magnitude than communities with 
SGAs, on average. The most notable examples are in housing availability and labour force 
participation, which saw gains of 47 points and 23 points, respectively, between 1991 and 2001. 
This is compared to average gains of 8.7 and 12.6, respectively, for FN communities. 
Communities with SGAs had housing availability scores 5 points higher than those of FN 
communities on average, and gains in labour force activity scores were 6 points greater. This 
means that SG has yielded significant impacts in raising housing availability and labour force 
activity scores. MFN, however, has more than doubled its score on housing availability and 
improved in labour force activity substantially, meaning that it has outperformed communities 
with SGAs, on average. The reasons for this performance will be examined more closely in 
Chapter 5. 
4.5.2 Nunatsiavut 
The story for Nunatsiavut is much the same as for MFN. As a self-governing entity, NG 
has outperformed other communities with SGAs by a substantial margin in all categories except 
labour force activity. Labour force activity scores saw a modest gain of 1.5 points between 1996 
and 2016 compared to a 2.4 point average drop among all Inuit communities. Gains made in 
communities with SGAs, however, were 6 points better on average than those without, which 
means that SG may help to produce better employment outcomes elsewhere. This shortfall will 
be discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 6. NG has outperformed even other communities with 
SGAs on other metrics, however, such as in Housing availability, which saw an average gain of 
over 13 points for Nunatsiavut, compared to a 1.5 point average gain among Inuit communities 
over the same period, and a 6 point increase for communities with SGAs. Since these figures are 
gains in CWB values, not absolute values, and they are controlled for ambient factors, there is 
strong evidence that SG is having a positive impact on communities, and that SG in Nunatsiavut 
is having a stronger impact than other self-governing bodies.  
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4.6 Limitations of the CWB data 
The CWB provides robust datasets for the examination of important indicators of well-
being in indigenous communities, such as housing quality and crowding, education levels and 
income. While CWB data are useful for evaluating the impact of SGAs and CLCAs on those 
indicators, it does have some important flaws. As the authors point out in the Report on Trends 
(Government of Canada, 2019) for both Inuit and FN communities, the indicators pertain mainly 
to socio-economic well-being, and they measure well-being at the community level. CWB 
indicators may not capture the complex social and economic realities of individuals living within 
communities, and they also may not reflect any of the cultural realities that are examined in this 
thesis. For instance, the CWB measures how many people finish high school or post-secondary 
education, but not how many people are learning or re-learning thier traditional language or 
traditional practices, both identified as important issues for NG and MFN to address (Andersen 
and Johns, 2005, Jeddore, 2000; ).  
The indicators also represent important but rudimentary indicators of well-being in a 
community, and thus may fail to truly capture the complex and highly unique environmental 
factors present each individual community. The researchers who conducted the evaluation of of 
SG impacts on CWB indicators in indigenous communities (Government of Canada, 2016), 
attempted to control for ambient community factors as much as possible, but cannot do so 
completely. Further, the public-facing CWB data do not offer the same granular community-
level demographic data that was available to the researchers who developed the Government of 
Canada report, so it is not possible to control for these factors in the analysis conducted of 
Nunatsiavut and MFN.  
4.6 Conclusions 
The data presented in this chapter provide robust support for the claim that the presence 
of SGAs has a positive impact on the CWB indicators, in particular those related to housing and 
employment, examined in this thesis. The data also provide robust support for the claim that, 
during the period immediately before and in the 14 years following its establishment as a FN 
Band under the Indian Act, MFN experienced significant gains in these key CWB indicators. 
This supports the idea that, when it formed a band council in 1987, MFN began to set in motion 
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a policy agenda that helped to foster these gains. This will be discussed further in chapter 5. 
Nunatsiavut, for its part, has also experienced similar gains in CWB indicators for Labrador 
Inuit, both during the 10 years leading up to the creation of NG in 2006, and in the 10 years since 
its creation, up to 2016. The ways in which NG’s policy agenda has helped to foster these 
changes will be examined in greater detail in chapter 6. The data presented show that, although 
the effects of SG are complex and difficult to measure definitively through indicators, the data 
show strong positive movement in the key indicators in each community, and thus make a strong 
case that these communities have been successful in implementing policies that aim to improve 
these indicators.  
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  “I’ve often said: ‘we got in [to the Indian Act], and we can get out’” 
Chief Mi’sel Joe, Miawpukek First Nation, Interview, April 11, 2017 
Chapter 5: The evolution of governance in Conne River  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a case study examining the evolution of governance in the 
Miawpukek First Nation (MFN) at Conne River. Using the Five Principles of Good Governance, 
as presented by the Institute on Governance (IOG), I analyze the results from a series of semi-
structured interviews with officials and community members. For additional context, I draw on 
various records, including policy documents, Hansards, and media reports. The chapter also 
challenges the federal government’s definition of SG by arguing that Conne River has some of 
the characteristics of a self-governing community even though it does not have a ratified SG 
final agreement. The qualitative analysis presented here, together with the data presented in 
chapter 4, demonstrates that not only is MFN a success story in SG in empirical terms30, like its 
counterpart, NG , but it also has performed better, on average, than many self-governing 
communities across Canada on those metrics. Self-governing communities, meanwhile, have a 
tendency to perform better on the four community indicators measured than communities that 
operate fully under the Indian Act.  
Section 5.2 of this chapter briefly covers the history of the community from its 
beginnings as a logging and fishing community prior to confederation, through its struggle for 
recognition as a FN band, to its now-stalled progress toward final agreement in SG. Section 5.3 
provides a description of MFN’s strategy in three policy areas, while 5.4 introduces the evolution 
of governance in Conne River. Next, sections 5.5 through 5.9 examine the state of governance in 
MFN, using the IOG’s Five Principles. 5.5 begins with a discussion of legitimacy and voice in 
the community, highlighting how residents feel about their input into the political process. Next, 
5.6 gives a discussion of direction, which analyses the strategic direction in both policy and 
overall governance in the community. Section 5.7 looks at performance, highlighting both how 
                                                
30 Speaking in terms of their socio-economic factors, based on figures from the CWB (Government of Canada, 
2019). 
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well MFN represents its people, and how well it has performed in three policy areas: housing, 
employment, and language and culture. Here, I highlight respondents’ feelings about thier 
government’s performance both before and after the 1991 time-marker identified in Chapter 3. In 
section 5.8, I discuss respondents’ thoughts on the accountability and transparency of their 
government. Section 5.9 finishes with a short discussion of fairness. Throughout the examination 
of governance, I use remarks from interviewees and cross-reference them with news reports, 
CWB data and policy documents to construct a narrative of the evolution of governance in 
Conne River.  
5.2 Mi’kmaq History in Newfoundland 
5.2.1 The Beginnings of Conne River and Miawpukek 
Prior to European contact, the Mi’kmaq were a semi-nomadic, predominantly hunter-
gatherer people situated in the region surrounding much of the Gulf of St Lawrence. They 
traditionally occupied what is now Gaspésie in Eastern Quebec, Eastern New-Brunswick, Nova-
Scotia, and parts of New England and Southern Newfoundland (Pastore, 1998; Bartels and 
Bartels, 2005; Dickason, 2009). As Pastore writes, Mi’kmaq people first began to continuously 
inhabit the southern and western shores of Newfoundland at least as long ago as the 16th 
century, though Bartels and Jantzen (1990) suggest they did not take up permanent residence in 
that region until the mid-17th century. The south of Newfoundland, like the island of Cape 
Breton, forms a part of Mi’kmaq traditional territory, according Mi’kmaq oral history, 
particularly for seasonal hunting and fishing (Jeddore, 2011, 2015; Dickason, 2009). More 
Mi’kmaq groups also migrated to the island of Newfoundland in increasing numbers as they 
became increasingly displaced due to European settlement in large parts of what is now Nova 
Scotia and New Brunswick,31and they eventually began to establish permanent settlements. 
Miawpukek began as a summer camp for Mi’kmaq who originated from Cape Breton, for whom 
the Coast of Bays region formed a part of the traditional territory. Miawpukek became a 
permanent settlement and its residents emerged as a distinctive group by the mid-18th century, 
                                                
31 The matter of traditional gterritory would become important in the 20th century, in the ongoing dispute over 
existence and extent of Mi’kmaq territory in Newfoundland. In 1983, MFN filed a land claim for over 14,000 km2 of 
territory, which was rejected on the grounds that the Mi’kmaq did not ‘occupy’ that territory continuously prior to 
colonialism. The Qalipu First Nation continues to be without a reserve (AANDC, 2015; Wetzel, 1995, 1999). 
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and was represented on the Mi’kmaq Grand Council by the 19th century (Jackson, 1993; 
Jeddore, 2015).   
Settlement and development in southern Newfoundland heavily impacted the Mi’kmaq in 
a number of ways. It also had a devastating effect on the Beothuk, who, after violence and 
displacement, predominantly by settlers, are thought to have disappeared before 183032. The 
disappearance of the Beothuk is regarded as a dark mark on the history of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, and remains one of the most poignant and shameful examples of genocide against 
indigenous peoples in Canadian history (Dickason, 2009). Mi’kmaq are known to have interacted 
with the Beothuks, and an erroneous belief emerged, called the Mi’kmaq Mercenary Myth, that 
Mi’kmaq had been offered a bounty by French colonial authorities to hunt Beothuk in 
Newfoundland. This would later contribute to negative perceptions of Newfoundland Mi’kmaq, 
and help serve as justification for discriminatory policies33.  
By the mid-18th century, Mi’kmaq families had become increasingly dependent on wage 
labour and the volatile fur trade for income while fishing and hunting for subsistence (Pastore, 
1998). Continued infrastructure development and settlement of the isand also increasingly 
disrupted the traditional Mi’kmaq way of life in the Coast of Bays region during this time 
(Pastore, 1998; Bartels and Bartels, 2005; Dickason, 2009). The fur trade then collapsed in the 
20th century, while the collapse of the local caribou population, due to environmental pressures 
created by increased development, created food shortages. Economic destitution soon followed 
for the Mi’kmaq (Heritage Newfoundland and Labrador, 2019, Bartels and Bartels, 2005). By 
the time of confederation in 1949, residents of Miawpukek, by then called Conne River, were 
disproportionately undereducated, underemployed, and dependent on provincial welfare.  
Most residents of Conne River were Roman Catholic by the late 19th century, and had 
experienced significant loss of traditional language and culture. Conversion to Christianity and 
repression by the church, combined with intermarriage with the settler population and repressive 
colonial laws, led to culture and language shift. Widespread stigmatization of Mi’kmaq identity, 
present throughout the region, also contributed to the shift, with some actively masking or 
                                                
32 The total disappearance of the Beothuk as a people is unconfirmed. A few reports from the 1820’s indicate that 
some Beothuk individuals may have joined other groups, such as the Mi’kmaq, and there are those, even today, who 
self-identify as having Beothuk ancestry. The passing of Shawnawdithit in 1829, however, is widely understood to 
mark the end of the Beothuk as a distinctive culture. (Pastore, 1998, Dickason, 2009, Bartels and Bartels, 2005).  
33 This contributed to the stigmatization of Mi’kmaq, even as the Beothuk were idealized, and may have impacted 
recognition and rights later on. See Bartels and Bartels, 2005; Lawrence, 2009, 2014; Wetzel, 1999 
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forgetting their indigenous ancestry. By the mid-20th century, many Mi’kmaq children were 
raised without learning any of their traditional language or attending traditional gatherings. At 
the time of confederation in 1949, Conne River was an impoverished community that was at risk 
of losing its traditional language and culture (Tulk, 2008, Dickason, 2009).   
5.2.2 Gaining Status under the Indian Act.  
The quote at the beginning of this chapter was part of the Chief’s response when asked 
about the process of gaining status under the Indian Act for residents of Conne River, or Samiajij 
Miawpukek34, and becoming MFN. Joe essentially means that MFN has fought for recognition 
under the Indian Act in order to gain the associated rights and benefits, as part of an overall path 
to SG. When Newfoundland joined Confederation in 1949, none of its indigenous groups were 
officially recognized as indigenous, with the Smallwood government at the time openly denying 
their existence. Some have argued that the exclusion of Newfoundland and Labrador residents of 
indigenous ancestry from official recognition was, in part, a strategy of the then Department of 
Indian and Northern Affairs (DINA) to avoid acquiring legal and financial obligations to 
indigenous peoples in the new province, as it had to those in the rest of Canada (Bartels and 
Jantzen, 1990; Joe, personal communication, April 2017)35. In fact, there are estimated to be at 
least 40,000 people of indigenous ancestry across the province today (statistics Canada, 2019). 
Including those who are still without official status or membership, that number could be over 
100,000. The Mi’kmaq of Newfoundland, including residents of Conne River were thus denied 
status at the time of confederation, along with other indigenous groups in the province, and were 
treated as simple Newfoundland residents, with only limited access to provincial services, up 
until the 1970’s. By this time, Conne River had a logging operation with a mid-sized lumber 
mill, one of the few sources of income for the community.  
By the 1970’s, the community of Conne River was a poor logging settlement, with 
income and education levels well below the average for the Coast of Bays region (Bartels and 
                                                
34 The word “Samiajij” is derived from the Mi’kmaq term “aosamiajij”, meaning “too big but too small”. During 
negotiations with the provincial and federal governments to create the reserve, a key sticking point was surrounding 
the exact territory for the reserve, with the federal government reluctnat to allow the full extent of traditional lands 
to be included. The community decided on a name that captured the idea that the reserve was larger than the federal 
government had wanted, but smaller than Miawpukek oral tradition would indicate. The reserve is listed as Samiajij 
Miawpukek on all official documents as of 1987. 
35 Full explanation for the denial of indigenous status recognition, and the accompanying funding and services, to 
the Mi’kmaq of Newfoundland, exists largely in confidential negotiations and secret cabinet documents from the 
time of confederation, which were not available as source material for this thesis. 
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Bartels, 2005, Pastore, 1998; Dickason, 2009). Many Mi’kmaq living in the region also did not 
acknowledge their Mi’kmaq heritage due to multigenerational stigma36. This began to change 
when the Federation of Newfoundland Indians (FNI), a coalition of Newfoundland’s Mi’kmaq 
groups, officially launched in 197537. The FNI was formed as a combined effort to strategically 
pressure the provincial and federal governments to recognize that there were, in fact, indigenous 
groups in Newfoundland and Labrador with legitimate rights under the Indian Act and the 
constitution. The FNI met considerable opposition from provincial and federal officials, 
especially those in the department of Indian Affairs under the government of Prime Minister 
Pierre Trudeau, who were keen to avoid the additional financial liability associated with tens of 
thousands of additional Status Indians receiving the rights and benefits required under the Indian 
Act. (Wetzel, 1995; Hanrahan, 2009, 2014, Joe & McDonald, Interview, April 11, 2017).  
The FNI consistently lobbied officials in St. John’s and Ottawa between 1975 and 1986. 
For provincial officials, The FNI argued that, as a First Nations people, fiscal financing for 
Newfoundland Mi’kmaq would be a federal responsibility and thus it was in the Province’s best 
interest to help the FNI to secure recognition under the Indian Act. By 1981, the federal 
government was making annual cash transfers to the Government of Newfoundland and 
Labroador to support Conne River. The Province channeled the funds into general revenue, 
rather than release them to the community, prompting FNI to increase pressure on officials 
(Wetzel, 1995, 1999). Repeated requests to release the withheld funds to the community were 
ignored, as was the advocacy process in general. In 1983, Mi’sel Joe38 managed to garner 
national attention for the issue when he led a group of nine protesters from Conne River in a nine 
day sit-in and hunger strike in the offices of Premier Peckford. Peckford’s government then 
finally released the withheld funds to Conne River, which in 1984 submitted an official request 
to receive status as a band under the Indian Act. Status was granted in 1987, which began a new 
chapter for the newly minted MFN in its journey toward SG. Since 1987, both MFN and the 
other Mi’kmaq groups have continued to pursue their own paths to self-determination.  
                                                
36 Recall that the Mi’kmaq Mercenary Myth, which had first appeared two centuries earlier, contributed to the 
stigmatization of Newfoundland Mi’kmaq, and to the beleif that the Coast of Bays region was not a part of their 
traditional territory, and thus they had no claim to it. This was exacerbated by racist stereotypes and colonial 
attitudes that impacted indigenous groups more generally (Bartels and Bartels, 2005, Wetzel, 1995, 1999). 
37 FNI was originally called the Native Association of Newfoundland and Labrador, which formed in 1972 and 
represented the Mi’kmaq, the Labrador Innu, Labrador Inuit, and the Inuit-Metis of southern Labrador. In 1975, the 
Inuit, Innu, and Inuit-metis split off to form their own groups, and the association was renamed.  
38 Recall that Mi’sel Joe has been the Chief, or Saqamaw, of MFN since he was first elected to the position in 1983, 
with the exception of a short break from 1988-1990.  
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5.3 Governance in Conne River 
5.3.1 Status and membership disputes  
In 1983, just prior to applying for status as an Indian Band, MFN withdrew from the FNI 
to pursue recognition solely for its own reserve. FNI continued to campaign for recognition of 
status for the much larger group of Newfoundland Mi’kmaq claimants living outside of the 
reserve in Conne River. The Labrador Inuit and Innu each also withdrew in the mid 1970’s to 
form their own organizations, which will be discussed further in chapter 6. The FNI continued to 
advocate on behalf of other Mi’kmaq groups, which was a task made more difficult in that other 
Mi’kmaq of Newfoundland were spread across much of the southern and western coasts of the 
island, and were tied to numerous communities, but no one community could be identified as 
solely Mi’kmaq. This also made proving ancestry difficult and onerous for many. (Hanrahan, 
2003; 2012) Ultimately, the FNI would reach an agreement-in-principle with the federal 
government in 2006, creating the Qalipu First Nation as a band without reserve lands. To date, 
the band boasts the largest membership in Canada - over 25,000 - but many people of Mi’kmaq 
heritage have been denied status under the enrollment rules used by the band, leading to 
controversy. Many who self-identify as Mi’kmaq, are connected to the wider Mi’kmaq 
community, and are able to trace back their Mi’kmaq heritage for many generations, nonetheless 
fail to meet the specific guidelines for membership. The guidelines focus on both tracing lineage 
and citing specific forms of connectedness to the broader Qalipu community, in addition to 
federal requirements. In other words, some have argued that the parameters for membership are 
arbitrary and that criteria set by the Government of Canada and the band do not capture what it 
means to be Mi’kmaq.  
The controversy surrounding membership in the Qalipu First Nation exemplifies the 
broader issue of First Nations status across Canada, specifically: who gets it, and who does not. 
The question of status is central to indigenous governance, since the latter is concerned with 
serving a particular community, ensuring services are adequate, and improving social and 
economic outcomes, all of which pertains to a particular population. Indian status is, as a 
concept, inherently discriminatory, since it seeks to categorize and exclude. As King (2012) and 
Wolfe (2006) note, the creation of status is, historically, concerned with the elimination of 
indigenous identities and rights, rather than the preservation of them. Due to the specific legal 
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rights and financial benefits enshrined within the Indian Act and the Constitution Act, together 
with the cultural and social benefits of membership within a band, status has become desirable 
for many Mi’kmaq in Newfoundland, despite the historical and colonial roots of status 
(Garamond 2014). For each band, determining Indigenous status, which many have argued is 
both arbitrary and centered in racist and discriminatory legislation, is a challenging and 
controversial matter, which has impacted MFN in a number of ways. MFN has managed issues 
surrounding status by ultimately administering only a small subset of Newfoundland Mi’kmaq 
who share a connection to a particular place. The question of band membership remains a 
challenge for MFN. As Saqamqaw Joe and McDonald note (Interview, April 11, 2017), the 
question of membership within the band has produced controversy, particularly concerning who 
could vote in band elections39, and what services, if any, could be made available to those living 
off reserve.40 
5.3.2 Emerging Governance  
After being brought under the Indian Act in 1987, MFN began to officially implement 
key policies for which it had already laid the groundwork in the years leading up to 1987 
(Wetzel, personal communication, April 2017). The most economically significant of these were 
housing and employment policies that evolved into those still in use today. These will be 
discussed more thoroughly in the next section. In 2004, negotiations began for a self-government 
agreement. The aim of this negotiation process was to get a better deal for MFN, to solidify its 
independence as a community, and to formally remove itself from the strictures of the Indian Act 
in order to chart its own course. (Saqamaw Joe, McDonald, interview, April 2017). As discussed 
in chapter 2, the Indian Act is widely understood to be a restrictive and paternalistic piece of 
legislation (Dickason, 2009; Coulthard, 2007, 2014; Alfred and Corntassel, 2005). Under the Act, 
communities often forced to seek approval from the federal government for simple matters, such 
as harvesting resources from their own lands41. An AIP was reached in 2013. From there, 
through engagement with the community, the band council worked to establish consent in 
                                                
39 Currently, only those who can demonstrate residency on reserve may vote in Conne River, though the matter has 
been rdisputed a number of times. A majority of residents support this policy. (Saqamaw Joe and McDonald, 
personal communication, 2017).   
40 Currently, core benefits, such as subsidized housing, the jobs program, or assistance with travel and education 
costs, is reserved for residents.  
41 See: The (2018) INAN report on indigenous land claims, which reported recurring frustrations of many groups in 
attempting to govern their lands, particularly with having to seek federal approval for simple harvesting rights.  
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anticipation of ratifying a final agreement. Ultimately, this process failed, and Conne River 
remains under the Indian Act today.  
The main reason for the failure of the Final Agreement, cited by over half of those 
interviewed for this study (9 of 13), was an unfavorable fiscal financing agreement within the 
AIP. Under the funding formula used in Canada’s Fiscal Approach to Self-Government, the 
money received in the annual general transfer42 to the band is offset by revenue sourced within 
the community (own-source revenue, or OSR). OSR is revenue from resource royalties, property 
taxes, or income from band-owned businesses. MFN has relatively low OSR levels, but what 
little it does have would offset what the community currently receives in federal support, causing 
a net negative financial impact from the agreement. The advantage of SG agreements, as one 
community member pointed out (personal communication, April 2017), is that governments gain 
greater control of the revenues they do have, while still receiving support from the federal, and 
sometimes provincial government. However, this benefit only works properly when a 
community has enough revenue to fund programs. A community with low revenue cannot afford 
to lose any.  
What the failed Agreement in Principle highlights is that SG is not solely dictated by the 
definition used in Government of Canada policy documents. Rather, it is present in the policies 
and practices of an individual community. As several community members note, including Chief 
Joe, Conne River is, in many ways, self-governing in that it has created its own policies that 
work for the community (Interview, April 11, 2017). The Indian Act is restrictive, but 
communities do not always comply with these restrictions, and it is up to federal officials to 
enforce them. Occasionally, a community like Conne River will begin to manage its affairs in a 
way that does not comply wiht the Indian Act, and, upon recognizing that the community is 
functioning well, officials may make a discretionary choice to allow the practices to continue 
without penalty43. While this condition is paternalistic and colonial in nature, MFN has set an 
example as to how such institutional conditions can be managed. When this occurred in Conne 
River, the community continued to implement the policies in housing that were conceived in the 
                                                
42 There is a separate funding category, called the “social transfer”, which refers to dedicated funds for specific 
social programs and is excluded from the calculation. However, the “general transfer” includes the per-member 
welfare transfers required under the Indian Act, which can be offset (Government of Canada, 2015, pp. 5).This 
effectively creates both a “transfer ceiling” and a “transfer floor” .  
43 Under the Indian Act, communities can face penalties, such as having their assets or funding frozen, for violating 
the act.  
Evolving Governance Merrell 81 
mid 1980’s, and the Government of Canada elected not to interfere (Joe, Interview, and April 11, 
2017).  
As negotiations for an agreement in principle unfolded, MFN began the process of  
developing its own land code under the First Nations Land Management Act (FNLMA), which 
was ratified by the community, then signed by the Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations and 
Northern Affairs (CIRNA) in 2017 (Government of Canada, 2019). This marks another 
significant step forward for MFN in terms of self-determination. Having a land code transfers 
control of key powers related to management of land and resources, such as mortgages, local 
harvesting, and matrimonial property, to bands, allowing, flexibility in the management of a 
wide array of economic activity (Bouthiller, 2016). Being under the FNLMA regime involves 
drafting a land code and submitting it to CIRNA for review. Once approved, the code must be 
ratified by community members, then both parties sign a framework agreement, officially freeing 
the community from the imposed land management regime under the Indian Act. To date, land 
management agreements under the FNLMA have received little scholarly or media attention, but 
one report shows that the new regime has created considerable benefits in the communities that 
have their own land codes, compared to those whose land and resource management remains 
under the control of the federal government under the Indian Act (KPMG, 2014). The latter is 
known to hamper economic development by creating unnecessary bureaucratic restrictions and 
greatly increasing transaction processing times. Communities that have their own land codes 
have seen their transaction times fall drastically, while overall economic activity has increased 
considerably (KPMG, 2014, Bouthiller, 2016).  It is too early to determine how the new land 
code will impact future economic outcomes for MFN, but the above data suggest a land code is 
likely to be a positive policy development.  
5.4 Government through policy 
5.4.1 A Job for every resident 
As discussed above, the seeds for the emergence of successful policy implementation in 
employment and housing were planted before 1987, but becoming an Indian band, and securing 
the associated grant funding, helped MFN to build on these policies. The goal of full 
employment within the community originated with the staffing, supply and operation of the 
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band-owned lumber mill that was upgraded and in the 1970’s, which included the construction of 
a service road and other amenities. The community also mobilized its meager financial 
resources, a dedicated workforce, and a portion of the lumber it produced, to construct new 
housing for residents. When it began to receive funds under the Indian Act in 1987, Conne River 
had lumber and a capable workforce to support in producing its own housing. This not only 
improved housing availability, but fostered another of the community’s achievements: job-
creation.  
MFN boasts full employment, measured in terms of the number of residents employed for 
at least part of the year, because it runs a job-creation program that gives residents the option of 
seeking employment by the band council for a minimum of 17 weeks each year, funded 
primarily through an annual grant agreement with the federal government, on a per resident 
basis. The majority of eligible MFN residents are able to work under this regime. The tradition of 
aiming for full employment began with the staffing and operation of the band-owned lumber mill 
that began operation in the 1970’s, and included the construction of a service road for the mill, 
and other amenities. During this time, the community had also mobilized its meager financial 
resources, a dedicated workforce, and a portion of the lumber it produced, to construct new 
housing for residents. By the time funds started flowing to the band under the Indian Act in 1983, 
Conne River had a capable workforce engaged in logging, running the mill, or in carpentry, and 
was capable of producing its own housing.  
Today, the job-creation program, now called the MFN Employment Assurance Program, 
gives residents the option of seeking employment by the band council for a minimum of 17 
weeks each year. It is funded through regular federal transfers and by a regular Grant Agreement 
through INA44, on a membership basis. The Program ensures the majority of eligible MFN 
residents are able to work at least part of the year. Those who are unable to find additional work 
after working the requisite 17 weeks for the band may then apply for Employment Insurance 
(EI). This ensures residents have earnings year round, and also brings additional funds into the 
local economy. This method of ensuring income exemplifies innovative policy as a response to 
local needs. In a community where employment opportunities have been scarce since the closure 
                                                
44 The agreement wil be officially administered through Indigenous Services Canada in late 2020. Although INAC 
has been officially dissolved and CIRNA and Indigenous Services Canada have been created, line items for grants 
and transfers in the federal budget still read: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, as of the Supplementary Estimates 
proceedings in the fall of 2019. This will change once responsibilities are officially shifted to Indigenous Services 
Canada in 2020.  
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of the sawmill in 1999, but where an active workforce still remained, the band council pursued a 
model that redirected the efforts of that workforce to community projects, such as maintaining 
roads, while ensuring they continued to have an income. 
5.4.2 Housing done differently 
The housing program in MFN, administered by the Miawpukek Housing Authority, has a 
genealogy that is closely related to the jobs program that arguably has its roots in the 
construction and operation of the Conne River Sawmill that closed in 1999 (Conne River 
resident, interview 41, April 12, 2017; archived continent, no date). The mill provided lumber for 
constructing homes and other buildings. This was how Conne River residents were able to secure 
modern housing at a time when funds were being withheld by the federal government and cash 
flow within the community was extremely limited. (Wetzel, 1995, 1999; Dickason, 2009). Each 
homeowner was invested in their property at that time, and Conne River had the unique position 
of becoming a FN reserve with modern homes, owned by their occupants, already on the land. 
When the band set about expanding housing availability for the community, a regime was 
devised where prospective homeowners would pay what they could, and could apply for subsidy 
based on need, according to a point system, where the band would allocate financial assistance to 
the purchase of housing for residents as needed. Today it is called the Miawpukek Market-Based 
Housing Policy.  
The program in Conne River differs substantially from that found in most communities 
on the mainland, which focus mainly on allocating new housing to those who apply as it 
becomes available, which in turn depends upon available funding. In 2013, the Assembly of First 
Nations (AFN) reported that and estimated 37% of on-reserve housing units required 
replacement or major repairs, with many residents on waitlists. An estimated total of 130,000 
new units are expected to be needed by 2031. MFN currently has low demand for renovations 
and a manageable waitlist of approximately 30 residents (Miawpukek Housing Authority, 2017). 
The housing program in Conne River once again demonstrates policy adaptation to unusual 
conditions: the sawmill made production of materials possible, while significant external funding 
was unavailable prior to the band receiving status in 1987. Once the band was able to recieve 
status, and federal funds were available at the expected levels for a first nation’s band, the band 
council had an opportunity to try to avoid the deteriorating housing situation found on many 
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reserves: create a housing program that would be sustainable and yet provide housing to those 
who needed it. The band has been able to keep homes in good repair while building new homes 
at a sufficient pace to prevent long waiting lists45 
5.4.3 “Our strength is ourselves”: Mi’kmaq cutural revitalization 
Despite centuries of colonial rule, coupled with various policies of of cultural genocide 
and assimilation that led to neglect of Mi’kmaq cultural heritage, that heritage remains vibrant. 
Both language and musical practices are being revived by those with Mi’kmaq heritage, status 
and non-status alike, across the Newfoundland (Tulk, 2008). This revitalization is a source of 
strength and community resilience for many. In Conne River, cultural revitalization comes after 
a long period of subjugation or loss of culture and language, and is centered on two key policy 
initiatives: The first is support for the annual pow-wow, which is attended by residents and 
numerous visitors and includes displays of traditional Mi’kmaq dance, music, food, and other 
activities. All of those interviewed regarded this practice as a benefit to the community and an 
important showcase - and celebration - of the cultural revitalization present there. The second is 
language revitalization through language learning. Mi’kmaq instruction is provided at the local 
school, which the community has had full control over since 198746. Conne River is currently 
home to only a handful of native speakers of the Mi’kmaq language, with most middle-aged or 
older people reporting that they did not learn more than a few words as children. Most report 
disappointment or sadness at not having learned more when they were younger. To promote 
fluency, MFN has begun providing funding for teachers to take Mi’kmaq language immersion 
classes in Mi’kmaq communities in Nova Scotia, where the language is more widely spoken 
These initiatives constitute innovative policy solutions to suit a community’s specific 
needs. Realizing the importance of traditional Mi’kmaq language and ways of knowing, MFN 
has structured its education policy around ensuring that youth learn about their Mi’kmaq heritage 
and receive an instruction to Mi’kmaq language. The interviews examined in the sections to 
follow present clear picture of how, due to the school language program and other policy 
                                                
45 Interviews #33, #34, #35, #36, April 11, 2017, #39, April 12, 2017.  
46 The band has had full control of the local school since 1987, including its administration, hiring of teaching staff, 
and adding cultural elelments and Mi’kmaq language to curriculum, though the education program remains 
provincially funded at standard levels. A new school building, Se’t A’newey Kina’matino’kuom, or St. Anne’s 
School, opened its doors in the fall of 2017 (MFN website, 2019; ISC, 2019).  
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developments, Conne River is better able to preserve Mi’kmaq language and culture than prior to 
1987. Sections 5.5-5.9 offer a closer examination of findings from interviews and a review of 
media and policy documents, going through each of the Five Principles to evaluate governance 
for MFN.  
5.5 Legitimacy and Voice 
Legitimacy and voice is an important aspect of the Five Principles of governance used by 
the IOG identifies who in the community has influence in decision making, how decisions are 
agreed upon, and how different voices are included in the governance process. Legitimacy and 
voice is important from a theoretical standpoint because studying a community like MFN as a 
rational actor in a principal-agent relationship requires an understanding of the concerns and 
motivations of the principal. It is crucial to determine who has a voice and how this shapes the 
behaviour of the principal. MFN holds monthly band council meetings, which the public are 
welcome to attend. Residents may voice their concerns either in those meetings, or at the ballot 
box. Not everyone exercises this right, however, and some voices are heard more than others. 
The interviews conducted for this study suggest that MFN does a good job of hearing from its 
members and, as a result of becoming a band with more resources than before, is better able to 
represent their interests than it was prior to 1991. Not all members feel they have a voice, 
however, which hurts the local government’s legitimacy for many.  
5.5.1 Participation 
Crucial to understanding participation is knowing whether all community members are 
able to have a voice. 12 of those interviewed felt that MFN residents can at least be heard. 
Everyone was aware of their right to approach the council, with one noting that “to voice your 
concern you had to go straight to the top [of the community government]” (Interview #38, April 
12, 2017). Some felt that councilors were not always accessible outside of meetings, with two 
noting that “the government doesn’t listen to us, we haven’t seen the chief in quite a while” 
(Interview #37, April 11, 2017). Five residents47 noted that speaking before council is one thing, 
but it doesn’t mean anything will change as a result. Still, 9 interviewees felt that the council will 
hear members concerns, and take them seriously. Though it is difficult to extrapolate numbers 
                                                
47 Interviews # 37, April 11, 2017, #40, #41, April 12, 2017 
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from a sample this small to the whole population of Conne River, these numbers do highlight the 
importance of participation in the success of governance in Conne River. Members can have 
input, then, and several of the council members interviewed feel strongly that they took 
seriously, and attempted to act on, substantive concerns brought before them. One ongoing 
complaint came from those worried about the either the waitlist for housing, or the fact that the 
scoring system for determining who would receive housing did not always appear fair48. Another 
layer of participation concerns the ability of the community to pursue its interests to higher levels 
of government. Chief Joe and other councilors pointed to the ability of the community to lobby 
the government to first attain status, then advocate for its key policy goals. “Hopefully they have 
a voice through us in our campaigning in St. John’s and Ottawa”, Joe said, also noting that 
Trudeau’s government “ministers are more accessible from before”. As if echoing a complaint 
heard from some residents, however, they noted that "just because a minister hears from 
[communities] doesn’t mean anything will change” (Interview # 35, April 11, 2017).  
Another crucial component of participation concerns whether community members are 
engaged. One community elder noted that the community seemed not to be as engaged as in the 
past. A Councilor noted that some people do engage, and others do not, but that members should 
remember that they can come into the band office any time, they do not have to wait for the next 
meeting or the annual assembly. The latter is a five-day affair at which some community 
members are “very vocal”, according to community members (Interview 36, April 11, 2017). 
The council is also seeking community input on its new governance code, currently at the draft 
stage. The code is available online (MFN website, 2015) and a survey was conducted to solicit 
input. One common complaint regarding engagement in relation to the stalled Self-Government 
negotiations was that many members tried to engage the council on the matter, but information 
came in “dribs and drabs; you had to fight for information” (Interview 38, April 12, 2017). Three 
councilors and two band employees noted, on the other hand, that council worked hard over the 
course of over a year to engage the public, and it was often difficult to get the complexities 
across49. Some community members appeared to have difficulty determining and weighing the 
exact costs and benefits of a SG agreement, a complex and often speculative endeavor that can 
                                                
48 Two of those interviewed complained that the scoring system needed improvement, with one noting that there was 
a single man who had recently received a 3 bedroom house, while at least one single mother of three children had 
been on the waitlist for several months.  
49 Interviews #33, #34, #35, and #36, April 11, 2017 
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be difficult to articulate concretely. Those who expressed certainty about the costs and benefits 
were almost unanimous in their preference for the status quo over formalizing a final SG 
agreement. (8/14) 
5.5.2 Consensus Orientation  
The SG negotiating process showcases the next component of the governance model: 
how consensus is reached in deliberations. To address this, members were asked whether 
mediation of conflicting interests is effective in Conne River. Here, opinions ranged between two 
extremes: The claim that no consensus was present in the local SG negotiations, or in most 
decision-making within the community more generally, versus the assertion that SG negotiations 
were a clear example of consensus-building that is commonplace in the community, with the 
ultimate consensus, after considerable engagement, being to postpone any agreement. Some of 
those interviewed expressed frustration with some of the more routine examples of the council 
balancing interests, particularly in managing the business environment50. One Band councilor 
pointed to the successful practice of consensus as exemplified by the use of the healing circle for 
matters such as community justice or general disputes51. This type of example demonstrates both 
the presence of consensus-building for MFN and the successful use of traditional practices to 
solve problems.  
Examining consensus orientations within the community also leads to an evaluation of 
multilevel governance systems for MFN, concerning how consensus is reached at the 
organizational level, as well as cooperation or disagreement with other levels of government. 
This conversation is again relevant to the proposed SG agreement.  All councilors pointed to the 
notion that relations with the provincial and federal governments were primarily positive, noting 
that MFN had usually been allowed to pursue its chosen policy initiatives. One Councilor 
suggested that a federal bureaucrat who came to visit Conne river “would see that we govern 
                                                
50 Managing conflicting interests in a community is never easy, and ultimately some community members will be 
left unsatisfied. One member pointed out that when the local grocery store had sought a liquor license, it had been 
denied, when a short time later, the Band granted a license for its ban-run store at the local gas bar. The situation 
exemplifies the Band council’s need to balance the interests of one local business with the desire to promote a 
reveue stream for the band itself.  
51 A Councilor cited both local justice proceedings and disputes within council as areas where the healing circle 
practice has been used. The process is sometimes used in criminal proceedings to foster reconciliation with the 
victims of the crime, and broader community healing, while the practice is useful in council; in one such example, a 
counselor was accused of misconduct, and after a mediation, that person resigned without serious conflict. 
(Interview 36, April 11, 2017).  
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ourselves already” (Interview 36, April 11, 2017). As McDonald notes: “getting SG, day-to-day- 
would be the same, except [with SG] it’s your house” (Interview, April 11, 2017). This 
testimony emphasizes the idea that, in terms of its relationship with other levels of government, 
MFN has many of the characteristics of SG already, and that these developments have the 
potential to produce benefits by fostering successful policy development.  
5.5.3 Power Orientation 
One cannot discuss the allocation of power between both elements within the community 
and other levels of government, without discussing power orientation itself. Examination of the 
locus of power in the community reveals a policy system that relies upon the legitimacy granted 
through band elections, the development of policy to address community needs, as discussed 
above, and the devolution of powers in order to implement those policies. As seven councilors, 
government employees, and community members note, the drawing down of powers by MFN is 
impressive: In terms of powers that would normally be administered provincially, MFN enjoys 
local control of education, as mentioned above, a locally-run medical clinic with two full time 
nurse-practitioners52, a housing assistance program, and a full land code under the FNLMA. 
These achievements demonstrate considerable policy making capacity at the local level, and in 
the case of health and education, require a high degree of synergy with other levels of 
government.  
Important for understanding power orientation is the degree to which devolution 
produces benefits in the community. Those interviewed are virtually unanimous in saying that 
the benefits of devolution are apparent in terms of outcomes in the community, though there was 
disagreement in terms of degree. One resident indicated that the council is not accountable 
enough as it is, due to the lack of accessibility that the same resident mentioned earlier. A few 
others expressed doubts about whether devolved powers produced the desired benefits discussed, 
or that the rate of improvement had slowed down53, but went on to mention key benefits that had 
                                                
52 One of the Nurse-practitioners at the clinic, Dennis Benoit, sits on the band council, and also served as director for 
the MFN Health and Social Services department at the time of data collection.  
53 Slower growth is evident in the CWB numbers for 2001-2016, compared to the 1990’s (Government of Canada, 
2019).  
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emerged since 198754. The issue of slower growth in community outcomes is further examined 
later in the chapter. 
In addition to evaluating the locus of power in the community, it is important to ensure 
that community members see an important role for local government. Most residents of Conne 
River see an important role for their government, with many acknowledging a role for local 
government in improvements to housing and employment. In regards to whether or not that 
could lead to formal SG, one resident stated that the local government plays an important role in 
the policy improvements seen, but that he was still against SG. In terms of policy “We’re already 
doing it”, he said, but added that without own-source revenue official SG would not work 
(Interview #38, April 11, 2017). Lastly it is important that local decision-making reflects local 
culture, and that policy initiatives are “home-grown”, or designed by the community, for the 
community. Several community members point to practices such as healing circles, discussed 
earlier, but equally important to using culture in decision-making is to promote culture in 
decision-making. As one member stated:  
“[The] Band Council [is] promoting culture and language. I think it is very important 
because...anytime that we can … hang on to our culture and language, makes us a little 
bit unique and the more that we lose that we lose our language. We lose our culture. We 
lose our use of land. That's a big thing. Using the land to sustain, if we lose all of that, 
we're not who we are anymore.” (Interview # 38, April 12, 2017). 
This quote captures the sentiment of most of those interviewed, who were almost 
unanimous in their emphasis on the importance of celebrating Mi’kmaq heritage, and ensuring a 
part of community identity. Those interviewed were also positive in their assessment of 
community efforts to promote and preserve culture.  
Although some were unsure of the role of their local government, many emphasized the 
need for local decision-making to promote positive outcomes. One community member 
highlighted the convergence of factors between 1987 and the early 1990’s, such as chronically 
low incomes, the expansion of the sawmill, and the sudden increase in federal funding, that led 
MFN to pursue the important policy directions, such as its jobs and housing programs, that 
helped transform the community. (Interview #41, April 12, 2017). These developments 
                                                
54 Three elders and two community members stated something to this effect. One stated that while they felt things 
are not improving now the way they were in the 1980’s and 1990’s, there were a lot of good roads and good houses, 
and a new school (Interviews #40, 43, 2017).  
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emphasize the importance of having a local government with the power to make meaningful 
decisions when facing social and economic conditions such as those found in Conne River in the 
1970’s and 1980’s. Not only is it necessary to ensure that the local government is responsive, but 
it must have both the power and policy capacity to make desired changes.  
5.6 Direction  
The key for judging Direction for a local government is to ascertain a clear strategic 
vision, both on policy and on good governance. Strategic vision on policy is established by 
developing policy that progressively addresses community needs, while a vision for good 
governance is determined through both a strong governance plan and clear principles of 
leadership (Institute on Governance, 2019). In order to maintain a stable principal-agent 
relationship, the principal must be assured that the agent is using a positive strategy in executing 
governance. Although direction can be difficult to measure, a number of those interviewed had 
insights on the direction of their government. Their testimony generally points to a positive 
direction in terms of both policy and governance since the 1991 time marker identified, as 
compared to beforehand. This is largely due to increased financial resources, the presence of 
strong leadership and improved policymaking capacity.  
5.6.1 Strategic Vision on Good Governance  
Based on a review of its policies and discussions with members, the core vision of 
governance for MFN appears to be to establish effective, responsible local government, both 
formally and in practice, that meets the needs of the community, and keeps power local. This 
vision demands some degree of adaptation of federalism to accommodate meaningful SG at the 
community level55. According to a band employee, the goal of the negotiations for SG, and of 
the creation of a land code under the FNLMA, was finding ways to do things more 
independently, while maximizing overall revenue. Between funding transfers, local economic 
activity56, and EI payments, he added, the community has sufficient funds and would lose some 
                                                
55 This was discussed in chapter 2. See also Abele and Prince, 2005. 
56 At the time of the interview, Conne River had several businesses operating, including a grocery store, a gas bar 
and liquor store (run by the band council), two bed and breakfasts, a restaurant, and a small fishery (license held by 
the band). 
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of this under SG (Interview #33, April 11, 2017). Another band employee stated that the 
community’s vision was about finding balance:  
“Even though in 1986 the school was acquired by the community, we still have to abide 
by the provincial curriculum ... you still need that provincial influence … especially in 
health policy. … In a sense there's a sort of combination where you follow the provincial 
curriculum but also there's lots of yes local stuff incorporated... [our control] is more in 
sort of teaching practices and other projects." (Interview #34, April 11, 2017). 
A community member echoed this sentiment:  
“I think a lot of people, they don’t like the Indian Act, they feel that it restricts [a 
community] … But they still ... like the way that Conne River is running, but I don’t 
think that, when it comes down to it, they don’t want the full control to be at the band 
office." (Interview #42, April 12, 2017). 
These three pieces of testimony seem to describe a community that has attained a 
measure of autonomy in the design and implementation of policy. At the same time, MFN is able 
to adapt provincial policy to suit local needs whether by, for example, ensuring school 
curriculum includes Mi’kmaq language and cultural traditions, or by ensuring that the medical 
clinic is equipped to provide culturally sensitive care (especially important given that culture can 
be an important determinant of health)57. This suggests a collaborative approach to governance 
that prioritizes local solutions for meeting community needs while still relying on provincial and 
federal governance infrastructure. Some still hold the desire to achieve full SG in the long term. 
Councilor McDonald offered an apt analogy: Conne River is a house, and a SG agreement to the 
title deed, as introduced earlier. The “house” belongs to the people of MFN, which has the 
flexibility to implement policy, or operate the house, in a way that works for residents. Many 
members, however, want the deed to their house (Interview, April 11, 2017). These testimonies 
demonstrate that Conne River has a strategic vision on governance, which it is still developing. 
Although there is some disagreement on the direction governance should take, most of those 
interviewed are happy with the evolution of policy and governance in MFN since 1987. 
                                                
57 A study of adults from MFN showed a positive relationship between traditional practices and health (2014). A 
report by the Health Council of Canada (2012) explains why western healthcare practices can be alienating or 
exclsionary (or even racist) for indigenous people in Canada.  
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5.6.2 Strategic Vision on Policy 
"...Here [In Conne River] we’ve got the structure in place where our policies are sound... 
I’ve been working since ’91 and there’s always been policies in place, and they’re still 
being updated, and normally by a policy committee, and there is a process for that… if 
you're going to go with SG, you should have all your policies in place. Some places, they 
don’t even have any policies whatsoever. [At MFN], we have a lot of similar policies [to 
the provincial and federal government], but tailored to our community” [emphasis added] 
(Interview #33, April, 17). 
This was said by a government employee on the importance of locally-developed policy. 
The quote captures a broader theme in the examination of policy development for MFN: strategic 
vision for governance of a community is critical, and it lacks substance without a coherent policy 
structure. Members interviewed tended to point to MFN’s vision on policy as evidenced in the 
policy directions the community has taken since 1987, particularly in terms of housing, jobs, 
education, and culture, while others cited a lack of vision, evidenced by a recent period of little 
change. One member suggested, for example, that “there is a plan and a vision at the school to 
teach the Mi'kmaq language to kids, and they hold the [annual] Pow-wow, which is important, 
[but] I don't know if it is a good overall vision for success…” (Interview #38, April 12, 2017). It 
is too early to tell how successful the language program will be, but the vision and plan that has 
been set out lays a clear foundation for the community. A band employee notes that MFN has 
"outlined everything as a great big strategic plan that’s... not just for a couple years, but… a long 
term plan..." (Interview #33, April 10, 2017). As mentioned above, he compared this to some 
bands he had visited that appeared to lack a strategic policy framework, but had SG. He also 
noted it is difficult to have long term thinking with an election every 2 years58. The issue was put 
to a referendum in 2016, but residents voted against it.  
5.7 Performance 
To assess the performance of a local government, we break the concept down into 
responsiveness and effectiveness and efficiency. Responsiveness can be measured by gauging 
                                                
58 Recall from chapter 2 that two years is the standard time horizon for band council elections under the Indian Act. 
As Cornell and Kalt (2007) note, these short time horizons are associated with poor policy outcomes, as they make it 
more difficult to make long term decisions.  
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how well community residents feel their government hears their concerns and responds to their 
needs. Effectiveness and efficiency, on the other hand, is measured in this thesis through 
evaluation of key policy outcomes. Of the Five Principles, performance measurement makes the 
greatest use of empirical data, such as the CWB findings used to demonstrate success in key 
policy areas. Residents offered an array of feedback on responsiveness, effectiveness, and 
efficiency to supplement qualitative findings. Due to its empirical value and foundation in policy 
outcomes, performance is central to understanding whether and how SG in MFN is successful in 
producing better outcomes since 1991 than beforehand.  
5.7.1 Responsiveness 
The key to understanding responsiveness is to assess whether policy attempts to address 
needs in the community, and whether people feel their voice is heard. Testimony presented in 
section 5.8.1, earlier, notes that thoughts on accountability are mixed. Most state that they are 
able to approach the council, and be listened to, but it is not always clear what has been taken 
seriously. A number of community members pointed out that council was more responsive in the 
1990’s and early 2000’s59, but that it is often difficult to see or measure that same responsiveness 
today. One member stated this, but also reiterated that things improved dramatically after 1991, 
and are still improving, but slowly (Interview #38, 2017). One of the most common complaints 
from residents was regarding persistent boil water advisories60, and problems with the sewage 
system, which recently saw $3 million in upgrades. Two residents complained that there is a 
sewage outlet on the beach near their home, and that during the summer months, the smell is 
unbearable (Interview #37, April 11, 2017). The challenge in addressing complaints about 
complex infrastructural problems is these problems can be difficult to address quickly, especially 
with limited resources. A common theme for rural communities is that even expensive systems 
fail or are difficult to repair, especially water and sewage systems (National Ground Water 
Association, 2017; US Department of Housing, 2006). When there doesn’t appear to be 
movement in certain policy areas, many residents may blame government responsiveness, or 
assume nothing is being done. Those who are upset with their government are likely to continue 
                                                
59 Interview #37, April 11, 2017, #40, #41, April 12, 2017. This was a period of rapid improvement in community 
well-being followed by a period of more gradual improvement, see CWB scores from the CWB index, Government 
of Canada, 2019).  
60 The most recent of which was lifted June 13, 2007. There have been 5 boil water advisories since 2007, prompting 
frequent upgrades to MFN’s small water treatment facility (Barry, CBC News, August 2019) 
Evolving Governance Merrell 94 
to feel that way in spite of positive outcomes later on (Hibbing & Theisse-Morse, 2008). In the 
case of water treatment, media sources and interviews with government employees and band 
councilors reveal ongoing remediation efforts that may often be invisible to community 
members. A worthwhile tactic to address this problem is to strengthen lines of communication on 
what is being done about key issues. This relates to our discussion of voice in section 5.5, in 
which some members cited challenges in engaging or in receiving information. Overall, the 
evidence suggests that MFN is responsive, but there are challenges in communication about 
policy solutions. 
5.7.2 Effectiveness and Efficiency 
MFN is at least reasonably responsive as a government, but is it effective and efficient in 
maintaining current policy outcomes or introducing new policy to improve those outcomes? A 
cursory examination of community outcomes on the CWB report (Government of Canada, 
2019), and of a recent evaluation of the MFN Grant Agreement (Government of Canada, 2011) 
show that up until 2011, MFN has had considerable success in policy outcomes, as illustrated in 
Chapter 4. Less information is available regarding policy success since then, as the most recent 
edition of the CWB was completed in 2016. The data gathered for this study serve to both 
evaluate residents’ impressions since 2011, and get a sense of what the numbers mean for people 
in the community.. In the analysis of CWB data, presented in chapter 4, all 5 of Conne River’s 
CWB scores improved sharply from 1981 to 2001. Since 2001, the rate of improvement has 
levelled off substantially61, but the community was already scoring well on all metrics by this 
time. There is room for improvement in community outcomes, as in any community, but a steep 
growth curve like that seen in the 1990’s is usually not sustainable, and it is possible that some 
residents have become disillusioned with slower growth in outcomes more recently. This means 
that overall growth is more positive, and more beneficial to the community, than some residents 
may realize.  
                                                
61 Between 1981 and 2001 the overall CWB score for MFN more than doubled, from 32 to 66, compared to a 22 
percent improvement across all First Nations Communities over the same period. From 2001 to 2015, however, 
CWB in Conne River improved by a much more modest 7.6 percent, from 66 to 71, a growth rate that is more 
comparable, though still superior, to growth in other first nations (6.2 percent) over that period.   
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5.7.2.1 Housing 
For housing, the CWB data are both descriptive and encouraging, and yet has become a 
point of contention from some community members. One member suggested that “compared to 
other communities, you hear things, that we’re lucky to have good housing in our community” 
(Interview #42, April 12, 2017). Others, however, suggested that there are problems with the 
scoring system for allocating housing or housing subsidies (5/14). Income is taken into account, 
they say, but there were concerns about how it is calculated62. One particular member noted that:  
“The housing system has really progressed from where it was, but 4 houses per year is 
not keeping up [with the demand]. The point system needs adjusting. The housing 
program [formally] began in '97… prior to 96/97, people were building their own homes 
and a very, very small percentage [were receiving assistance from the band]. We had no 
no programs in place, but now you have a program in place that looks after low income 
[earners] and you have a program in place for [building] sweat equity…[and] for loans." 
(Interview #38, April 12, 2017). 
 This member has pointed out the three main elements of the program. A point system is 
designed to determine financial need, there is a rent to own program for those who cannot get a 
mortgage or purchase up front, and there are low interest loans available, to be combined with 
financial assistance (MFN Government, 2017). A government employee added that MFN has its 
own capital lands and housing department, which oversees the allocation of housing. Two houses 
per year are built for the community. "Everybody's got a place to live", he stated (Interview #33, 
April 11, 2017). This implies that the previous claim that four houses per year is inadequate may 
not be accurate. According to the CWB index and the AANDC Report on the MFN Grant 
Agreement, crowding rates63 in Conne River are among the lowest among indigenous 
communities for housing, meaning that even if community members are frustrated with the 
process of obtaining housing, the situation is at least manageable, given limited resources.  
                                                
62 For instance, one member suggested that when a band member is cohabiting with a non-member, the non-
member’s income is not counted. Another pointed to an example where a single adult had received a subsidy to 
purchase a 3 bedroom dwelling while several families with children remained on the waitlist.  
63 Recall from Chapter 4 that crowding rates are the key metric used to determine a community’s CWB score for 
housing (Government of Canada, 2019). For MFN, the housing score for 2016 was 94, ranked 14th among 387 
indigenous communities across Canada that received a score for housing in 2017. Note: housing scores were only 
given to communities with at least 250 residents.  
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5.7.2.2 Employment 
Several members had feedback on the Employment Assurance Program as well. Some 
(5/14) noted that employment numbers increased dramatically in the 1990’s, but now are steady. 
All government employees and band councilors interviewed point to the program’s ongoing 
success, with one noting that the program had “transformed the community”, with 180 members 
currently on the program (Interview #33, April 11, 2017). He noted that Employment Insurance 
only provides funds to those who are between jobs or work seasonally, never to those who are 
chronically unemployed. He added that there have been changes to improve productivity, such as 
incentives. A community member pointed out that the program definitely works: people grumble 
about "part time" work, but when you think about it, EI is own-source revenue under this system, 
and “that's good for the community” (Interview #38 April 12, 2017). This comment is in 
response to recurring complaints (6/14 in this study) that the term “full employment” is 
misleading, because those who accept seasonal work with the band only work for part of the 
year, and many argue that is not “full employment”. This is reflected in the figures seen in the 
CWB score for labour force participation. (Government of Canada, 2019)64, which do not count 
those working under the Conne River Employment Assurance Program. It is worth noting, 
however, that, given the relative lack of local industry, many of these individuals would likely be 
unemployed entirely without the Program, and thus would be ineligible for EI. Taking this into 
account, it becomes clear that, although the program may not truly produce full employment, it 
still produces considerable financial benefits for the community, constituting a clear 
improvement on conditions that existed prior to 1987.  
5.7.2.3 Language and culture 
Another policy area in which the band council has been active is language and culture. As 
described earlier, the Se’t A’newey Kina’matino’kuom school is 80 percent staffed by teachers 
from the community. This is because the band provides financial support to band members to 
study education away from the community, and band control of the school means it can offer 
preferential hiring to Mi’kmaq applicants. Several teachers have been sent to do a Mi’kmaq 
language immersion program in Nova Scotia. These initiatives have generally been positively 
                                                
64 The 2016 score for MFN is 69, having remained relatively constant from 2001. The data are derived from the 
Canadian Census, which takes into account weather workers are employed throughout the year. Those who work for 
only 17-21 weeks are not counted, as they fall below the threshold.  
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recieved in the community, although some have expressed concerns. One elder emphasized the 
importance of traditional culture in the communities and commended the school program, but 
said that while young children are often engaged with the programming, many teenagers seem to 
lose interest (Interveiw #43, April 14, 2017) Some of those interviewed expressed uncertainty at 
the benefits of Mi’kmaq language education, wondering if the program might divert resources 
away from other programs, or have an adverse impact on test scores (Interviews #34, April 11, 
2017; #42, April 12, 2017). The question of whether student performance is impacted by 
language and culture programs is outside the scope of this study, however the CWB data do 
show a sharp increase in high school completion rates almost soon after MFN assumed control of 
the school in 1986. This finding demonstrates previous findings that engagement with traditional 
culture helps both facilitate access and increase benefits of education for indigenous students 
(Leavitt, 1995; Hampton, 1995; Kitson and Bowes, 2010).  
Despite some concerns, there is strong support for a language program at the school 
(most of those interviewed, 9 of 14, praised it), but is the program working? School language 
programs are difficult to assess because they are designed to promote long-term outcomes (i.e. 
language-fluency), and they typically do not produce fluency on their own (see section 6.7.2.3). 
A number of community members echo this sentiment. Some feel that the program is unlikely to 
produce fluency at all (3 of 14), while others (4 of 14) felt that it is a positive step but is unlikely 
to produce fluency without parents also learning the language and speaking it at home. This 
challenge is more common in a community where only a small percentage of the population are 
fluent in an indigenous language: it becomes very difficult for children to reach a point of 
fluency because there is no way to provide language immersion. This is a difficult challenge, but 
community members are not wholly discouraged by it - many feel it is positive just to have some 
Mi’kmaq language in the community, so that it will not be lost entirely.  
Community members were virtually unanimous in their praise of other community efforts 
to promote Mi’kmaq culture, such as the local annual pow-wow, which hosts Mi’kmaq from 
across Atlantic Canada, and includes cultural performances, such as song and dance. Another 
example is the Little Braves program, which has community elders provide instruction to local 
children and youth in traditional practices, such as wilderness survival, trapping, and snowshoe 
making. Chief Joe and Councilor McDonald each highlight the gains made in language and 
culture revitalization over the last several years, but that there is more to be done: “ever since 
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taking over the school in the 1980's we've been able to address culture in the community, and 
you know we've brought back things that haven't been in the community in a long time” 
(Interview, April 11, 2017).  
These successes in reconnecting with culture are also reflected in the community’s use of 
Mi’kmaq traditions at the political level, such as having a chief with both ceremonial 
administrative duties. As Chief Joe notes, he is “largely a cultural ambassador for the 
community” (Interview, April 11, 2017). Some of his administrative duties are shifted onto other 
councilors such as McDonald, who serves in the dual role as Band solicitor and vice-chief, 
allowing Joe to spend time on the important work of advocating for Miawpukek and Mi’kmaq 
history and culture worldwide. These activities range from setting sail in a birch bark canoe 
made in Conne River, to lend credence to Mi’kmaq oral history, or petitioning the Scottish 
government to return ancient Beothuk remains65, to speak on behalf of MFN. Miawpukek has 
demonstrated a vision for cultural leadership in addition to its vision on administrative 
governance.  
5.8 Accountability and Transparency 
Accountability and transparency are closely connected to some of the themes covered 
section 5.5, and so have already been discussed. For example, transparency is concerned with the 
flow of information between principal and agent, whereas voice describes how the principal is 
able to convey concerns and priorities to the agent. Accountability is a measure of how much the 
agent is bound to serve the interests of the principal, while consensus and power orientation 
concern how much the principal is able to influence the agent. All of these relationships 
underscore the legitimacy of governance structures. Since 1991, MFN has performed well in 
terms of accountability and transparency, held accountable through to band members through 
both elections and public inquiry, and able to demonstrate accountability through delivering on 
policy. Transparency is achieved through information sharing, which is practiced through public 
                                                
65 For example, in 1999, Chief Joe and a small crew from Conne River sailed from Cape Ray, NL, to Chapel Island, 
NS in a traditional birch-bark canoe, making the traditional journey Mi’kmaq had made centuries earlier as part of 
their seasonal travels. The modern journey served to demonstrate to the world that the perilous trip could have been 
made with available technology at the time. Joe also negotiated the return of the remains of two Beothuks, 
Nonosabasut and Demasduit, announced in January 2019. The remains had been in the possession of the Scottish 
National Museum since 1827, having been taken from Newfoundland before then. Chief Joe made several trips to 
Scotland to petition for the remains to be returned to Canada as an important gesture of reconciliation, and the 
remains are now being transferred to the Canadian Museum of History in Ottawa (McNeish and Ladik, Jan. 2019).  
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meetings and reports (Government of Canada, 2011). Crucially, MFN is able to provide adequate 
accountability and transparency than the provincial and federal governments did prior to 1991 
precisely because MFN serves its community directly and is more accessible to members. Some 
community members did express concerns on the topic of accountability, discussed below. 
5.8.1 Accountability  
One community member notes that the band council is both constrained, and also held to 
account, under the Indian Act, by virtue of the requirement to report revenues and expenditures, 
and to follow set procedures for elections and government protocols (Interview 41, April 12, 
2017). Others (4 of 14) felt that there was uncertainty as to the level of accountability that would 
be present without the Indian Act. This is one of the major reasons why some members were 
recalcitrant about the concept of a final agreement on SG. As another member put it: “they 
would do whatever they like” (Interviews #37, April 11, 2017; # 40, April 12, 2017). Some of 
those interviewed pointed to positive developments in accountability. As mentioned earlier there 
is a governance code guiding council decisions, and an elections code, both of which were 
ratified by the community, ensuring that governance operates in a way that is compatible with 
community preferences. As one community member points out: 
“council is elected [by the] community ... they get voted in and then they all get this 
certain portfolio to handle different things and if we didn't have this band council, we 
wouldn't have anything, would probably look like some of these places up [in Nova 
Scotia and elsewhere] That looks pretty bad... Band councils there aren't always as 
active… this one has a strong record, we've got a good chief there every minute and the 
community can hold council accountable and make sure they make good decisions. That's 
why we have good policies.” (Interview # 42, April 12, 2017). 
This quote summarizes the sentiments of a large portion of the community who see the 
strong policies described earlier as stemming directly from the accountability of council. 
Although accountability can be difficult to ensure, MFN appears to possess solid mechanisms for 
promoting it, which, in turn, fosters positive policy outcomes in the community.  
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5.8.2 Transparency 
Community members consistently cite strong public confidence in the transparency of 
elections (12/14, but fewer cited confidence in the transparency of government activities (5 of 
14). 6 of 14 respondents also expressed concern that transparency would decline under an 
official SG regime, due to the disappearance of reporting requirements under the Indian Act and 
the associated Grant Agreement. One member thought they would "get away with things or do 
things that... that the communities probably might not even be fully aware of" (Interview # 42, 
April 12, 2017). Another stated that the public is largely unaware of band council activities, 
particularly in the operation of the fishery. The band holds several fishing licenses and a small 
fleet, which are leased to a private company. The public is unaware of the specific activities or 
financial condition of the company. An audit was conducted in 2015, which was inconclusive 
and vague (Community member, Interview 41, April 12, 2017). Another community member 
noted:  
“There were concerns that there would be - It's not just about the [OSR issue] - that there 
would be less accountability with self-government which is which was counterintuitive to 
me because I thought self-government was supposed to be about more accountability, and 
that information never got out..."[emphasis added] (Interview 38, April 12, 2017). 
This quote, again, relates to the point raised earlier: A key pitfall is information flow, 
which is detrimental in terms of transparency, because it leads to a lack of public confidence. A 
second community member noted:  
"we still have communities complaining that there's not enough accountability but if you 
compare other First Nations to what we do here everything all our meetings are open the 
minutes go to the public anybody can come in and ask for information… so long as it's 
not private information or confidential information, it's provided… Copies of financial 
statements, so everything is open but I don't think they realize… what other communities 
do so they have nothing to compare it to." (Interview 34, April 11, 2017). 
The testimony seems to confirm the idea that public confidence is shaken by a perceived 
lack of information flow. Since this information is available, either through an access to 
information request or a review of council record of decisions, this is not a fatal flaw and can 
likely be addressed through a more robust communication strategy. From a theoretical 
perspective, improved transparency will be crucial to long term success in SG because, as was 
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highlighted in section 2.2.5, the incomplete flow of information between principal and agent, 
who are both rational actors, can lead to self-interested or detrimental behaviour. Moreover, 
improved transparency would improve public confidence within MFN.  
5.9 Fairness 
The final Principle of Governance is fairness, which concerns how well a community 
serves equity and the rule of law. These elements are largely outside of the scope of powers 
devolved to the community, but community members did have thoughts about them.  
5.9.1 Equity 
In terms of governance, equity concerns the ability of a government to ensure that 
different groups have the opportunity to participate equitably in society. Since MFN is a First 
Nations community with a predominantly Mi’kmaq population, this would primarily include 
women, people with disabilities, or lower income residents. One of the issues identified was 
whether people are able to participate fairly in band elections. Most felt that anyone can 
participate in elections, although some suggested that elections are too long, which can drive up 
the costs of a campaign. Another common concern regarding equity is whether policy benefits 
are distributed within the community according to need. Impressions regarding this issue were 
mostly positive, however, some members, again raised the issue of the point system used by the 
housing program, with one member noting: "There's been instances here where you know 
families have applied for a same house and you have single men living in a four-bedroom 
house". This issue could potentially be resolved with an adjustment of the point system, which in 
turn could be informed by a gender-based analysis of the housing program to ensure that the 
point system is assessing needs properly.  
5.9.2 Rule of law 
Public safety and policing is managed provincially throughout Newfoundland and 
Labrador, either through the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary, or through local-provincial 
partnerships that install RCMP detachments like the one in Conne River. There is therefore no 
direct relationship between law enforcement and local policy. A few residents did express ideas 
about how the rule of law is perceived locally. One band councilor noted that it is difficult to 
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enforce community policies, because people only ever support policies that benefit them thus use 
of law enforcement to back local policy is generally to be avoided. For that reason, small 
communities are usually governed through social pressure and a system of agreements between 
residents. There is another side of this problem, which is the perception from the individual 
community member’s point of view that the band council does not enforce anything, or that it 
does not enforce anything on behalf of a community member. One member highlighted the issue 
mentioned earlier in which the tender for a liquor license was refused to one local business, when 
there is a liquor store occupied by the band. In addition, the band requires band employees to 
purchase items at the gas bar, also operated by the band, for official business, such as hosting 
events. This issue, together with the one listed above regarding the lack of transparency in the 
operation of the fishery, has left certain members with the impression that the band protects its 
own interests but not those of local business. On the other hand, public-private partnerships like 
the one involving the fishery often include stipulations that are private, while it is not uncommon 
for local governments to require their staff to patronize publicly-run services. Refusing a license 
to a private business to prevent completion with a publicly owned business should be addressed 
in the next policy review cycle. This problem demonstrates the challenges associated with 
managing conflicting interests and preferences, and with enforcing local laws fairly.  
5.10 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the history of MFN and the Mi’kmaq of Newfoundland, then 
discussed three key policy areas examined in this thesis, and finally conducted an evaluation of 
governance in Conne River, using the Five Principles of Good Governance. Examining 
governance with this method reveals how MFN is able to excel in both delivering on its key 
policy priorities and exercising leadership, both within the community and across Canada. Four 
key successes are listed below.  
● Outcome 1: CWB scores for Conne River are high and consistently rising.  
● Outcome 2: MFN has an effective housing program that promotes low crowding rates has 
seen the community go from a very low CWB score to a very high score.  
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● Outcome 3: MFN has gained control of local education, which has seen rising highschool 
completion rates66 and the creation of a new Mi’kmaq language program.  
● Outcome 4: MFN has a decent employment rate and high incomes, compared to the 
average First Nations community67.  
MFN band members have good reason to be proud of the accomplishments of their 
community over the past few decades. From being one of the poorest communities in the already 
poor Coast of Bays region, Conne River has become one of the most prosperous in the region, 
and has done so without a strong source of own-source revenue, such as revenue from a mining 
operation. As of 2016, Conne River ranks 64th out of more than 1000 indigenous communities to 
have received a CWB score68. Despite these successes, the examination of the three policy areas 
and the Five Principles also reveals five key points of concern for band members:   
Issue 1: Transparency and information flow: Some members feel left in the dark. The issue 
of transparency came up in almost every interview, with most community members raising 
concerns about information flow. Improved communication and engagement would help to 
address this problem. In particular, better communication could help alleviate concerns that there 
has not been meaningful action on issues such as the sewage and water treatment systems, which 
are difficult and complex issues to solve.  
Issue 2: Language retention: Doubts about the potential for success, concerns about 
resources 
Preventing language shift or loss is a complex and challenging area, and some community 
members are unsure whether language shift is possible to reverse. If the goal of the MFN 
language program is one that produces fluent speakers, then more resources, such as Mi’kmaq 
lessons for parents, would be required. If the goal is simply to promote familiarity with the 
Mi’kmaq language, then it is already a successful program in that it gives students a solid 
introduction to Mi’kmaq language.  
                                                
66 On the CWB index (2016), out of 387 First Nations communities, MFN is ranked 52nd for education, with a score 
of 54, which is considered moderate. This is compared to a score of 9 in 1981.  
67 ibid. MFN is ranked 172nd for labour force participation, with a score of 68. It is also ranked 49 of 387 for 
income, with a score of 69. These numbers are a substantial improvement from 50 and 29, respectively, in 1981, but 
are more modest than improvements in housing.  
68 Recall that only communities over 250 residents were given a score for individual indicators, such as housing. 387 
such communities were listed as First Nations. All communities with over 60 residents, however, received a general 
CWB score. There are over 1000 First Nations communities with such a score (Government of Canada, 2019).  
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Issue 3: The Employment Assurance Program does not produce “full employment” 
Although it is true that full employment normally refers to each eligible worker having full time 
employment, this is not always necessary or required to promote well-being in a community. By 
receiving earnings seasonally, then going on EI, members are able to secure higher annual 
incomes than social assistance payments alone would provide, at a lower cost to the community. 
The issue does generate public frustration, as many feel unable to secure adequate work.  
Issue 4: The Market-Based Housing Policy does not always allocate housing equitably.  
Several problems were identified regarding the scoring system, mainly which it fails to take 
some conditions into account, and so does not always allocate financial assistance according to 
need. A review of the guidelines with a gender-based analysis leading to more comprehensive 
guidelines could address the issue.  
Issue 5: The previously rapid rate of improvement in policy outcomes appears to have 
slowed.  
The ‘levelling off’ of some indicators has led some in the community to become concerned that 
the community government is no longer very active. This is largely a problem with 
communication and transparency, since members are not always aware of how much is being 
done to address issues. It is also important not to become complacent, and allow standards or 
procedures to loosen. Continued policy review and analysis and strong public engagement will 
be necessary to maintain the progress that has been made over the last few decades.  
The questions this thesis asks are: How has Indigenous governance in Canada evolved 
over time, especially in the past two decades? What explains the successes of certain governance 
structures and policies, introduced in self-governing communities, in achieving higher socio-
economic outcomes? The case of MFN offers an answer for each. The evolution of governance 
in MFN since 1987 differs from what went before in that it used to be a small, struggling 
community, with few policies and relatively little governance, but with residents who had 
innovative policy ideas. Since receiving recognition, the community gained more financial 
resources and developed home-grown, purpose-built policies that address community needs. In 
this pursuit, MFN had to contend with the institutional constraints of Canadian federalism, from 
its disputes with provincial and federal governments over status and withheld funds, to 
navigating the complex regulatory landscapes imposed by the Indian Act. Despite the fact that it 
was brought under the Indian Act at a time when many communities were trying to do the 
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opposite, MFN has been able to work beyond legislative constraints, charting its own course in 
policy and government, while receiving financial resources to make new policy options possible. 
As a rational actor representing the interests of the residents of Conne River, MFN has had 
success with its policy initiatives because these initiatives were designed in the community, 
developed in the crucible of the community’s history, outside of the one-size-fits-all aproach 
present in the Indian Act.  
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“If Nunatsiavut Government hadn't been there, and LIA hadn't been there, none of this would be 
there. We'd be back where we were in the early ‘70's, with the [provincial] government telling us 
what to do, when to do it, how to do it. It's the biggest thing that's happened. People realize now 
that they do have rights, they do have a voice”.  
- Jim Lyall, Ordinary Member, former President, NG Assembly 
interview, April 27, 2017 
Chapter 6: The Evolution of Governance in Nunatsiavut 
6.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents a case study evaluating governance outcomes for Nunatsiavut 
Government (NG), which serves residents of the Labrador Inuit Settlement Area (hitherto 
referred to as the Settlement Area or Nunatsiavut69), as well as Labrador Inuit across Canada. I 
use the Five Principles of Good Governance, as presented by the Institute on Governance (IOG), 
to analyze the results from a series of semi-structured interviews with officials and community 
members. For additional context, I draw on various records, including policy documents, data 
reports, and media reports. The chapter also explores the modern concept of SG via the modern 
treaty process, seen through the negotiation and ratification of the Labrador Inuit Land Claims 
Agreement (LILCA). The qualitative analysis presented here, together with the data presented in 
chapter 4, demonstrates that, as with MFN, not only does NG enjoy strong governance outcomes 
in empirical terms70, but it also has performed better, on average, than self-governing 
communities across Canada on the metrics identified in the CWB. Self-governing communities, 
meanwhile, tend to perform better on the four community indicators measured in the CWB than 
most communities that either operate fully under the Indian Act, or are non-status71 and non-self-
governing. As this case study will demonstrate, outcomes in Labrador Inuit communities 
                                                
69 Settlement Area refers to the geographical area created by the LILCA, while Nunatsiavut refers to Labrador Inuit 
society in the abstract: Settlement Area residents, diaspora, the Settlement Area, and NG itself. 
70 Based on figures from the CWB (Government of Canada, 2019). Communities served by NG have enjoyed 
greater improvements in terms of policy outcomes, than other Inuit communities across the Canadian Arctic, and 
enjoys generally better outcomes than communities that are not self-governing 
71 Recall from the previous chapter that a number of indigenous groups were never governed under the Act and so 
are non-status. These include Inuit, metis and federally unrecognized, or non-status, First Nations people. The Inuit, 
in particular, lived outside the areas impacted by the treaties.  
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improved markedly directly after NG formed in late 2005. It shows that his change is attributable 
to a combination of the homegrown, community-tailored policy systems that NG has been able 
to deploy. This demonstrates that an empowered, properly funded regional government is better 
equipped to produce positive outcomes in governance, than government by provincial and 
federal governments, and better able to be an advocate for its people than representative 
organizations such as the Labrador Inuit Association (LIA).  
 Section 6.2 begins with a brief history of the Labrador Inuit from pre-contact through to 
the formation of the LIA, while 6.3 summarizes its submission of a CLCA, its attainment of SG, 
and the layout of the newly-formed NG. In section 6.4, I describe NG’s strategy in three policy 
areas. Sections 6.5-6.9 examine the state of governance in NG using the IOG’s Five Principles. 
6.5 looks at legitimacy and voice in the community, highlighting how residents feel about thier 
input into the political process. 6.6 continues with a discussion of direction, examining where 
respondents feel MFN is at in terms of governance, and where things are headed. Section 6.7 
discusses performance by examining representation (6.7.1) and key performance outcomes 
(6.7.2) in housing, employment, and language and culture, highlighting NG’s performance since 
its 2006 formation, the time-marker identified in Chapter 3, compared policy outcomes found 
before then. Section 6.8 discusses respondents’ thoughts on the accountability of their 
government while 6.9 examines fairness. Section 6.10 then identifies 5 key success for NG, then 
and discusses 6 key issues needing to be addressed.  
6.2 Labrador Inuit history 
6.2.1 from pre-contact to 20th century hardships 
 The Inuit are a circumpolar culture that have historically occupied vast stretches of arctic 
tundra and boreal forests in the far north. Inuit Nunangat, or homelands, extend from the modern 
day territories of eastern Siberia, Canada, Alaska, and Greenland (Inuit Tapirisat Kanatami, 
2019; Brice-Bennett, 2012; Dickason, 2009). Labrador Inuit are known to have occupied the 
northern coast of Labrador continuously for more than 1000 years, and Inuit history holds that 
Inuit have lived there since time immemorial. The Labrador Inuit subsisted through a seasonal 
rotation of moving inland to hunt caribou, fox, and other animals, then to the coast for fishing, 
hunting seal, and whaling. In terms of governance, they lived predominantly in smaller groups of 
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20-30 mebers for much of the year, often congregating in larger numbers in coastal areas to 
mingle and trade (Heritage Newfoundland and Labrador, 2008). The primary mode of 
governance for these groups was Inuit customary law, elements of which are still practiced 
today. Contact between Labrador Inuit and European whalers and fishermen began in the 15th 
and 16th centuries, and early encounters were predominantly for trade, though violent 
interactions did occur (Brice-Bennett, 2012).  
Inuit life evolved differently from that of the Mi’kmaq during the colonial period. Until 
the late 19th century, settler populations in Labrador consisted largely of seasonal fishing traffic, 
traders, and Moravian missionaries who established settlements along the coast. Inuit continued 
their seasonal movements and activities much as they had done prior to contact until the 20th 
century, but increasingly relied on trading furs, seal pelts, and whaling products in exchange for 
goods offered by Europeans, such as guns, nails, and metal tools (Dickason, 2009). This led to 
the creation of trading settlements along the coast. During the 18th century, Moravian 
missionaries from Europe began establishing missionary posts on the Labrador coast72 (Hiller, 
2015). The mission outposts served predominantly as trading posts until the 19th century, when 
settlers began to move in. Descendants of resulting intermarriages between these groups still 
reside on the north coast today, many of whom identify as Labrador Inuit. By the early 20th 
century, due to financial difficulties, the Moravian mission was forced to lease its lands and 
trading rights to the Hudson’s Bay Company (HBC), which traded primarily in furs, leading 
many Inuit to become more dependent on the fur trade. The HBC set prices, which were profit 
and market-driven, and, as Korneski highlights (2016), replicated colonial patterns of interaction 
that consolidated settler authority and racialized systems of compensation73. This colonial 
relationship deepened hardships for the Inuit.  
                                                
72 The Moravians set up numerous trading posts along the Labrador coast. The first of these was Nain, the first 
missionary settlement for Inuit to be established in North America (Hiller, 2015). Soon after, stations were also 
erected at Okak and Hopedale and eventually Hebron. Later, in the mid-to-late 19th century, Makkovik, Ramah, 
Zoar, and Hebron, were established. Zoar, Hebron, Ramah, and Okak would later be abandoned. Hebron is now an 
important Labrador Inuit heritage site, and has received considerable attention from archaeologists. The detailed 
archaeological record on the northern coast of Labrador would later become a factor in the successful negotiation of 
the LILCA (Alcantara, 2009, 2014).  
73 Korneski (2016) notes that race and class - based delineations help to shape patterns of interaction and 
institutionalized the often impoverished payments Inuit received for their trade goods. These patterns help to solidify 
settler dominance and contributed to Inuit poverty. Although this article is based primarily on records from 1830-
1850 - nearly a century prior to the takeover of the mission licenses by the HBC, the company had already been 
active in the region for some time (Dickason, 2009).  
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Confederation in 1949 had significant political impacts on the Inuit, particularly the 
provincial government’s policy of denial of indigenous presence in Labrador. For Inuit, the 
impact of this was different than for other groups, in that Inuit do not fall under the Indian Act74. 
Instead, Labrador Inuit would have been invited by the federal government to negotiate a CLCA 
in the 1970’s75. Due to the institutional structure of Canadian federalism, however Inuit groups 
living within a province as opposed to a territory generally became institutionally embedded 
within that province in terms of the delivery of services that the federal government would be 
responsible for in a territory (Dickason, 2009; Alcantara, 2008, 2014; Pain, interview 15, April 
20 2017)76. This has caused the Labrador Inuit remain more politically distant from the federal 
government than Inuit in other regions. Many Inuit had by this time converted to Christianity.  
Confederation also impacted Inuit life. In 1949, for instance, Moravian schools77 were 
taken over by the provincial and federal governments and brought into Canada’s Indian 
Residential School System78, where abuse was common and English-only instruction prevailed, 
leading to similar trauma and language and culture loss found elsewhere in Canada between 
1949 and 197979. Collapsing fur prices in the 1950’s and 60’s led Inuit to become increasingly 
dependent on wage labour or government assistance in the coastal communities (Heritage 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 2008; Dickason, 2009). The combination of economic decline and 
colonial policies led to considerable economic and social hardship for Labrador Inuit. This 
culminated in the closure, by the Provinces of Newfoundland, of the communities of Okak, 
                                                
74Unlike the Mi’kmaq and the Innu, who, upon receiving recognition, came under the Act. Like the Inuit of Nunavik, 
Labrador Inuit existed in a regime in which political and legal responsibility for Inuit affairs was ambiguous. 
75 Recall that, in 1973, The Government of Canada invited indigenous groups that did not already have formal 
agreements to negotiate modern treaties with the Crown. The first of these was a combined treaty between the Cree, 
Naskapi, and Inuit of Quebec, in the historic James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (JBNQA) of 1984 
(JBNQA, 1984; Alcantara, 2016).  
76 The Inuit in the Canadian arctic (what is now the Northwest Territories, Nunavut, and Nunavik), had limited 
contact with the south, and received very little attention from the Federal government, until after the Second World 
War. Early interactions were often a negative experience, as seen with the forced relocations that occurred during 
the Tuberculosis epidemic of the 1940’s and 50’s, or during the High Arctic Exiles in the 1950’s (See Government 
of Canada, about the Nunalivut Initiative, 2019, and the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples The High Arctic 
Relocation, 1994.  
77 Since the late 18th century, Moravian schools provided and promoted literacy and oral instruction in the Inuit 
language, using an orthography based on Roman letters and developed by the missionaries (Taylor, 1998).  
78 Interestingly, the systematic removal of children from their families and placement in the schools that stripped 
them of language and culture and subjected them to abuse, took place despite the fact that the government of 
Newfoundland and the Government of Canada had each taken the official public position that Newfoundland and 
Labrador did not have indigenous groups.  
79 In 2017, Prime Minister Trudeau delivered a formal apology on behalf of the Government of Canada to survivors 
of the Newfoundland residential schools. The apology was accompanied by a class action settlement of over $50 
million for the survivors and their families (Bartlett, November 2017; Government of Canada, 2019).   
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Nutak, and Hebron in the 1950’s, and the subsequent relocation of residents to other 
communities, primarily Nain and Hopedale. The resettlement deepened hardships for those 
affected, in some cases separating neighbors, families and friends. 
6.2.2 The Labrador Inuit Association and Submitting a land claim 
In response to their hardships they were experiencing, the Labrador Inuit joined the 
Federation of Newfoundland Indians when if formed in 1973 to begin advocating for recognition 
and land rights80. They then withdrew in 1975 to form the LIA, which, in 1977, began 
negotiating a CLCA with the provincial and federal governments81. The negotiation of modern 
treaties is more complex in a provincial jurisdiction than for Inuit in territorial jurisdictions (such 
as the Inuit and Inuvialuit of the Northwest territories) because it requires agreement from three 
signatories (The provincial government, the federal government, and the indigenous group(s) 
concerned) as opposed to just two (the group(s) and the federal government) (Alcantara, 2014, 
2016; University of Northern British Columbia, 2020)82. Negotiations officially began in 1984, 
and historical and anthropological evidence was gathered to build the case for a Labrador Inuit 
Settlement Area (NG, 2019; Heritage Newfoundland and Labrador, 2008)83. 
The LIA began to provide services to Labrador Inuit, laying the groundwork for the SG 
agreement that would create NG. The LIA grew to include the Labrador Inuit Development 
Corporation, which created jobs and focused on economic development for Inuit; the 
OKâlaKatiget Society, which provided broadcasting services in Inuktitut and English for Inuit 
audiences, the Labrador Inuit Alcohol and Drug Abuse Program, and the Labrador Inuit Health 
Commission (NG, 2019; Heritage Newfoundland and Labrador, 2008). These organizations 
played an important role in beginning to address issues such as poverty, unemployment, and 
housing shortages. More importantly, they demonstrate the re-emergence of community-driven 
                                                
80 Like other indigenous advocacy organizations that formed at that time, the Federation, and the LIA were a 
response to the Trudeay government’s infamous White Paper on Aboriginal Peoples, released in 1969, which 
proposed abolishing Indian status altogether to focus on policies of assimilation. This caused widespread outrage 
among indigenous groups and academics, as it would mean extinguishment of indigenous rights. See Palmater, 
2019; Coulthard, 2007; and Wetzel, 1995, 1999.   
81 Thery were joining the Nunavik Inuit and the Inuvialuit, who had begun the process in 1973 and 1984, 
respectively. 
82 Recall that becoming institutionally embedded at the provincial level meant a different experience for Inuit in 
terms of governance than for Inuit living in the Northwest Territories or Nunavut (See Wilson and Alcantara, 2012; 
Alcantara and Davidson, 2016).   
83Archaeological evidence would fill a critical role not only in determining the traditional lands of the Labrador 
Inuit, but in probing their very existence as a people, after governments had initially denied it.  
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governance for Labrador Inuit, which would in turn lead to complex regional government. One 
of its most important accomplishments was forming the Torngat Regional Housing Association, 
an arms-length agency that owns housing units in the five Inuit communities in the Settlement 
Area and helps provide affordable housing for those in need.  
6.3 Regaining Inuit governance in Labrador 
6.3.1 Nunatsiavut Government 
 After more than 15 years of negotiations, the LILCA was signed by the three parties in 
2004. The claim gave Labrador Inuit legal title to more than 15,000 square kilometers of 
settlement lands along the Labrador north coast (called the Settlement Area) and a suite of 
powers and rights over hunting, harvesting, resource revenue sharing, and service delivery. The 
LIA was dissolved, and NG was created in its place under the self-government chapter chapter of 
the LILCA to administer services to Labrador Inuit. The incumbent LIA president, Anthony 
Anderson, assumed the role of interim NG president until the first presidential election in 2008.  
NG is a regional government with an array of administrative functions, the majority of which are 
located at its main administrative building in Nain (along with the President’s office). The 
legislature, called the Nunatsiavut Assembly, is located in Hopedale and consists of a total of 18 
elected members: the President, ten ordinary members84, one AngajukKâk (Inuit leader similar to 
a mayor) each for Nain, Hopedale, Makkovik, Postville, and Rigolet, and the chairs for each of 
the two community corporations in the Upper Lake Melville area85. Ordinary Members, 
AngajukKâks, and community corporation chairs are elected in a general election every four 
years, the most recent of which was in 2018. Presidential elections are every four years, but are 
staggered between general elections. The next Presidential election will be held in the spring of 
2020. Although NG is primarily responsible for administering the Settlement Area on the 
northern coast of Labrador, it also has representatives from Upper Lake Melville (ULM) and the 
Constituency of Canada, which represents all beneficiaries living across Canada.  
                                                
84 The ordinary members are elected representatives for the constituencies of Nunatsiavut. They include one each for 
Hopedale, Makkovik, Postville, and Rigolet, as well as two each for Nain, and the Upper Lake Melville area (home 
to more than 2500 Labrador Inuit), and the constituency of Canada (office located in St. John’s).  
85 Which consists of Happy Valley-Goose Bay, Mud Lake, and Northwest River, situated on the shores of Lake 
Melville. There are currently two community corporations, though the NG constitution allows for additional ones to 
be created as needed. Currently they are: Suvunivut Community Corporation, in Northwest River, and Nunakatiget 
Community Corporation, in Happy Valley-Goose Bay. 
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The NG President serves several roles, including presiding over Nunatsiavut Assembly 
meetings, facilitating consensus in decision-making and selecting a cabinet. Six of the ten 
ordinary members elected to the Assembly are assigned a role in Cabinet, such as minister of 
Education and Economic Development or Minister of Nunatsiavut Affairs, in addition to their 
legislative role. Like provincial and federal ministers, ministers in the Nunatsiavut Assembly are 
responsible for administering the offices and services of NG. Key programs that ministers 
manage include education and skills development, allocating funds for housing, operating 
programming to support language and culture retention, and working on strategic initiatives to 
address problems like overcrowding and food security (NG website, 2019; Interview 15, April 
28, 2017). NG derives much of its funding from a fiscal financing arrangement set out in the 
LILCA, and also has tax-raising authority and draws resource revenues from the Voisey’s Bay 
mine, owned and operated primarily by Vale, Inc., which lies entirely within the Settlement Area 
and with which the Labrador Inuit have an Impact Benefit Agreement (IBA). Together these 
revenue streams, which amount to significantly more than the LIA had prior to 200686, help to 
finance a sophisticated governance structure and policy agenda for Labrador Inuit. One 
informant (Ernie McLean, interview, April 20) pointed out that without the kind of political 
power that a fully functioning regional government, backed by a land claim, it is unlikely that 
Labrador Inuit would be able to secure as much autonomy or funding as it did.  
6.3.2 Understanding Inuit Corporate Governance 
 Section 2.3.3 discusses Inuit corporate governance in the arctic, and its relationship to 
MLG. In Nunavut, regional community corporations, such as Nunavut Tuungavik Corporation, 
exist alongside the public government of Nunavut, but have different responsibilities87. Unlike in 
the other Inuit Nunangat, Nunatsiavut self-governing on a limited-membership model. Due to 
this, LIA was dissolved because NG would be able to represent Inuit directly. Nunavut requires 
regional corporations to represent Inuit interests because it is a public government, responsible 
for serving all residents of the territory. In Nunatsiavut, corporate governance is exercised 
                                                
86 See Alcantara, 2017, and NG website, 2019. Half of respondents, most government officials and elected members 
and a third of community members think that Nunatsiavut is better off than it was under the LIA (Interviews, April 
3-May   
87 The Inuvialuit have their own development corporation representing the interests of the Inuvialuit Settlement Area 
while residents remain under the jurisdiction of the Government of the Northwest Territories. The Nunavik Inuit 
have two corporations: Kativik and Makkivik Corporation. 
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through Nunatsiavut Group of Companies (NGC), an arm's-length consortium of companies, 
51% owned by NG, that helps employ Labrador Inuit and ensure local business development and 
vital services, such as air travel88. Most of those interviewed recognize the importance of 
Nunatsiavut Group of Companies in promoting economic development in the region and 
providing employment to beneficiaries, however some expressed concern about the lack of 
transparency of the group, or that NG has no direct control over the companies’ activities. This 
issue highlights the complex nature of Inuit corporate governance and its integral role in the 
policy ecosystem of a regional government like NG. The Group could play a role in facilitating 
NG’s strategic objectives on housing infrastructure development. NGC also plays a role in 
capital management for NG. Currently, the LILCA provides for a 30-year fiscal agreement with 
the Government of Canada, after which time NG plans to be fiscally self-sufficient. This plan 
rests in part on NG’s capital holdings and investments, which are held in trust in order to 
continue to ensure funding for NG programs after the current fiscal financing arrangement 
expires.  
 6.4 A policy framework  
 Like MFN, NG has made advances in government by policy since the creation of NG in 
2006. This includes an arrary of programs that support NG’s efforts to aleviate poverty, increase 
incomes and labour force participation, address some of the daunting infrastructure and housing 
problems it is experiencing, especially in Nain and Hopedale, and reduce culture and language 
loss. Per our discussion from chapter 2, in examining the policy landscape present in 
Nunatsiavut, NG can best be understood as a rational actor, working as an agent to maximize 
benefits of its beneficiaries. Operating within an imposed institutional structure, NG must 
implement the LILCA and SG by enacting policies to improve the lives of Nunatsiavummiut.  
6.4.1 NG beneficiaries, membership, and residency  
 In order to manage services for beneficiaries, NG must, like any government, establish 
who exactly it serves, and justify this decision. This critical question determines who benefits 
from the LILCA. Chapter 5 contains a discussion of membership troubles experienced by the 
                                                
88 Reporting to the Labrador Inuit Capital Strategy Trust, NGC is designed to build capital to be held in trust for the 
benefit of Labrador Inuit, in the form of profitable companies. The Precursor to NGC is the Labrador Inuit 
Development Corporation, which was formed in the 1970’s to promote economic development in the region. 
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Mi’kmaq of Newfoundland, and similar membership disputes have affected Labrador Inuit. 
Some of these difficulties revolve around a widespread frustration and lack of clarity around how 
membership is determined, and whether or not the practice is fair. In addition, there is a 
perceived divide, among Nunatsiavut beneficiaries, between those who reside within the NG 
settlement area, on the north coast, and those who reside in ULM, or in the rest of Canada. As 
one beneficiary from HVGB reminds us (Interview, April 25, 2017), NG’s obligations under the 
LILCA are primarily to beneficiaries residing in the Settlement Area. This creates a problem for 
many since the majority of Labrador Inuit live outside of the land claims area, and some, 
especially in ULM, have unique or complex program needs. The same informant also stated that 
she had voted in favor of the LILCA, along with over 75 percent of beneficiaries, when it was 
ratified in 2005, but that many who voted for it did not fully realize what they were voting for. 
Benefits would be more concentrated in the Settlement Area, and some would lose membership 
entirely due to multigenerational absence from the settlement area89. Enforcement of these rules 
has become more rigorous in recent years, with the registrar reviewing the membership of 
individuals as they apply for services. One informant (interview 10. April 24, 2017) suggested 
that this increased scrutiny is due to the rising costs of service delivery, and a desire to reduce 
membership in order to reduce program liabilities, with closer observation of the rules being a 
defensible way to do so.  
 Another problem, mentioned by 5 informants, 3 of whom were women living outside the 
Settlement Area90 is the issue of children that were taken forcibly from their homes and placed in 
foster care, often far away from their home communities, due to real or perceived abuse or 
neglect by provincial or federal authorities91. The crisis continued for decades, with multiple 
generations taken from their homes. Some have argued that a lack of care was taken to place 
children in the care of family members or to keep them in their communities (Sinclair, 2007). 
                                                
89 The determination of membership for Labrador Inuit is outlined in Chapter 3 of the LILCA. The chapter sets out 
rules for registration as a Labrador Inuit beneficiary: an individual must either be of at least one quarter Inuit 
ancestry (by birth record) and have been born in the Settlement Area or have a parent or grandparent born in the 
Settlement Area (LILCA, 2004). These criteria are controversial. Some people of Labrador Inuit ancestry have 
strong roots in the ULM region, their families having been there for several generations.  
90 Interviews #1, April 3, 2017; #2,# 6, April 21, 2017; #10, April 24, 2017; #17, April 28, 2017; and #20, May 2, 
2017. 
91 Dubbed the ‘60’s Scoop, the crisis affected indigenous communities across Canada. In a 2017 class-action 
settlement, survivors were awarded over $800 million by the Government of Canada. Some have argued that the 
60’s Scoop never ended, with children continuing to be taken from their homes and mishandled by the system, being 
taken far from home, losing touch with family, or siblings separated (Sinclair, 2007, Government of Canada, 2020). 
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This eventually led to loss of membership years later, as some individuals grew up far from the 
Settlement Area, often losing connection to their home communities. There are numerous 
documented cases of one sibling receiving membership under the LILCA, while the other did not 
as a result of being separated from the family (Sinclair, 2007; Interview #10, April 25, 2017). 
These issues are of extreme importance to many beneficiaries because, as we will see, many 
people have come to rely on services offered by NG, and their ability to benefit is impacted by 
their status as beneficiaries or as residents of the Settlement Area. The research questions 
investigated in this thesis concern how the policy agenda of a self-governing community 
addresses community needs. The issue of membership raises the question of whose needs are 
being addressed by policies, and how this is decided. This chapter will focus primarily on 
recognized beneficiaries when determining how the community benefits, but it is important to 
understand the complex nature of this question, since the question of who is a member and who 
is not is complex.  
6.4.2 Housing policy in Nunatsiavut 
 Similar to other regions of the Canadian arctic, especially the Inuit Nunangat, 
Nunatsiavut has a housing crisis. This crisis is complex and heavily influenced by contextual 
factors, such as an arctic environment, lack of road access, and high building and heating costs. 
Nunatsiavut also faces a distinctive fiscal reality, which it shares with Nunavik, but is distinct 
from the other two Inuit Nunangat in the high Arctic. Indigenous organizations situated in one of 
the three territories receive special additional funding reserved for communities situated north of 
the 60th Parallel. As part of provinces, Nunavik and Nunatsiavut do not qualify for this 
additional funding, and their funding agreements are determined primarily by their respective 
CLCAs. In addition, NG does not qualify for housing or infrastructure funding earmarked for 
First Nation reserves. One NG government employee (Interview # 15, April 27, 2017), 
highlighted that Nunatsiavut exists in “every policy gap you can imagine for an Aboriginal 
person in this country”, despite its complex infrastructure funding needs, which are comparable 
to those of other fly-in-only, arctic communities. Nunatsiavut does receive some dedicated 
funding for housing under its fiscal financing agreement with the Government of Canada, but the 
employee described it as minimal in comparison to the needs.  
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 The key housing problem in northern communities like those in Nunatsiavut is lack of 
availability and affordability, which leads to overcrowding and, as homes age, health hazards 
such as mould, and a need for repairs. Statistics Canada defines overcrowding for a private 
dwelling as having at least one bedroom too few for the number of occupants (Government of 
Canada, 2019). These dwellings often contain multiple generations or families within the same 
household. According to the 2012 Regional Housing Needs Assessment (NG, 2014), conducted 
in partnership between NG, The Government Canada, and the Government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, 10 percent of dwellings in the Settlement Area are overcrowded, while 40 percent are 
occupied by more than one family. 74 percent of dwellings are in need of repairs, and about 44 
percent had issues with mould. These figures are typical of homes in Inuit Nunangat across 
Canada, and, as the Standing Senate Committee on Aboriginal Peoples found in its (2017) report, 
the problem had worsened slightly across Canada’s arctic over the past decade. The needs 
assessment conducted in Nunatsiavut represents the first in-depth assessment conducted by NG 
since its formation in 2005, and will be used to inform future policy.  
 Currently, the policy framework for housing in Nunatsiavut consists largely of subsidized 
housing provided to low income families by the Torngat Regional Housing Association (TRHA), 
an arms-length association of NG. TRHA was founded by the LIA in the 1990’s to address the 
growing housing difficulties experienced by Labrador Inuit in securing affordable, safe, and 
warm housing. As several of those interviewed highlight, NG has been able to ensure increased 
funding to TRHA since 2006, which was intended to lead to new units being built and necessary 
repairs being done (Interview 2, April 20, 2017; Interview 17, April 28; Interview 26, May 9, 
2017). As one local official pointed out (interview 26), NG has been able to secure 
unprecedented funding for TRHA and other programs, including the $15 million set aside for 
Nunatsiavut in the 2016 federal budget, $4 million of which is earmarked for housing. This 
individual identified issues as well, however, specifically that TRHA is only designed to address 
the needs of a certain sector of the population, namely, low-income households that have 
sufficient cash flow to finance subsidized housing and pay for utilities. NG also attempts to fill in 
the gaps through Assisted Living, a federal program that NG now administers, which is designed 
to house people with complex needs, including challenges such as extreme low income, 
substance abuse, or mental illness. NG has operated this program with federal backing since 
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2006. These strategies have created a policy landscape that NG beneficiaries hope will begin to 
alleviate the housing crisis.  
6.4.3 Creating Jobs for Labrador Inuit 
 A key ingredient for prosperity and economic sustainability for NG is boosting the 
employment levels and incomes of Labrador Inuit, which NG supports in several ways. 
Unemployment or underemployment are a perennial problem for many northern communities. 
According to the CWB, labour force activity92 in Inuit communities lags behind the rest of 
Canada, sitting at roughly 75 percent in 2016, compared to 84 percent for non-indigenous 
communities in that year, and down 2 percent since 1996 (Government of Canada, 2019). This 
problem contributes to lagging incomes, compounding the economic challenges residents face, in 
terms of housing affordability and food insecurity93. Between 1996 and 2016, Nunatsiavut 
lagged slightly behind other Inuit Nunangat in terms of labour force participation with a 
weighted average score of 71 across the 5 communities in 2016, up 2 points from 1996. This 
appears to be the result of a combination of sluggish economic growth and resource development 
in the region in the late 20th century, and low levels of education among the local population, 
meaning that many Inuit could not take advantage of employment opportunities in local industry, 
such as mining (Belayneh, Rodon, and Schott, 2018; Rodon and Lévesque, 2015). CWB scores 
for education94 in the five Nunatsiavut communities reached 43 in 2016, up from 32 in 1996, 
compared to a 2016 score of 56 for non-indigenous communities.  
 Nunatsiavut’s method of addressing this gap has been twofold: Ensuring preferential 
hiring of qualified Nunatsiavut beneficiaries by employers inside the settlement area or at Vale’s 
nickel mining operation at Voisey’s Bay, and supporting training and education for beneficiaries 
to help ensure they are qualified for new employment opportunities. The requirement to hire 
qualified Inuit at Voisey’s Bay is part of the Impact Benefit Agreement (IBA) between Vale, and 
Nunatsiavut, negotiated as part of the broader LILCA process in 2005. As noted by Alcantara, 
                                                
92 Recall that this indicator is derived from an equally-weighted combination of labour force participation, by 
percentage of working-age population, over the week prior to the census, and the percentage formally employed.  
93 Food insecurity is an ongoing problem in Nunatsiavut, with over 80% of Nain and Hopedale residents 
experiencing food insecurity, with lower rates in the other 3 communities, according to a 2017 survey (NG).  
94 Recall from Chapter 4 that Education scores are derived by combining two equally-weighted variables, the 
proportion of a community’s population, 25 and older, that holds a university degree, and the proportion that holds a 
high school diploma or greater.  
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(2008; 2014), and by several of those interviewed95 The IBA with the Voisey’s Bay mine, and 
development pressure in general, was an integral part of the completion of the LILCA, since the 
mine was situated in Labrador Inuit traditional territory. The IBA, among other things, requires 
that at least 51 percent of employees be beneficiaries of the agreement. The other cornerstone of 
employment-related policy in Nunatsiavut is the support it provides for training and skills-
development through the Post-Secondary Inuit Support Program (PSISP). This suite of grants 
and other funding is designed to assist beneficiaries with the costs of post-secondary education or 
apprenticeships, by subsidizing the cost of travel, lodgings, tuition, and other expenses for those 
pursuing job training away from the Settlement Area. Most of those who use the program travel 
to Happy Valley Goose Bay, in central Labrador, to pursue training there.  
6.4.4 “Speaking into the future”: language and culture revival 
 Another key policy issue for NG, which was identified as important by a large majority 
of those interviewed (25 of 32) and as a top priority by 10 of 32, is the issue of culture loss and 
language shift in Nunatsiavut. Many cultural traditions of Nunatsiavummuit have seen revival in 
recent years, and traditional subsistence practices such as fishing, trapping, and hunting continue 
to be widely practiced. Labrador Inuttitut language shift documented in detail by Andersen and 
Johns (2005), and by statistics Canada (2019). Andersen and Johns offer a detailed profile of 
Labrador Inuttitut and a related dialect from Rigolet, as distinctive dialects of Inuktitut. 
Anderson and Johns identify the extent and causes of language shift in Labrador. After Inuttitut 
transmission was disrupted over multiple generations by the Newfoundland Residential Schools, 
most Inuit children in Labrador were no longer exposed to the language at a young age, resulting 
in lack of fluency. According to statistics Canada, fewer than 27 percent of adults are fluent in 
Inuttitut today, most of whom are elderly. The current demographic situation could see total 
language shift within the next generation (Andersen and Johns, 2005).  
 NG has an important opportunity to act upon the urgent issue of Labrador Inuittitut 
language shift. This is being done primarily through two ventures: Support of the Language Nest 
Program, which has been in operation since 2005, and the Inuit Bachelor of Education Program 
(IBEP), which is offered by Memorial University of Newfoundland in partnership with NG, at 
the Labrador Institute. The IBEP is designed to ensure that there are qualified Inuit teachers 
                                                
95 Interviews #5, April 20, 2017, #18, April 28, 2017; #20, May 2, 2017; Andersen, Interview, April 28, 2017. 
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equipped with traditional knowledge and Inuttitut language skills for teaching jobs in the 
Settlement Area. The program turned out its first graduates in 2019. The Language Nest, which 
currently operates in Nain and Hopedale only, is an immersive all-Inuttitut preschool to Grade 3 
program designed to foster Inuttitut fluency. Together, these two programs are intended to 
promote study and reproduction of Inuit culture and reverse Inuttitut language shift by creating a 
continuity of native speakers. The Language Nests are resource-intensive and struggle to find 
qualified staff. Inuttitut language instruction is also available to students in Nain, Hopedale, and 
Rigolet.  
 There are several other policy initiatives that are relevant to culture and designed to 
promote both cultural continuity and overall well-being. An important example is the 
Community Freezer initiative, which provides local, culturally appropriate food, such as moose, 
seal, fish, and berries. The initiative targets vulnerable populations, including elders, in both 
ULM the Settlement Area, who are unable to get out on the land. The program is provided out of 
the two Inuit Community Corporations in ULM and through the Inuit Community Governments 
in the Settlement Area. Food is provided by or purchased from local hunters. The Community 
Freezer is one example of how NG supports cultural activities and continuity in the context of 
changing circumstances. With food security a growing issue in the Settlement area, in part due to 
the ban on caribou hunting to preserve a dwindling local herd. Changes in sea ice reliability due 
to Climate Change are disrupting seal hunting as well (Communities of Labrador, 2005; Wollett, 
2010). Caribou and seal are traditionally two primary food sources of the Labrador Inuit, and 
their disruption has deepened food insecurity for Labrador Inuit, especially those in vulnerable 
populations. One ULM resident stressed the importance of the Community Freezer for 
vulnerable people in particular in ULM, both for sustenance and cultural continuity (Interview 8, 
April 24, 2017). 
In each of these policy areas, NG exemplifies rational use of its limited resources to 
produce better outcomes for its beneficiaries than existed prior to 2006. NG faces notable 
institutional and environmental challenges, however. Institutional challenges include constrained 
fiscal realities, early childhood education regulations requiring a daycare license and training to 
operate the Language Nest Program, a lack of educational resources in the Settlement Area and 
minimum provincial and federal standards for skilled work in trades and other professions, which 
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pose challenges for ensuring employment. Environmental challenges include extreme cold in 
winter, sea ice that limits shipping, and lack of roads.  
6.5 Legitimacy and voice 
 As mentioned in section 5.5 of the last chapter, gauging legitimacy and voice traces the 
flow of decision-making power, determining who has a voice in decision-making, and how. The 
principle is underpinned by participation across the community, consensus orientation, which 
determines how consensus is reached and that decisions result, and power orientation, which 
describes the locus of power and control. This part of governance is important in answering our 
research questions, as it is central to understanding how governance in Nunatsiavut differs today 
from what was seen under the Provincial government and the LIA prior to 2006, when 
substantial changes took place in terms of representation and also helps explain why NG is more 
effective at meeting the needs of beneficiaries. As one beneficiary and former Ordinary Member 
of the Assembly pointed out, NG is the result of a carefully negotiated land claim and is now 
responsible for negotiating on behalf of Labrador Inuit, that beneficiaries can influence their 
government, and that in turn, NG can be their voice (Interview 13, April 27, 2017). Legitimacy 
and voice has multiple dimensions, especially in a complex regional government, such as NG. 
First, participation is examined thematically by asking who has a voice in affairs within the 
community. Next, consensus and power orientation are examined by reviewing how conflicting 
interests are mediated, how power is exercised, and by whom.  
6.5.1 Participation 
 Understanding how people are able to participate in the governance of their community is 
crucial to understanding SG. Those interviewed had more to say about members having a voice 
than almost any other element of governance. Most of those Interviewed (24/32) stated either 
that members tend to feel they had a voice or that NG gives its members a voice. A member of 
the Assemble stated that he felt that he and the other ordinary members do a good job of bringing 
concerns to the Assembly and Executive Council, even though they have to “contend with 
executive council” and so cannot always guarantee the preferred outcome, but such is the nature 
of regional politics and consensus government (Interview 8, April 24, 2017). A community 
member from Nain pointed out that community concerns definitely are “heard” in in the 
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Assembly, but that “ministers could be more visible and hear them more” (Interview 17, April 
28, 2017). This should not be taken as a wholesale indictment of the cabinet, however, as 
ministers have to balance concerns from across Nunatsiavut and are focused on their own 
portfolios, such as Nunatsiavut Affairs. Another community member from Nain remarked that 
Members try to bring concerns forward, but “it is often a funding issue, they [cabinet] can’t 
address these issues”, or they are working on them already. (Interview 18, April 28, 2017).  
In general, those interviewed noted that NG provides a robust framework for political 
representation of Labrador Inuit. As one informant noted, NG means “having 18 people 
representing you...that’s a big thing... I think [this is] representation and, it’s our people and 
people feel comfortable." (Interview #6, April 21, 2017). In other words, NG provides a strong 
system of representation for Labrador Inuit by having a sufficient number (18) who are local 
people and are accessible to local Inuit. As another resident notes, it is important for Labrador 
Inuit to feel they make their own decisions. For too long, people felt that “you had to be from 
away to make decisions, which becomes a culture in itself… and it takes work, and time, to make 
change”(Interview 5, April 20, 2017). This highlights the importance of local people feeling they 
have a voice in Nunatsiavut affairs, and a plurality of informants (22/32) suggest this is the case.  
 An important caveat to the theme that beneficiaries have a voice is that of Upper Lake 
Melville (ULM) residents. Five informants from ULM (half of those interviewed there) 
mentioned that residents of ULM do not feel their voice is heard as much as those living in the 
settlement area. They also suggested that Ordinary Members from there are diligent in bringing 
concerns forward, especially regarding membership, but many feel their concerns are not heeded. 
Some feel other concerns are not heeded either, such as those regarding access to housing 
assistance. Of the 10 respondents interviewed from ULM, 6 mentioned that housing is expensive 
in HV-GB, and is not just a problem in the Settlement Area. One ULM resident, who does 
community outreach work, stated that the local shelter is routinely full and that there is a definite 
need in the community (Interview, April 2017). This problem is connected to the discussion in 
section 6.4.1 regarding the importance of membership and residency in NG. As one respondent 
pointed out, those living in ULM often “feel left out” of the conversation regarding both 
membership and other issues in ULM (Interview 5, April 20, 2017). Another pointed out that 
membership is frequently the number one issue for ULM residents when the Assembly conducts 
its quarterly town hall meeting in the area (Interview 2, April 20, 2017). A community member 
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pointed out that, although many are upset about the issue of membership and more should be 
done to address concerns, this is the agreement that we all signed on to, and the membership 
rules are in the agreement, and are not easy to change now (Interview 10, April 25, 2017). 
Although this chapter focuses primarily on the importance of governance for beneficiaries, it is 
important to note that the membership rules mean that those who are not beneficiaries do not 
have a voice in the same way that beneficiaries do, which means that many who identify as 
Labrador Inuit will not have a voice in NG policy.   
6.5.2 Concensus and Power Orientation 
 Consensus and power orientation are crucial for understanding governance in 
Nunatsiavut. The issue of consensus is salient because if conflicting interests are not managed in 
a productive way, then governance cannot work for everyone. There are a number of conflicting 
interests in Nunatsiavut, meaning that policy development and treaty implementation are 
determined in part by either power brokerage or collaboration. One relevant example are the 
issues surrounding fishery licensing licensing (over which NG has jurisdiction within the 
Settlement Area under the LILCA), and harvesting rights both inside the settlement area and in 
ULM. Disagreements have existed between members and non-members and between NG and the 
Government of Canada. A few informants highlighted the importance of greater clarity or 
enforcement in terms of fisheries and harvesting in facilitating the wellbeing of Labrador Inuit 
and in terms of facilitating subsistence activities and business initiatives96. Blake, in particular, 
noted the importance of stronger controls on harvesting in the Settlement and Lake Melville 
areas, as there are concerns of over-harvesting, especially by the settler population. 
Unfortunately, the LILCA only covers the Settlement Area for terrestrial resources and imposes 
quotas but does not grant exclusive fishing rights to beneficiaries, meaning some issues around 
harvesting are beyond NG’s control. Others note that respect for Inuit traditional harvesting 
practices needs to be central in ongoing policy development in order to ensure that those 
practices are able to continue.  
As highlighted above, this has implications for food security (Max Blake, April 24, 2017; 
Interview 25, May 9, 2017). Many Inuit continue to push for greater consensus on the 
                                                
96 Interviews 4 and 5, April 20, 2017; Interview 9 and Max Blake, April 24, 2017; Interview 13, April 27, 2017, 
Interview 18, April 28, 2017. 
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management and harvesting of resources and the enforcement of treaty provisions. The decline 
of caribou herds in the area has increased pressure on the issue, as beneficiaries are increasingly 
concerned about land management. Some note that issues such as this make it more important 
than ever to have a strong regional voice for Inuit interests (Interview #4, #5, April 20, 2017; 
Interview #18, Paril 28, 2017). Without a well-equipped regional government, they suggest, 
Labrador Inuit would have difficulty advocating to the same degree, as was the case with the 
LIA, prior to 2005. As one beneficiary pointed out, under NG, Labrador Inuit “have more clout.. 
More ability to fight for the rights of Labrador Inuit” (Interview #10, April 25, 2017). Another 
noted that “transition to SG created the ability to make decisions' ' (Interview #5, April 20, 
2017). The role of NG in being an advocate for beneficiaries also came into sharp relief during 
the Muskrat Falls protests, situated outside the land claims area. Though there was little NG 
could do to oppose the project directly, it was called on to step in on behalf of a number of Inuit 
protesters who were arrested after blockading the project. The protesters are concerned about the 
risks posed by Methylmercury levels in the water and fish of Lake Melville, an issue in whcih 
NG has become a vocal advocate (NG website, 2020).  
Understanding consensus-building within communities necessitates a MLG lens, 
examining relations with external organizations and other levels of government. NG has had a 
few points of contention with other entities, which it has managed as best it can. Alcantara 
(2017) discusses how disputes between NG and the Federal government over harvesting rights 
and quotas, specifically in regard to shrimp fisheries, are managed. In this example, the LILCA 
is specific about shrimp quotas to which NG is entitled, but, due to scarcity and competition, NG 
and the Government of Canada have been at odds in the issuing of licenses, which has affected 
access for NG beneficiaries and companies. This has led to what the author refers to as 
compromised treaty implementation (pp. 339), in which the direction of policy often turns on 
coervice negotiation and the locus of power. The study illustrates what several informants from 
this study allude to - the need for greater certainty and cooperation on fisheries, for the benefit of 
Nunatsiavummuit. NG has so far addressed the matter by standing its ground, issuing permits as 
much as possible and negotiating with the government, which relates to the ongoing theme from 
informants that NG functions as an advocate for beneficiaries and for regional economic 
development.  
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The same study also identifies another case where NG and the federal government are 
able to cooperate more harmoniously on NG’s fiscal financing arrangement, due to clarity of 
treaty language and the absence of any dispute over implementation. This success, called 
administrative implementation, exemplifies what informants have identified as a positive fiscal 
financing arrangement that provides solid funding for NG programs. One NG employee in Nain 
spoke to the centrality of the Fiscal agreement in implementing the LILCA and delivering 
programs for beneficiaries (Interview 15, April 27, 2017) while a beneficiary in HV-GB noted 
that NG policy and government is best if delivered locally, while the most important role for 
other levels of government is financial support (Interview 10, April 25, 2017).  
Another important component of consensus-building at the community level is the Inuit 
model of consensus government, which is an important feature of political life in NG, and is 
cited by many respondents as positive (19 of 32). One informant pointed out that consensus 
government is a crucial part of Inuit political tradition and comes from a long history (Interview 
20, May 2, 2017). Thus, the practice is important not only due to its benefits, but also its 
traditional significance. Consensus government is an important feature because it eliminates 
party politics and adversarial decision-making from the policy-making process, which can foster 
a more collaborative policy approach (White, 2006). This, in turn, can help to foster the kind of 
innovative or cooperative policy initiatives that are often credited with policy success. Consensus 
government can have important implications for power orientation within the community as 
well. What happens when there is an impasse, or when members cannot agree? As one 
respondent notes (Interview 9, April 24, 2017), consensus government can sometimes mean 
government by NG President, since the President can frame the debate or push a particular 
direction if there is a dispute. Overall, informants were positive in their view of consensus 
government.  
6.6 Direction 
Direction is important for understanding government, since it is impossible to predict 
future outcomes without understanding how governance and policy are being shaped over time, 
and what shapes them. As discussed in Section 5.6, the key for establishing directionality in local 
or regional governance is to determine a clear strategic vision, both on policy and governance 
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itself. This is a complex task when examining a compex regional government, but for NG there 
emerges some key themes in terms of strategic vision.  
6.6.1 Strategic vision for good governance 
 Respondents are somewhat divided in their opinions of strategic governance in 
Nunatsiavut, both in terms of whether they think NG is acting strategically, or whether the 
current strategic aims are justified given the socio political reality. A beneficiary from ULM 
pointed out that, when it began operation in Nain and Hopedale 2006, NG "really didn't have a 
long term government plan" to ensure the viability of an administrative apparatus in two remote, 
arctic communities (Interview 5, April 20, 2017). By centering its administrative operations in 
Nain, for example, NG needed to ensure there would be adequate housing and services, such as 
digital communications, for a workforce of over 100, most of them qualified professionals. This 
is understood to have placed some strain on local housing and telecommunications infrastructure, 
which were already limited97. Since housing shortage and crowding continue to be a dire issue in 
Nain, as per the 2014 housing needs assessment introduced in section 6.4.2, the community does 
not have a high tolerance for any strain on these services. He further notes that due to the 
shortage of housing, some qualified personnel have opted not to seek employment with NG in 
Nain, not wishing to move there. This respondent identifies a clear challenge to the successful 
operation of NG, but ultimately it is a problem NG has been able to manage, as NG continues to 
operate and deliver services, and a number of qualified employees have been attracted despite 
challenges. Since NG has a mandate to serve the Settlement Area under the LILCA, and one of 
its priorities is to ensure employment within the Settlement Area (NG website, 2019), from both 
a logistical and symbolic standpoint, the primary bureaucracy and Assembly needed to be 
spatially located within the settlement area, alongside areas of historical, cultural and spiritual 
importance for Labrador Inuit, ultimately creating a logistical challenge that had to be solved.  
  Strategic governance in NG is also exemplified in NG's strategic capital management 
plan, which, though widely praised, has drawn criticism from some beneficiaries. Specifically, as 
resident of HV-GB notes: "People don't understand why they're keeping the money in the trust 
                                                
97 In fact, though they do have high-speed internet with limited bandwidth and are serviced by land lines, the 5 
commuinties on the North Coast continue to be without cellular coverage.  
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accounts”98 rather than use it to address pressing crises in housing and food security (Interview 
#10, April 25, 2017). “But you need to have it there in case you need it for the years to come... 
I've heard people say ‘oh they need to unlock that and deal with the housing now’. People really 
need to balance the two…” Jim Lyall (April 27, 2017) stated that trust funds are to be used 
strategically. We only have 30 years, then we need to be self-sufficient”99. Yet another NG 
official stressed the importance of holding contingency funds in case of futre shortfalls 
(Interview #6, April 21, 2017). A beneficiary from the Settlement Area, on the other hand, 
contended that both NG and Innu Nation had signed an IBA with the Vale, Ltd. for the Voisey’s 
Bay Mine, and NG had put away a substantial portion of the funds in trust instead of funding 
immediate needs, while individuals and families from Innu Nation were recieving a cheque each 
year, a source of frustration for many (Interview #18, April 28, 2017). This position echoes the 
sentiment that funds should be unlocked and used.  
A rational choice institutionalist approach can help to parse the conflicted nature of 
strategic policy in a regional government like NG. A rational agent, acting on behalf of a 
principal, faces conflicting pressures with regard to strategic governance (Hall and Talor, 1996; 
Shepsle, 2006). This is due to the fact that, although it is rational to optimize fiscal resources by 
holding some funds in trust to ensure future fiscal security, it is also rational for a principal to 
increase spending to address current social issues in the face of democratic pressure (the housing 
crisis and food in security in the case of NG). The three Trust funds referenced earlier are 
intended to provide long term financial security. It is unclear how long the Voisey’s Bay Mine 
will operate, or what a future fiscal financing arrangement with the federal government would 
guarantee beyond 2030. As Whitfield and Alcantara (2012) point out, Inuit corporate governance 
may hold the key to fiscal sustainability. A transition to SG in 2006 meant that NG could begin 
to implement its strategic capital plan, with the financial backing to be able to do so, and local 
governance means that Labrador Inuit have control over the funds. This has led to greater fiscal 
capacity to deliver policy for Labrador Inuit than existed prior to 2006.  
                                                
98 This refers to the three main funds through which NG manages its investment funds for future use: the Labrador 
Inuit Capital Strategy Trust, which oversees the NGC, The Labrador Inuit Lands Claims Settlement Trust Fund, 
which is where NG stores a one-time federal transfer it reiceived as part of the claims settlement, and the Labrador 
Inuit Land Claims Implementation Trust Fund, which manages funds used for LILCA implementation (NG website, 
2020 Alcantara, 2014; Wilson and Alcanatara, 2012). 
99 Lyall is referring to the provision in NG’s fiscal financing agreement with the Government of Canada, which will 
expire in 2035, at which point it will need to be renegotiated. At that time, the Government of Canada will no longer 
be obligated to provide the same funding levels under the LILCA.  
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6.6.2 Resource politics and governance success. 
 An interesting case study in examining directionality in governance is the development of 
resource management policies. Much has been written about the impacts of resource 
development on indigenous governance. There is no question that mining operations like 
Voisey’s Bay and Baker Lake, Nunavut, produce economic benefits for communities in the 
Canadian Arctic, and have become major economic drivers for the region (Belayneh, Rodon, and 
Schott, 2018; Rodon and Lévesque, 2015). This source of economic prosperity is no replacement 
for economic planning and strategic policy development. As Sachs and Warner (2001) note, 
resource development can actually be a curse, causing slower development and even political 
unrest, for countries that are not able to build capacity in other ways. The problem can also cause 
environmental damage or economic dependence when projects disappear.  
Dubbed the “resource curse” this phenomenon affects Canada’s indigenous groups as 
well. Although resource development can be an economic driver, and the promise of revenue can 
help facilitate the creation of CLCAs and SG (Alcantara 2008, 2014), it can also be a driver for 
hardship and unrest. For NG, the nearest example is next door: the Muskrat Falls hydroelectric 
dam, a megaproject situated on the Churchill River near HVGB. The project is currently in its 
impoundment phase of construction and is already causing elevated levels of Methylmercury 
(Calder et al., 2016), which are expected to increase further and render wild caught food in Lake 
Melville unsafe. Opposition to the project has already sparked protests among Labrador Inuit, 
especially from Rigolet, the community likely to be most affected. The case of Muskrat Falls 
demonstrates the economic and social risks to indigenous communities involved in a source 
development that is otherwise economically beneficial, and illustrates the need for strategic long-
term planning, as described above. In the previous chapter, we examined a community with little 
OSR or resource revenues, but with a strong policy network and some strategic planning that 
have led to successful policy outcomes. One member compared MFN to a community in the 
Yukon that had strong resource revenue and an SG agreement, but weak policy development. 
Similarly, as discussed in section 6.6.1, NG and Innu Nation each receive revenues through their 
respective IBAs with Voisey’s Bay mine. From these revenues, NG’s decision to fund its 
strategic capital plan instead of making cash payments to beneficiaries exemplifies a 
commitment to strategic planning. Without this type of planning, when a resource project 
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terminates, a community can be left worse off than before, between economic hardship and 
environmental damage.  
6.6.3 Direction on policy 
 Provided a secure funding formula and a sustainable governance structure, a regional 
government like NG can then think long-term about policy. Specific policy instruments will be 
discussed in section 6.7.2, but it is also important to examine the direction policy has taken since 
NG became self-governing in 2006. Overall, this has meant the gradual movement of policy 
from provincial and federal competencies under the control of NG. As one beneficiary from HV-
GB put it “We are recognized as a government”, which had not been the case prior to 2006 
(Interview 11, April 25, 25, 2017). An official from Hopedale stressed that NG’s “ability to 
make [its] own decisions” is a huge success and results in more money flowing to the 
communities for local services (Interview 21, May 2, 2017). An official in HV-GB pointed out 
that NG could work a little more on capacity, as powers such as Education and Health haven’t 
been drawn down yet (Interview 6, April 21, 2017). Others point out however, that although NG 
does not have control (or funding responsibility) over provincial health assets, it does administer 
the funds that flow from the federal government under the Non-Insured Health Benefits (NIHB) 
program. This program is intended specifically for indigenous communities and covers expenses 
not covered under the provincial plan, such as medical, dental and travel to receive treatment, 
and is offered to beneficiaries through NG. The majority (24/32) of those interviewed spoke 
positively of the program, even some of those who spoke negatively about other programs, 
particularly the housing programs, suggesting that administration of the program by NG has 
improved service quality since NG assumed control in 2005.  
 Another important policy direction for NG is the ‘re-indigenization’ of policy and 
government. This trend is seen most clearly through the implementation of consensus 
government, discussed in setion 6.5.2, and also through the mandatory requirement under the 
Nunatsiavut Elections Act, section 118 (c), that any candidate for NG president be fluent in 
Inuttitut in order to be eligible. Approximately one third of those interviewed spoke positively 
section 118 (c). For instance, one beneficiary stated she felt very strongly about the importance 
of the requirement, as it would encourage continued study and revitalization of the language and 
signal a commitment by NG to protect the language (Interview 1, April 3, 2017). Some 
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respondents were critical of Section 118(c), suggesting that, with so few people left who are 
fluent, it may prevent the most qualified candidate from coming forward (Interview 20, May 2, 
2017; Interview 4, April 20, 2018). Despite this possibility, it is clear that NG’s overal policy 
direction is to prioritize language retention and cultural revitalization as much as possible, and 
that it is a priority of most NG beneficiaries (more than two thirds stated that they felt it was very 
important for Inuit language and culture to be preserved and to be reflected in local governance. 
This policy direction is an indication that, despite any institutional or fiscal constraints, NG is 
committed to preserving the distinctiveness of Labrador Inuit identity as a method of promoting 
community well-being, and that local governance is a crucial ingredient producing this outcome.  
6.7 Performance  
 Establishing a clear direction for policy and governance helps us to understand what NG 
is trying to accomplish as a government and where things are going. Sections 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6 
have established how NG is different from what went before the LILCA was signed in 2005 
(greater government autonomy, a strategic fiscal plan, strategic policy objectives, and a strong 
voice for Labrador Inuit when negotiating with other levels of government). Evaluation of the 
specific policy instruments outlined in section 6.4, shows that new policy directions and 
governance structures are, indeed, leading to incrementally better outcomes for Labrador Inuit 
than was seen before 2006, and that the overall responsiveness of NG is part of what explains it..  
6.7.1 Responsiveness  
 Responsiveness, defined as the degree to which a government appears to action or 
address concerns of beneficiaries, is a key way to assess whether a democratic government is 
effective. Though opinions on the responsiveness of NG were positive overall among 
respondents, a number of those interviewed identified problems with the responsiveness of NG. 
Some respondents stated that responsiveness was lacking overall, or that it was unequal between 
ULM and the Settlement area. As one resident in the Settlement area indicated, there is a lot of 
frustration with key policy desires not being met, citing slow movement on the housing crisis and 
lack of action on food insecurity (Interview #18, April 28, 2017). One resident from HV-GB 
gave NG a six out of ten for responsiveness, saying that the government falls down in certain 
areas, particularly in terms of support to beneficiaries living in ULM (Interview #11, April 25, 
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2017). Another resident of HV-GB, who works in the human services sector, echoed this 
sentiment, pointing out that people in ULM do not feel their voice is heard, meaning that they 
likely do not believe that NG is responsive to their needs. 18 of the the 32 people interviewed 
indicated that they believe NG to be adequately responsive, with many stating that, as a 
democratic government, NG necessarily must address community concerns.  
One official from Nain stated that NG is responsive to its beneficiaries’ needs, adding 
that he “believe[s] in democracy and think[s] it has a positive effect in NG, but ... It doesn't 
always work that way”. He further added that in the NG Assembly, ministers are each 
responsible for their portfolios, and make strategic decisions collectively, through consensus, and 
thus decision-making is centered in cabinet, which is responsible for the whole region (Jim Lyall, 
interview, April 27, 2017). This means that the cabinet, which is made up of ordinary members, 
is making decisions that do not appear from the perspective of local residents, to be in response 
to their concerns. Meanwhile, ordinary members often lack direct input into the process, leading 
to frustration. Another resident in Nain highlighted that there was currently a lack of 
communication from ministers, which can further add to the impression of lack of 
responsiveness. Ultimately, most of those interviewed felt that NG is at least somewhat 
responsive to concerns of those it serves, and many of the problems highlighted stem from the 
complexity and diverse needs faced by a regional government in appearing to address needs.  
6.7.2 Effectiveness and efficiency 
6.7.2.1 Attacking the housing problem 
 As discussed in section 6.4.2, NG is currently managing a housing crisis, particularly in 
Nain and Hopedale. The crisis is characterized by difficulty finding housing, widespread 
problems with disrepair and mold, problems with crowding, and even homelessness (Barker, 
October 2019; NG website, 2020). What makes the problem so intractable for Nain and 
Hopedale specifically is the lack of new space to construct new housing, coupled with the high 
building costs and severe financial restrictions. As the AngajukKâk of Hopedale, Marjorie 
Flowers, highlighted, due to the rocky terrain, which has to be blasted the cost for zoning a new 
subdivision of just five homes, and attaching it to utilities, is over $1 million, before construction 
even begins (Interview, May 2, 2017). Nunatsiavut has historically only been able to allocate 
approximately $3 million in funds to Torngat regional housing from its fiscal financing budget,  
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but in 2018 was able to allocate another $2.6 million for high cost housing development 
initiatives (NG website, 2020). If all funds were allocated to Hopedale this year, it would only be 
enough for about 10 single detached homes, still not enough to fully address shortages. Flowers 
further notes that the community is currently experiencing severe water shortages and delivery 
problems100. The system has frequently lost pressure and needed constant repairs over the last 
several years, taking “a tremendous amount of funds from Hopedale”. She added that until the 
crisis is rectified, the community will have limited ability to address other matters.     
As one beneficiary in ULM pointed out: not only are Nain and Hopedale “really strapped 
for...places to build, [but] with rising economy, rising expenses, the low income people are hurt 
the most. The housing problem in Nain actually got a bit worse after Voisey's bay” (Interview 5, 
April 20, 2017). This was due to rising costs adversely affecting low income individuals and 
families that were unable to secure employment through Voisey’s Bay. An NG official in HV-
GB noted that the housing problem is serious, with severe overcrowding, but that, between 
lobbying for additional funds from the federal government and strategically allocating resources, 
NG is addressing the problem (Interview 6, April 24, 2017). One NG official in ULM noted that 
NG is addressing housing issues but it is slow and people are struggling “A lot of people move in 
here [to ULM] from the coast because there’s more resources here so, maybe the Nunatsiavut 
government needs to look at, maybe providing some housing program here or work on 
something with the province, cost-sharing” (Interview 3, April 20, 2017). This sentiment was 
echoed in other interviews in the area, with a woman in HVGB noting that some people come to 
ULM to escape the housing troubles on the north coast, but that high rents also made it difficult 
to live in ULM (Interview 10, April 25, 2017). This response further speaks to the importance of 
continuing to address the crisis.  
Overall, those interviewed were at least somewhat optimistic about NG’s capability to act 
on this problem, with one NG employee and former Ordinary Member noting that it had “Come 
a long way” From the days of the LIA, despite ongoing difficulties (Interview #12, April 26, 
2017). Former LIA President Anthony Andersen highlighted that “only starting to show in the 
last couple of years that someone out there is listening to what the Nunatsiavut government is 
saying and there is starting to become more housing funds available” (interview, April 28, 2017). 
Andersen is in part referring to the announcement in the spring of 2017 of an additional federal 
                                                
100 See also: Pelley, January 2019, CBC news, March 2015.  
Evolving Governance Merrell 132 
transfer of $15 million to NG in dedicated funding for housing. This cash injection, for which 
NG had advocated for some time, could help turn a corner in the ongoing crisis. From 2006 to 
2017, NG’s primary housing strategy was, as identified in section 6.4.2, funding for Torngat 
Regional Housing association, administration of Assisted Living, and additional housing 
initiatives on an ad-hoc basis. In its 2018 budget, which totaled approximately 98 Million, NG 
unveiled additional funds for housing as part of its new Nunatsiavut Housing Strategy. This is a 
further signal that NG is moving in a new direction on addressing housing shortages. 
Nunatsiavut’s CWB101 score for housing score rose from 63.3 to 76.6, an increase of 13.3, 
between 1996 and 2006. This is compared to a slight decline of 5 points, from 71.3 to 66.2, in 
Inuit Communities across the Inuit Nunangat. This means that, although Nunatsiavut lagged 
behind other regions in terms of housing prior to the formation of NG, the overall housing has 
improved markedly since its formation, despite the challenges identified above. This suggests 
that the dedicated housing funds NG has been able to unlock and strategically allocate, through 
Torngat and other initiatives, has begun to succeed in boosting outcomes. It is still too early to 
tell whether the current Nunatsiavut Housing Strategy will boost these gains further.  
6.7.2.2 Promoting employment, raising incomes. 
Overall, thse interviewed were more positive about the employment situation for 
Labrador Inuit than they were about the housing situation. More than half (17 of 32) spoke 
optimistically about NG’s overall strategy for boosting both employment and income for 
Nunatsiavut beneficiaries. As discussed in section 6.4.3, Nunatsiavut does this in two primary 
ways: by requiring employers in the Settlement Area to hire a qualified Inuit Candidate where 
one is available, and by offering support through the PSISP for post-secondary students. Each of 
these programs has had some success in promoting Inuit employment in Nunatsiavut. Anthony 
Andersen noted, for instance, that NG is now able to do things under the LILCA and SG 
agreement that it couldn’t do before, such as guaranteeing a share of employment fo Inuit, 
through Impact Benefit agreements such as NG has with Voisey’s Bay, and, throuugh its 
education department, promoting skills development (Interview, April 28, 2017).  
                                                
101 These figures are taken as a weighted average between the 5 communities in the Settlement Area. CWB housing 
scores are determined by combining the percentage of homes that are not overcrowded with the percentage of homes 
not in need of major repairs (Government of Canada, 2019).  
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An official from HVGB added that the combination of the IBA (which generates demand 
for Inuit trained in trades and other professions) and investment in education programs has “put a 
lot of Inuit in college, which makes us a more skilled workforce”. This quote is accurate 
according to NG’s own estimates; post-secondary enrollments increased by over 25 percent 
between 2006 and 2017 (NG employee, personal communication, April 2017). CWB scores in 
education102 rose from 32 to 43 between 1996 and 2016, a 35 percent increase, whereas the score 
across Inuit Nunangat increased by only 25 percent over the same period. This evidence suggests 
that a combination of NG’s IBAs and training programs have had a significant positive impact 
on education in the region.  
The positive feedback was not universal. Some students have suggested that the PSISP 
does not always provide enough funding or makes unfair decisions. One beneficiary recounted a 
personal situation in which poor grades from courses taken over a decade earlier disqualified him 
from financial assistance (Interview 32, October 26, 2017). Another described a family that 
relocated to HV-GB for training programs for both parents, but were forced to return home as 
funding was insufficient to support the family (Interview 22, May 3, 2017). Several 
respondents103 also pointed out that the IBAs and employment rules are not always fully 
honored, noting that fewer Inuit than the 50 percent quota are employed at Voisey’s Bay mine, 
and NG frequently hires non-Inuit to its administrative offices in the Settlement Area. This issue 
highlights both the need for NG to be vigilant about enforcing IBAs, and the importance of 
strengthening the PSISP in ensuring Inuit are qualified for a variety of jobs (Including those 
offered by NG). One Hopedale resident and former NG official said:  
“There are bad parts of any government. The good thing is that… when [companies] 
come into our communities now, [companies] have to employ some of us, but then you as 
elected official, you have to stand up and make sure that happens. I’ve had run-ins here with 
companies that brought in their labour here and I was ready to ship them back on the next 
plane…”  
Interview #20, May 2, 2017 
This comment not only speaks to the importance of ensuring employment of Inuit in 
Nunatsiavut communities, but also the advocacy role of NG, which ties back to the discussion in 
                                                
102 CWB scores for education are based on an equally-weigted combination of the percentage of residents with a 
highschool diploma or higher, and the percentage of those with univeristy degrees.  
103 Interview #11, April 24, 2017; Interview #18, April 28, Interview #20, May 2, 2017. 
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section 6.5 about the importance of NG as a voice for Labrador Inuit, and that this role may be as 
important as any policy role in impriving outcomes.  In terms of NG’s success in promoting 
employment, some respondents pointed to a lack of increase in the number of Inuit employed. 
The CWB score for Nunatsiavut only increased by 1.4 points, or 2 percent, between 1996, and 
2016. This may appear discouraging, yet income scores increased by 21 points, or over 40 
percent, over the same period104. Coupled with the rising education outcomes for Nunatsiavut, 
the data suggest that although the raw number of jobs has not increased, the quality of jobs has 
increased, suggesting that, through a combinatin of IBAs, job training, and job creation, NG has 
acheived moderate improvement for beneficiaries in employmet.  
6.7.2.3 Language and culture revitalization 
 NG has been active in the preservation of Inuit culture, though it is not able to dedicate 
financial resources to such pursuits to the same degree as more material concerns, such as 
housing. As discussed in section 6.4.4, most informants feel strongly about the importance of 
cultural revitalization by NG, while many feel it should be prioritized. In terms of governance, 
the key theme for culture and language retention for NG is balance. In a political environment 
with numerous, conflicting material demands on NG’s limited resources, NG has had to balance 
those urgent material needs with the equally urgent need to address problems like language shift 
before it is too late. One beneficiary noted: “it [culture] is one of those things that you have a 
department that continues to work and continues trying to integrate that into different programs 
across departments105... Still, you have to put resources into your health. You have to put 
resources into housing and community development as well”. This quote exemplifies the belief, 
held by many, which it is important to balance priorities, but that culture is important. As one 
respondent put it: “there’s nothing worse than losing your culture” (Interview 5, April 20, 2017).  
As Jim Lyall (April 2017) pointed out, “we don’t want people to lose their identity”, it is 
a matter of coming up with the right program. The current language nest, he argued, is very 
good, but by 2017 only 3 children in Nain had completed the program, and NG has to weigh the 
cost of that program (approximately $200,000 per child over 5 years) against other priorities. The 
                                                
104 CWB scores for income are calculated as the average income for a community, taken as a percentage of the 
highest average income in Canada (78,000 per year in 2016). The score therefore does not need to be indexed for 
inflation. 
105Here, “across departments” refers to the fact that culture is integrated into NG policy in multiple ways, such as the 
IBEP, or the Community Freezer.  
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challenge with an immersion program that ends after grade 3 is that it can be difficult to maintain 
fluency when the language is not spoken at home. There have been conversations about 
extending the program to Grade 6, but teachers have complained that this is difficult with the 
shortage of inuktitut language materials for older children. As another resident suggested 
(Interview #20, May 2, 2017), saving the Inuttitut language is critical, but it will take longer than 
10 years, meaning that it is still too early to tell whether NG will have success in reversing 
language shift. Such initiatives take time and resources. Fortunately, as numerous respondents 
remarked, NG has been successful in several initiatives. For example, NG partnered with the 
Rosetta Stone Endangered Languages Program in order to produce a full edition of Labrador 
Inuttitut106 materials for distribution, ensuring that there is a full record of the language to assist 
with transmission.  
NG has also had a great deal of success hosting an annual Heritage Forum, an academic 
conference in which topics in Labrador Inuit history and culture are thoroughly examined. 
Reserchers share insights, archaeological findings, or key themes in ongoing cultural 
conversations. These initiatives will not revitalize Labrador Inuit culture on their own, but they 
do inform and invigorate the conversation about cultural revitalization, while ensuring that 
knowledge and information are available. They also encourage the adoption and dissemination of 
cultural knowledge. What emerges from this is a cultural confluence that NG may be able to 
build on. One resident of HV-GB pointed out that “You're bringing a culture into another culture 
and you have to learn to work and live in both cultures” (Interview 10, April 26, 2017). Another 
beneficiary noted that NG is “very supportive” of cultural revival of practices such as throat-
singing and drum-dancing, but also of the Nain brass band, which many residents are very proud 
of. Enthusiasm for the brass band shows that cultures are not static but can change. The brass 
band is something the Moravians brought over, but it can still be considered an Inuit cultural 
tradition today (Interview, April 2017). These quotes highlight Nunatsiavut’s complex 
relationship with settler society, occupying the nebulous space between cultural adaptation and 
assimilation, attempting to preserve identity while moving forward.  
                                                
106 See the program website at:  https://www.rosettastone.com/endangered/projects/ 
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6.8 Accountability and Transparency 
 Accountability and transparency are hallmarks of a good government because they show 
that there are mechanisms in place to ensure that the government continues to deliver the 
services people rely on, and that they strive to improve if there are shortcomings. In section 6.7, 
an assessment of NG’s policy performance in key areas was given, which demonstrated the 
strides NG has made, since 2006, in improving outcomes. Sections 6.8 and 6.9 examine how 
those successes can be maintained, and how NG can ensure that those successes benefit 
everyone.  
6.8.1 Accountability 
	 Accountability is a critical component of government, and numerous respondents (18 of 
32) mentioned its importance. There are two basic forms of accountability that informants 
identified: Personal accountability, which applied to NG officials, elected or not, in carrying out 
their duties, and institutional accountability, which applies to the operation of the whole of 
government, at any level, in delivering on its obligations. Personal accountability was mentioned 
in the context of individuals within NG being held to account in any case of misconduct. As one 
informant from ULM aptly put it: “there's rules and if you break them, that's it” (Interview 4, 
April 20, 2017). Another Informant from ULM mentioned that when irregularities or misconduct 
are discovered, an ordinary member or other official will either resign or be dismissed. 
(Interview 10, April 26, 2017). This has happened 5 times in NG’s 13 year history for ordinary 
members and ministers alone107, suggesting that NG has a record of promoting accountability 
among its officials. This does not mean accountability is assured, but it does signal to the public 
that accountability is taken seriously.  
The other form of accountability respondents identified was institutional. The main issues 
identified in this regard were related to NG’s accountability to both beneficiaries and to the other 
levels of government in the handling of disbursed funds, and holding other levels of government 
accountable for their obligations to NG beneficiaries. Participants were divided on whether they 
prioritized holding NG or other levels of government accountable to beneficiaries. One former 
                                                
107 These are: Kate Mitchell, 2019, dismissed as First Minister for allegedly interfering with the Torngat Regional 
Housing Association; Minister Roy Blake, 2017, resigned from the Assembly amid-sexual assault charges; Sean 
Lyall, resigned from the Assembly amid -personal spending account irregularities; Dan Pottle, 2015, dismissed as 
Finance Mister after missing a crucial meeting; Max Blake, 2011, resigned amid -allegations of misconduct.  
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official in Hopedale indicated support for financial reporting requirements, saying if NG receives 
money from the provincial or federal government, it has to go through the process of reporting 
on how the money is spent. NG needs to have accountability for the flow of funds (Interview 20, 
April 2, 2017). Another beneficiary noted the loss of investment funds from NG’s capital trusts 
during the 2009 financial crisis (Interview 9, April 24, 2017). This financial loss was largely 
beyond NG’s control, but many beneficiaries were upset by the loss and called for greater 
accountability. Respondents raised some concerns about accountability, but the health of the trust 
funds discussed in section 6.6.1, the ongoing delivery of services, and the removal of officials for 
rule breaking all suggest strong accountability within NG.   
6.8.2 Transparency 
“The biggest issue is communication”. One official in ULM summarized one of the major 
problems NG faces in maintaining the confidence of many of its beneficiaries: perceived 
transparency. (Interview 8, April 24, 2017). One respondent from ULM, a former cabinet 
minister of the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, said that he was unfamiliar with the 
role of each minister within NG. “People don't know what the government is up to”, he said, 
adding that they look to Okalakatiget (OK) radio, the only radio station in the settlement area, 
but suggested that NG shares very little there (Interview 5, April 20, 2017). This is cause for 
concern, because in a region with limited communication infrastructure, a government must take 
additional efforts to ensure adequate transparency.  
NG has a well-developed website, on which it presents information on all of its policy 
initiatives and posts press releases to report any significant activities. As several informants note, 
however, many people, both within the settlement area and in ULM, lack internet access, and 
some expect more robust in-person communication. In addition, multiple respondents indicated 
that NG has weaker communication and transparency in ULM than in the Settlement Area. The 
NG Assembly does conduct quarterly town halls in the area, but this is not often enough to put 
people at ease, and both more frequent updates and more robust flow of information is needed. 
As one respondent noted, NG could benefit from a communications director to develop a 
strategy for ensuring better flow of information (Interview 20, May 2, 2017). When people do 
not receive updates on what their government is doing, they become concerned that their 
government is not addressing their concerns at all. NG’s transparency problem relates to our 
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discussion in Chapter 2 regarding the problem of imperfect communication in the principal-agent 
relationship. Imperfect information flow can allow the agent to be unaccountable to the principal, 
but in this case, it also leads to the principal believing the agent to be unaccountable.  
6.9 Fairness 
The final piece of the Five Principles, fairness, has considerable importance in 
Nunatsiavut. Examining both equity and the rule of law determines the degree to which NG is 
succeeding at ensuring that all Labrador Inuit are able to benefit from the LILCA that was 
negotiated on their behalf. Fairness has critical implications for the legitimacy of NG as a whole.  
6.9.1 Equity 
NG has attempted to ensure equity in a number of ways, such as through programs 
designed to serve vulnerable people, and through its administration of campaigns and elections. 
As introduced  in section 6.4.1, NG’s most salient challenge in promoting equity lies in how well 
it serves residents of ULM versus the Settlement Area, and in how it manages issues with 
membership. Many beneficiaries argue that the issue ultimately turns on equity, because it 
determines who benefits from SG based on demographic characteristics. Two interviewees 
pointed out that the seemingly arbitrary criteria for determining identity is problematic because 
“An Inuk is an Inuk”(Interview, May 2017), and “If your mother is Inuit and your father is not 
[or vice-versa], you’re still Inuit.” (Interview 20, May 2, 2018). The latter informant goes on to 
suggest that denying membership based on mixed ancestry or cultural drift is “racist… [NG] is 
committing political genocide”. Use of the term genocide here evokes the discussion in section 
5.3.1 which centered on the complex nature of Indian Status as a tool to exclude.  
King (2012) and Wolfe (2006) reach the conclusion that the concept of status serves as a 
tool used by federal governments to exclude, usually in order to remove obligations. They argue 
this practice has resulted in genocide by creating a large group that has been stripped of identity. 
Some have suggested that NG risks doing the same if the result is eliminating Inuit identity for 
part of the population. Membership as an equity concern is a governance problem, because a 
government is arguably not working if it is not working for everyone. Sections 5.5 and 6.5 
discuss how diversity of voice in decision-making informs the legitimacy of a government. Any 
discussion about who has the power, or a voice, to influence the policies that serve a community 
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must necessarily also be about who has the power to decide who that policy is serving. This is 
why resolving membership concerns in NG is crucial - If NG is to be evaluated on its ability to 
improve outcomes for Labrador Inuit since 2006, then it must entertain the ongoing conversation 
about who Labrador Inuit are, and that discussion must be as inclusive as possible. 
Another salient theme from the interviews concerns who has the ability to run for office, 
vote in elections, or work in government. Equity is a crucial concept in a representative 
democracy, because it connects again with the concept, discussed in section 6.5, of voice in 
policy making as a determinant of legitimacy (Hibbing and Theisse-Morse, 2008). From a 
rational choice institutionalist perspective, representative democracy is an agent-principal 
relationship where the principal has 3 avenues to influence the agent: through voting, running for 
office, or entering the bureaucracy (Taylor and Hall, 1996).  In NG beneficiaries feel 
overwhelmingly that NG elections are fair (30 of 32 interviewed), although some felt that NG 
could take some actions to improve access to voting. 4 respondents108, for example, noted that, 
for voters in the Canadian Constituency, which is spread across the country, the use of mail-in 
ballots causes a democratic deficit as many fail to vote before the deadline109. These respondents 
favor a longer voting period for the constituency of Canada. 
In terms of running for public office, two salient equity challenges include gender and 
income, specifically, it can be more difficult for low income individuals and women to run for 
office (Sanbonmatsu and Carroll, 2017; Prindeville, 2004). Being low income can be a barrier by 
making a candidate uncompetitive due to lack of resources, while gender identity can pose 
psychological, economic, or emotional barriers to running. Nunatsiavut has fairly robust 
mechanisms to address both issues in its elections legislation. Section 33 of the Nunatsiavut 
Elections Act, called the extraordinary procedure for ensuring gender equality, permits the 
President to nominate a woman to run in a contest in which no female candidate has entered. 
Campaign finance rules, meanwhile, impose a $1000 limit on spending in order to level the 
playing field for candidates. Despite these provisions, there are still shortcomings in terms of 
equity. As McMahon and Alcantara (2019) suggest in their research on Nunatsiavut elections, 
there is evidence that gender impacts running for office in NG. They find that, similar to other 
                                                
108 Interviews #1, April 3, 2017; #19, May 1, 2017; #30, June 27; #31, June 29, 2017. 3 of 4 were from outside 
Labrador. 
109 Two respondents noted that some of the ballots had arrived at the NG returning office (in HV-GB) after te 
deadline and could not be counted. One canadidate suggested that they would have won the election had these 
ballots been counted.  
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political contexts, women are as likely to have nascent ambition, or a desire to run to influence 
policy, but are less likely to develop expressive ambition, or the decision to run. Factors that 
impact this include family responsibilities and self-confidence. The solution to this issue is likely 
not political, since fewer women than men run and win in NG elections even where section 33 is 
practiced.  
Equity is also a factor in NG’s administrative bureaucracy. As mentioned in section 
6.7.2.2, several informants cited concerns surrounding the hiring of Inuit for administrative 
positions within NG. As Riccucci and Van Ryzin (2016) note in their discussion of 
representative bureaucracy, equity within an administration is important because it helps ensure 
greater accountability, promotes legitimacy and trust, and projects equitable practices into the 
whole of society. In the context of NG, this would be accomplished by demonstrating that every 
effort is taken to hire qualified Inuit to administrative positions and to build a qualified 
workforce. Though NG has policies in place to address both, interviews suggest there is a lack of 
public confidence that this is being carried out. Equity is thus an important concern across NG, 
and although NG has robust policies to promote equity, more work is likely needed to continue 
to close equity gaps.  
6.9.2 Justice and the rule of law 
Although NG has a right to take on powers in criminal justice under the LILCA, it has 
not yet drawn down this power, meaning those interviewed had less to say about it than other 
matters, but there is evidence of its importance. As Loukacheva (2012) notes, traditional Inuit 
society lacked formal forensic or law enforcement institutions, but had a sophisticated system of 
Inuit customary law. The last formal Inuit trial held in Canada was reportedly near Iqaluit in 
1924 (p. 205). Today, justice and law in the arctic is emerging as an important area of study, 
which underscores emerging tensions between colonial law and order and Indigenous 
jurisprudence. As one community member from Nain notes: “Things like justice, education [are] 
not drawn down, why don't we have more say?” (Interview #18, April 28, 2017). Another stated 
that without full devolution of powers like health, education and justice, “we aren’t where we are 
supposed to be eventually” (Interview 10, April 24, 2017). These comments convey that 
although NG currently lacks a clear vision or policy framework for expanding its control of law 
and order, many beneficiaries see the development of Inuit regimes of law and order as important 
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in solidifying local control over their own affairs. Justice and the rule of law are an important 
component of fairness in SG because they provide assurances that the rules will be enforced 
equitably across the population. As section 6.4.1 discusses, fairness is of particular concern in the 
enforcement of membership rules, and it will be important for NG to apply those rules equitably 
for the purposes of ensuring that all Labrador Inuit are able to share in the benefits NG has 
strived to produce for beneficiaries since 2006.  
6.10 Conclusion 
To quote former NG president Jim Lyall: “NG has accomplished more in 9 years than the 
provincial and federal government had accomplished in 30 for Labrador Inuit” (Interview, April 
27, 2017). These words summarize what has changed for Labrador Inuit since attaining SG in 
2006. This chapter examined a brief history of the Labrador Inuit and their path to SG, then 
discussed NG’s approach to key policy areas, including housing, employment and income, 
language and culture, and membership. It also included an evaluation of governance in NG, 
using the Five Principles of Good Governance, considering the testimonies of interviewees, 
reports, policy documents, and laws. Examining governance with this method reveals how NG 
has been able to excel in delivering on its key policy priorities, exercising leadership, and being a 
voice for Labrador Inuit, both to other levels of government and to the public. Five key successes 
are listed below.  
● Outcome 1: NG has become voice for Labrador Inuit, advocating its concerns to other levels 
of government, and promoting Inuit culture.  
● Outcome 2: NG has facilitated rising incomes in the Settlement area by reserving jobs for 
qualified Inuit in industry and government and supporting beneficiaries in seeking post-
secondary education. 
● Outcome 3: NG has had success in administering the NIHB for Inuit, providing critical 
health services that many Labrador Inuit rely on.  
● Outcome 4: NG has secured additional, dedicated funds and developed a new strategy to 
address the housing crisis in the Settlement Area.  
● Outcome 5: Fostering financial sustainability through capital planning 
The 32 interviewees were almost unanimous in indicating that Labrador Inuit are proud of their 
landmark achievement in attaining SG, and they have good reason to be. As one beneficiary and 
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former cabinet minister of the Newfoundland Assembly put it: “Having SG is a benefit in itself” 
(Interview 5, April 20, 2017). There is a sense among beneficiaries that simply the feeling of 
having control over their own affairs is a victory and a benefit, without even measuring policy 
benefits. The benefits of SG in Nunatsiavut are measurable, however. Despite these successes, 
this chapter has revealed a number of issues that came up frequently in interviews and are shown 
in the data.  
Issue 1: Slow movement on housing 
As identified in sections 6.4.2 and 6.7.2.1, housing is a complex and intractable problem for NG, 
and many beneficiaries are concerned about the amount of time it is taking to address the crisis, 
especially in Nain and Hopedale, where homelessness and crowding are significant issues. 
Interviews pointed to considerable progress in measuring the problem and finding solutions, 
however, and NG has already acquired additional funding and developed a new housing strategy 
to attack the problem. It is still too early to test the success of this new strategy.  
Issue 2: Language shift is not being reversed in the Settlement Area. 
As discussed in sections 6.4.3 and 6.7.2.1, language shift is a challenging and complex problem 
that will likely take decades to truly address. With the looming threat of losing the few remaining 
native speakers of Labrador Inuktitut, the problem is urgent and NG will likely need to explore 
further policy options. These could include more courses or immersion seminars for adults, or 
expansion of the Language Nest programs, which are currently insufficient to reverse language 
shift on their own.   
Issue 3: Communication and transparency are a major issue.  
Similar to members of MFN, one of the primary complaints among NG beneficiaries was that 
NG does not make a sufficient effort to communicate its activities and solicit regular input from 
beneficiaries. To address this problem, NG may require a communications director and strategy, 
recognizing that many beneficiaries may not be accessing the NG website for information.  
Issue 4: Disputes over enrollment are not being resolved. 
Discussed in section 6.4.1, enrollment as a beneficiary is a serious issue for Nunatsiavut because, 
for many, it strikes at the core of what it is to be Labrador Inuit, and risks leaving some behind. 
Because membership rules are contained within the LILCA itself, they are not easily changed, 
however the registrar of beneficiaries will need to proceed with due sensitivity around the 
membership issue, and may need to adjust its interpretation of the rules. Alternatively, it may 
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need to conduct further review of those cases where membership has been lost, particulalry if it 
is due to family breakdown, to determine a possible path for remediation.  
Issue 5: Unequal benefits received by those inside versus outside the settlement area.  
The service and communication gaps, raised by many respondents, between the Settlement area 
and ULM is a multifaceted issue that touches on legitimacy, equity, and policy delivery. Since 
the focus of services within the Settlement Area is enshrined within the LILCA, it is not likely to 
experience fundamental change. NG might consider, however, strategically offering key services 
to beneficiaries in ULM in order to partially address the issue.  
Issue 6: After 10 years, some people feel as if things have not changed very much. 
In an interview, Lyall noted that NG spent the first 4 years of its existence getting everything set 
up, hiring people, configuring its administrative offices, and developing strategic plans. Because 
of this, NG had not had fully 10 years, between 2006 and 2017, to begin researching and tackling 
major problems such as housing. According to both Lyall and CWB data, NG has shown an 
impressive amount of progress thus far. As Hibbing and Theisse-Morse write: policy output, as 
manifested, for example, in a robust economy, has little effect on approval or trust of government 
(pp. 2, 2008). In other words, some people will invariably be unhappy with government 
performance.  
The questions this thesis asks are: How has Indigenous governance in Canada evolved 
over time, especially in the past two decades? What explains the successes of certain governance 
structures and policies, introduced in self-governing communities, in achieving higher socio-
economic outcomes? NG differs from the LIA before it in that it is a fully functioning regional 
government that delivers an array of policies for its beneficiaries and has a strategic capital plan. 
As in MFN, the explanation for the upward movement in policy outcomes Labrador Inuit have 
experienced since 2006 appears to be that NG  has access to considerably more financial 
resources than before, has the power to develop its own home-grown solutions to address its 
problems, and is able to be an advocate for Nunatsiavut. Unlike MFN, which lacks OSR and 
resource revenue, NG has substantial revenue streams and an IBA that guarantees employment, 
both of which have likely been a source of success for NG. Given the complex nature of resource 
development and the “resource curse”, however, this chapter finds that NG’s true path to success 
in improving outcomes since 2006 lies not in its access to resource revenue, but rather in 
Evolving Governance Merrell 144 
strategic policy development and capital management for future generations, thus showing that 
it’s not the resources, but how you use them, that moves SG ahead.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
7.1 “A Phoenix from the Ashes”: Self-Government for Inuit and Mi’kmaq in 
Newfoundland and Labrador  
Though vastly different from one another, the cases examined in chapters 5 and 6 are 
each examples of success in local governance. This thesis has shown that success in improving 
outcomes for indigenous groups in Canada is often due to SG, or structures that resemble SG. 
Many communities, such as MFN and Nunatsiavut, have introduced new modes of governance 
and have seen improvements in policy outcomes over the past 15-20 years. Despite the 
institutional constraints these communities face, evidence shows that their innovative and home-
grown policy solutions have facilitated this improvement. Both MFN and NG, as rational actors 
(or agents), representing the needs of their constituents (the principal), have managed 
institutional and environmental constraints to produce policy and administrative strategies that 
have improved outcomes over a given time marker. The cases thus offer useful insights for other 
communities looking to develop their governance regimes. Section 7.2 of this chapter 
summarizes the key findings from the two case studies, then discusses broader implications for 
SG in Canada. The chapter concludes that the key explanation for the success enjoyed by self-
governing communities is innovative and home-grown policy and governance structures, and 
that these benefits can be achieved irrespective of external factors such as poverty or resource 
development.  Recommendations for future work are offered and limitations of the study are 
identified in sections 7.3 and 7.4.  
7.2 Summary of findings 
This thesis establishes a positive relationship between rising outcomes, according to 
CWB data, and the presence of SG in a community, then analyzes 46 semi structured elite 
interviews with community members, together with other data, in two case studies. These 
findings provide detailed qualitative evidence that locally determined governance structures, 
such as consensus government, corporate governance, and policy committees, and innovative 
policies, such as the MFN Employment Assurance Program, or NG’s PSISP, help to explain the 
success MFN and NG have enjoyed in improving outcomes in their communities. The evidence 
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suggests that although governance outcomes in the chosen cases are far from perfect, the changes 
in policy and administration that have taken place between the time markers identified (1987 for 
MFN and 2006 for NG) and the present day have overall been positive. Evidence further 
indicates that the ability of indigenous communities to structure their own governments and 
policies is crucial for for these positive outcomes to occur.  
Those interviewed identified a variety of concerns with certain policies or governance 
modes within their communities. For MFN, these concerns included transparency and 
information flow, the effectiveness and resource requirements of language training, the fact that 
the Employment Assurance Program does not provide true ‘full employment’, the market-based 
housing program is not always fair, and the rate oif improvement in policy outcomes has slowed. 
These concerns are valid, and speak to ongoing challenges in effective governance in a small 
community that faces resource constraints. The evidence suggests that MFN consistently makes 
efforts to address concerns, but that residents are not always aware of what their government is 
doing. The issue of information flow is of particular concern, as it lies at the core of the Five 
Principles of which transparency is a crucial element for determining confidence in a local 
government (Institute on Governance, 2018). MFN has succeeded in a number of areas. CWB 
scores improved dramatically after 1987 as compared to beforehand. The housing program is 
effective in preventing crowding, keeping homes in good repair, and minimizing waiting lists, 
while the employment rates are favorable and incomes are significantly higher than average 
among indigenous communities. The band-controlled school is providing Mi’kmaq language 
instruction, which has sparked enthusiasm among many members. Overall, these results are 
indicative of a community that is successfully self-governing, and residents point to their 
innovative policies to explain this.  
For NG, results are more complex. Interview findings were also, broadly speaking, 
positive about governance in the settlement area, but NG’s path to success in SG is more 
administrative than policy-driven, and measuring policy success was more complex. Those 
interviewed expressed several key concerns, including: slow response to the housing crisis, 
however this is a complex and extremely expensive issue to address, and NG has taken concrete 
steps, through increased funding and pilot projects; language shift reversal is slow or non-
existent, a complex challenge that is difficult for any government to address; communication and 
transparency, a persistent concern that will likely require NG to improve its communication 
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strategy; disputes over membership and enrollment, a deeply sensitive issue for many, which the 
language set out in Chapter 3 of the LICLA ultimately determines - Inuit lineage and residency 
in the settlement area is key; unequal service between the Settlement Area and ULM, a difficult 
problem that again is rooted in the LICLA, which favors the Settlement Area. Lastly, some feel 
that after 10 years (from 2006-2016), not enough has changed in Nunatsiavut. While indicators 
and policy documents show that there has, in fact, been substantial change in policy outcomes, 
interview data also indicates that the real change is within NG, that it has created sophisticated 
administrative structures and created a complex regional government. As Lyall notes (interview, 
April 2017), it took several years to assemble NG’s administrative apparatus. He also notes that 
having SG is an achievement in itself. Interviews also uncovered 5 key achievements for NG: 
That is succeeds as an advocate for beneficiaries, that its policies in IBA implementation and 
education have promoted rising incomes, that it has successfully administered the NIHB 
program, that it has attained dedicated additional funding for the housing crisis, and that has 
fostered long term financial stability through its corporate arm, NGC. These achievements are 
poised to produce lasting benefit for Labrador Inuit, and demonstrate that SG has indeed 
contributed to improving outcomes for Labrador Inuit.  
7.3 Corroborating the Argument 
This thesis set out to ask 2 research questions: How has Indigenous governance in 
Canada evolved over time, especially in the past two decades? What explains the successes of 
certain governance structures and policies, introduced in self-governing communities, in 
achieving higher socio-economic outcomes? A 3-part argument, introduced introduced in 
Chapter 3, offers an aswer to these questions and the three points are supported by the case 
studies.  
1. At the community level, The presence of SG helps to foster good government, as 
evaluated through the Five Principles. 
A detailed application of the Five Principles of Good Governance (Institute on Governance, 
2019; UNDP, 2019) supports this argument for each case. Both cases demonstrate key hallmarks 
of good governance, such as legitimacy, accountability, and strategic direction. Both have strong 
mechanisms to promote voice, and have managed to keep power local. NG has a strong strategic 
vision and financial plan with significant capital investments, while MFN has a more informal 
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strategic direction and a healthy financial statement. MFN succeeded in transforming Conne 
River primarily through innovative policy, while NG has an innovative regional administrative 
apparatus. Both cases have had sufficient autonomy to tailor policy and administration to local 
needs, and findings from interviews and other sources confirm a clear connection between this 
autonomy in decision-making and successful policy and administration. 
2: By establishing good government, self-governing communities better address community 
needs than they did 1-2 decades ago, before they were self-governing. 
This argument is suported primarily by examining the performance of each government, in 
sections 5.7 and 6.7. Here, by drawing on the clear improvements seen in CWB indicators across 
the time markers identified for each case, then contextualizing that with the local qualitative data, 
a clear narrative emerges: MFN and NG are better able to address issues in their communities 
today than they were prior to the respective time marker. This is due to their ability to structure 
policy and government in ways that work for the community. NG is a complex regional 
government with significant resources and a suite of targeted policies. Prior to 2006, Labrador 
Inuit had to rely on the much less resourced LIA and the provincial and federal government for 
services. Not surprisingly, services were less available and less effective. MFN was a poor 
community with limited resources prior to 1987, but with a full band government and full 
funding, the community was able to flourish, and provide high quality services for its residents.  
3: Communities are able to improve outcomes by practicing good government, and not 
solely through own-source revenue from resource development or local industry.  
This argument is corroborated by examining one of the key structural differences between the 
two cases: The fact that NG has significant OSR streams, including an IBA with a major 
resource development project and MFN has relatively little OSR, yet both have been able to 
implement policies that address community needs. As a regional government serving the 5 
remote communities in the Settlement Area and a large diaspora, NG has considerable resource 
requirements. It makes efficient use of its financial resources, such as resource revenues and a 
fiscal financing arrangement, despite the environmental challenges arctic communities face. 
MFN is a small, rural community with unique needs and little OSR, yet it is able to optimize its 
use of funds to deliver sustainable benefits to band members. Both cases thus exercise good 
governance and employ analagous policy strategies despite disparate revenue sources.  
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7.4 Limitations 
 A rich array of quantitative data was gathered for this thesis, but the study is limited in 
scope. The limitations of this research exist in 3 basic areas: representativeness of interview data, 
limitations of CWB data, and limited transferability to other communities. As discussed in 3.4.1, 
semi-structured interviews are critical for obtaining the degree of nuance and richness of data 
required for building a complex understanding of the evolution of SG in MFN and NG. Because 
interview research typically yields a small sample size, however, it is difficult to ensure findings 
are representative of the whole population. Those interviewed were also not sampled randomly, 
due to the fact that only certain individuals had required information. The interview method used 
was designed to yield a detailed analysis of governance in the two cases, but does not fulfill the 
same objective as a survey, as is often used in policy evaluation research to obtain conclusive 
findings on community outcomes.  
 It is difficult to generalize some of the more anecdotal findings, such as individual 
testimonials about experience with a particular policy, to the whole population of either 
community without a fully representative sample. It is also difficult to extrapolate a statistical 
analysis of interview findings, often shared in this thesis as a ratio of the total number 
interviewed having shared a particular perspective. These figures are not meant to portray a 
statistically accurate cross-section of public opinion within each community. Instead they simply 
convey the relative salience or prevalence of a particular position or issue among a politically 
active subset of the population. Despite a lack of representativeness, the combination of 
interview data and findings from other sources produces a detailed narrative about the evolution 
of governance in each community. This thesis addresses the problem of representativeness by 
using supporting data and media reports, especially for corroborating anecdotal findings. In some 
cases, wholesale criticisms of either government were based on a particular experience but were 
not typical. This was noted in the discussion.  
 Because it did not use a survey, this study had to rely on metrics from other sources to 
measure policy outcomes in each community. The primary source of quantitative data for the 
study was the CWB provided by the Government of Canada (2019). While this dataset is robust 
and comprehensive (in that it provides data for the majority of Canadian communities), it only 
offers data only at the community level and lacks the granularity to help understand the complex 
experiences of individuals in each community (Government of Canada, 2017, 2019). In terms of 
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the housing crisis in Nunatsiavut, for instance, the CWB can indicate whether crowding rates 
have risen or declined in absolute terms, but offers little insight on the many factors that impact 
life in an overcrowded home, nor does it describe subsidiary problems that may arise as a result 
of crowding. These are factors that policymakers ultimately must understand properly in order to 
determine priorities. Ultimately, a more nuanced system of metrics may be needed to understand 
a complex problem such as the housing crisis. This is why the more comprehensive 2014 report 
released by NG was cited in Section 6.7.2.1, however the 2019 edition is not yet available.  The 
thesis addresses this shortcoming by blending data from multiple sources. Specific details from 
the interviews were used to provide depth to the narrative derived from quantitative data.  
 Lastly, the findings from these in-depth case studies have limited transferability to other 
communities, because the cases are specific, and because the analysis only examined some key 
policy systems. Part of the advantage of a case study is that every community is unique, with its 
own complex history and needs, and what works in one community may not work in another. For 
instance, when MFN launched its jobs and housing programs in 1987, it had a working lumber 
mill, which could both employ people and produce lumber for housing construction, and a small 
skilled workforce, which could operate the mill and train new workers. These specific factors 
were unique to MFN, meaning the specific lessons the case study offers may be more relevant to 
some communities than others. More important is the message: that MFN and NG each had the 
opportunity to craft their own strategic policy regimes. The case of Conne River is an important 
indicator of why homegrown policy innovation is so important at the community level and why 
the one-size-fits-all approach under the Indian Act has been so damaging, while NG is a good 
exemplar of success in SG. Either way, communities need to have both autonomy and policy 
capacity to solve local problems. This process may look different in each community.  
7.5 Significance and future research  
 This thesis adds to the literature on the evolution of indigenous SG in Canada. It also 
adds to the literature on MLG, resource politics, and business development in indigenous or 
northern communities. It offers evidence of the benefits of Inuit corporate governance, but also 
highlights the risks posed by the resource curse described by Sachs and Warner (2001), and 
suggests how these risks can be mitigated. The results of this study are also useful for 
communities indigenous or not, who are either looking for new strategies to improve outcomes, 
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or are in the experimental phase of implementing SG. The lack of transferability of specific 
insights from the two case studies means that more case studies like these are needed to truly 
capture the evolution of SG for indigenous communities across Canada. The MDS is a valuable 
tool in comparing two disparate cases and discovering instructive commonalities, and the Five 
Principles of Good Governance (Institute on Governance, 2019, UNDP, 2019) can produce rich 
results when used to examine a governance up close. The Five Principles should be applied to 
other communities across Canada, and could even inform valuable international comparative 
studies of Indigenous governance outcomes in different nationalities. This field of research could 
also benefit from more data. Surveys of a larger sample of individuals in communities like 
Nunatsiavut and Conne River would generate a more representative dataset on residents’ 
experiences with policies such as NG’s PSISP or MFN’s Employment Assurance Program, and 
could also offer robust evidence on the success of these programs. A more in-depth 
understanding of governance structures would also help inform this body of research. A detailed 
thematic analysis of constitutional documents, or the full collection of laws from communities 
like those studied here could produce valuable insights on the evolution of governance.  
7.6 A final word 
Despite limitations, this thesis has provided robust evidence that something new and 
different is happening in indigenous governance in Canada: Some communities have found 
innovations in policy and governance that yield improvements in outcomes. With sufficient 
autonomy, self-governing communities, under an adapted federalism regime, can better address 
residents’ needs than local Inuit governments and band councils, or ‘mini-municipalities’ (Abele 
and Prince 2005), operating with limited powers under the full jurisdiction of provincial and 
federal governments. This is the case because, as we saw in sections 5.5 and 6.5, communities 
that are fully self-governing, or behave as though they are self-governing, tend to have sufficient 
legitimacy and power to grant a voice to their constituents. The Principal-Agent relationship 
introduced in Chapter 2 can only work when there is sufficient flow of information between 
them to promote accountability, and when the agent has sufficient power to act on the principal’s 
behalf (Delreux & Adriansen, 2017). This is particularly the case for indigenous communities, 
because an additional Principal-Agent relationship, between the community government and 
other levels of government, is also at play. If other levels of government have too much power in 
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determining local governance arrangements or policy decisions, then the community will lack 
autonomy to optimize its resources or tailor policy to community needs. When communities 
assert this autonomy, and develop the innovative policies that suit their needs, positive outcomes 
tend to occur..Some commentators have adopted the phrase: “a phoenix from the ashes” to 
describe developments in modern indigenous governance, because, it conveys a sense of rebirth 
or renewal. It appears meaningful SG has returned to these communities after centuries of 
colonial rule. This evolution is showing promise but it is still too early to say whether we are 
truly turning a corner, leaving behind our colonial past and moving towards meaningful self-
determination for indigenous peoples.  
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Appendix A: list of semi-structured interviews 
Table A1: List of Interviews, Nunatsiavut 
Interview Participant  Date Description 
1 Anonymous April 3, 2017 NG Beneficiary, female 
2 Anonymous April 20, 2017 Beneficiary, Ordinary Member, NG 
Assembly, male 
3 Anonymous April 20, 2017 Beneficiary, NG Assembly, male 
4 Stan Oliver April 20, 2017 Beneficiary, male 
5 Ernie McLean April 20, 2017 Beneficiary, former MHA and Minister, 
Legislative Assembly of NL, male 
6 Anonymous April 21, 2017 Beneficiary, Ordinary Member, NG 
assembly, female 
7 Anonymous April 23, 2017 Beneficiary, female 
8 Anonymous April 24, 2017 NG assembly, beneficiary male 
9 Max Blake April 24, 2017 Beneficiary, male 
10 Anonymous April 25, 2017 Beneficiary, female 
11 Anonymous April 25, 2017 Beneficiary, male 
12 William Barbour April 26, 2017 NG employee, beneficiary elder, male 
13 Jim Lyall April 27, 2017  Ordinary member, president NG 
assembly, male 
14 Anonymous April 27, 2017 Beneficiary, NG Assembly, male 
15 Anonymous April 27, 2017 Beneficiary, NG employee, female 
16 Anonymous April 28, 2017 Beneficiary, male 
17 Anthony Andersen April 28, 2017 Beneficiary, male 
18 Don Dicker, Sr.  April 28, 2017 Beneficiary, elder, male 
19 Anonymous May 1, 2017 Beneficiary, Female 
20 Anonymous May 2, 2017 Beneficiary, male 
21 Marjorie Flowers May 2, 2017  Beneficiary, AngajukKâk, NG Assembly, 
female  
22 Anonymous May 3, 2017 Beneficiary, female 
23 Anonymous May 4, 2017 Beneficiary, male 
24 Anonymous May 8, 2017 Beneficiary, Ordinary Member, NG 
Assembly, male 
25 Anonymous May 9, 2017 Beneficiary, NG Assembly, male 
26 Anonymous May 9, 2017 Beneficiary, NG Assembly, female 
27 Anonymous May 10, 2017 Beneficiary, NG Assembly, female 
28 Anonymous May 16, 2017 Beneficiary, NG Assembly, male 
29 Anonymous May 17, 2017 Beneficiary, male 
30 Anonymous June 27, 2017 Beneficiary, Ordinary Member, male 
31 Anonymous June 29, 2017 Beneficiary, male 
32 Eric Andersen, Jr. October 26, 2017 Beneficiary, male 
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Table A2: List of Interviews, Conne River 
Interview	 Participant		 Date	 Description	
33 Anonymous April 11, 2017 MFN Employee, male 
34 Anonymous April 11, 2017 MFN Employee, female 
35 Chief Mi’sel Joe and 
Shane McDonald  
April 11, 2017 Chief, male/Band Councilor, male 
36 Anonymous April 11, 2017 Band Councilor, female 
37 Anonymous, couple April 11, 2017 Community Members, male, female 
38 Anonymous April 12, 2017 Community member 
39 Mary Benoit  April 12, 2017 Community member, church leader 
40 Anonymous, couple April 12, 2017 Community members, male, female 
41 Anonymous April 12, 2017 Community member, male 
42 Anonymous April 12, 2017 Community member, female 
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Appendix B: pathways to self-government 
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Appendix C: interview scripts 
Interview Guide  
Local Stakeholders and officials in Miawpukek Mi’kmaq First Nation 
 
Script 
Thank you for agreeing to be part of this research study. The goal of this research is to better 
understand the politics and long-term impact of the ongoing comprehensive land claims 
negotiations and accompanying self-government agreements in NL. I also want to examine the 
effects of any constraints placed on this process by the Canadian political environment and the 
process of managing such obstacles. 
 
I am interviewing local officials or other prominent community members who are or were 
involved in any part of the negotiations processes. During this interview, we will ask you a series 
of questions about your knowledge or experience working in this capacity; your personal views 
or strategies vis-à-vis the concept of self-government or self-determination, and how this process 
fits into the future of your community. This interview will run between 30 to 60 minutes, 
depending on your time and level of interest. Please note that you can end the interview at any 
time and that you may skip any questions you do not wish to answer. Your identity will be kept 
strictly confidential. We will not use your name in any publications stemming from the research. 
 
I would like to record this interview so that I can transcribe it later. As per University policy, 
data will be kept for a minimum of five years, as required by Memorial University’s policy on 
Integrity in Scholarly Research. 
 
Do you give me permission to record this interview? 






Can you [each] tell me about your current role in the management of public affairs in 
Miawpukek First Nation and your background? 
 
Can you [each] tell me about your involvement (if any) in the ongoing process of negotiating the 
MFN agreement with the federal government over the last 10 years or more?  
 
What was the main goal for MFN in the CLC, Self Government agreement? negotiations at that 
time?  
 
Are you aware of any other similarities this negotiation process may have with that of any other 
land claims or Self Government negotiation process in Canada? What makes them similar [what 
makes this process unique]? 
 
It is my understanding that the ongoing process of negotiations with the federal government have 
not yet resulted in a modern treaty and that the 2013 Agreement in Principle for the practice of 
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Self Government in Miawpukek FN, though adopted by the Council, is not formally ratified by 
the federal government. Can you comment on this situation?  
  
How would you describe the behaviour of the federal government in this matter overall? 
 
In your view, what is required for a community to be Self-Governing?  
 






What role (if any) should the provincial and federal governments play in the management of any 
local affairs in Conne River?  
Regarding Cultural practice  
• employment?   
• or housing? 
 
As per the 2013 version of the Agreement, there is a provision for the preservation and 
continuation of cultural values in various aspects of government, particularly education. How is 
this evident in the community?  
 
Can this be found any actions by the local government? 
 
How important is it to you or your community that any traditional values and government 
practices of the Miawpukek Mi’kmaq be present in the modern constitution and government 
structures and practices?  
 
How is your community achieving this? 
 
What special considerations do indigenous governments need to have that differ from regular 
Canadian municipalities?  
 
 
What are the advantages? 
 
Some people think true autonomy of indigenous communities is incompatible with Canadian 
federalism. In your view, how does your community’s right to greater autonomy or land and 
resource control fit into Canadian federalism? Can our traditional understanding of federalism 




How does MFN Government represent the needs of the community?  
Within Conne River?   
 
At the federal government level? 
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Can you describe any changes to the Democratic process or representation in the community in 
the past 15 years?  
 
How might this have affected the following: 
 






Any other important political changes in the community? 
 
Have there been any major instances of misconduct among the council in the last decade? How 
was this handled?  
 
Who are the major stakeholders involved in the local affairs of your community?  
 




How do things for MFN differ today from what went before the creation of Miawpukek First 
Nation? 
 
From your perspective, what are the major successes or strengths of community governance in 
Miawpukek FN: 






From your perspective, what are the weaknesses or limitations?  
 
Has the government been successful overall? 
 
What explains why policy generated in the community creates better outcomes than what the 
federal government might do to solve problems in the community? 
 
Future  
How do you think MFN will fare in the years to come?  
 
Will it continue to be a model of successful community government, or even self-government?  
 
Conclusion  
Is there something you would like to talk about that you haven’t mentioned? 
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Interview Guide  
Local Stakeholders and officials, Nunatsiavut Government  
 
Script 
Thank you for agreeing to be part of this research study. The goal of this research is to better 
understand the politics and long-term impact of the ongoing comprehensive land claims 
negotiations and accompanying self-government agreements in NL. I also want to examine the 
effects of any constraints placed on this process by the Canadian political environment and the 
process of managing such obstacles. 
 
I am interviewing local officials or other prominent community members who are or were 
involved in any part of the negotiations processes. During this interview, we will ask you a series 
of questions about your knowledge or experience working in this capacity; your personal views 
or strategies vis-à-vis the concept of self-government or self-determination, and how this process 
fits into the future of your community. This interview will run between 30 to 60 minutes, 
depending on your time and level of interest. Please note that you can end the interview at any 
time and that you may skip any questions you do not wish to answer. Your identity will be kept 
strictly confidential. We will not use your name in any publications stemming from the research. 
 
I would like to record this interview so that I can transcribe it later. As per University policy, 
data will be kept for a minimum of five years, as required by Memorial University’s policy on 
Integrity in Scholarly Research. 
 
Do you give me permission to record this interview? 






Can you [each] tell me about your current role in the management of public affairs in 
Nunatsiavut, and your background? 
 
Can you [each] tell me about your involvement (if any) in the process of negotiating the LILCA 
with the provincial or in Self-Government? 
 
Follow up: What was the main goal for Nunatsiavut in establishing, Self-Government 
agreement?  
 
Follow up: How would you describe the behaviour of the federal government in this matter 
overall? 
 
The Labrador Inuit have had a self-government arrangement in place for about 10 years now. 
Before we start the main part of the interview, do you have any comments on how things are 
going so far? 
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Would you say that Nunatsiavut Beneficiaries are better off with Self-Government than before? 






Over the past 10-20 years, how much improvement have you seen in living conditions, the 
business environment, and public services in your community?  
 




How important is it to you that Labrador Inuit cultural values are present in your government’s 
laws and constitution?  
 
Should your government be structured in a way that is culturally relevant? Would this include 





What role (if any) should the provincial and federal governments play in the management of any 
local affairs in Nunatsiavut? 
 
In your view, how well does NG democratically represent its constituents? Are elections fair? Do 
people in the community feel their voice is heard?  
 
What progress has been made in Nunatsiavut in the following policy areas?  
 - Inuit Culture and Language retention 
 - Food and food security.  
 - Employment?  
 - Housing?  
 




How do things for MFN differ today from what went before the creation of Nunatsiavut 
Government? 
 
From your perspective, what are the major successes or strengths of community governance in 
Nunatsiavut: 
 
For cultural preservation and promotion? 
 
Employment? 




What explains these successes? 
From your perspective, what are the weaknesses or limitations?  
 
What explains these? 
 
What explains why policy generated in the community creates better outcomes than what the 
federal government might do to solve problems in the community? 
 
Is there anything your office could be doing differently to address challenges?  
 
Future  
How do you think Nunatsiavut will fare in the years to come? Will it continue to be a model of 
successful self-government?  
 
Conclusion  




Interview Guide  
Nunatsiavut Community Members 
 
Script 
Thank you for agreeing to be part of this research study. The goal of this research is to better 
understand the politics and long-term impact of the ongoing comprehensive land claims 
negotiations and accompanying self-government agreements in NL. I also want to examine the 
effects of any constraints placed on this process by the Canadian political environment and the 
process of managing such obstacles. 
 
I am interviewing local officials or other prominent community members who are or were 
involved in any part of the negotiations processes. During this interview, we will ask you a series 
of questions about your knowledge or experience working in this capacity; your personal views 
or strategies vis-à-vis the concept of self-government or self-determination, and how this process 
fits into the future of your community. This interview will run between 30 to 60 minutes, 
depending on your time and level of interest. Please note that you can end the interview at any 
time and that you may skip any questions you do not wish to answer. Your identity will be kept 
strictly confidential. We will not use your name in any publications stemming from the research. 
 
I would like to record this interview so that I can transcribe it later. As per University policy, 
data will be kept for a minimum of five years, as required by Memorial University’s policy on 
Integrity in Scholarly Research. 
 
Do you give me permission to record this interview? 
Do you give me permission to begin the interview? 






Can you tell me about your role in your community? 
 
The Labrador Inuit have had a self-government arrangement in place for about 10 years now. 
Before we start the main part of the interview, do you have any comments on how things are 
going so far? 
 
Would you say that Nunatsiavut Beneficiaries are better off with Self-Government than before? 






Over the past 10 years, how much improvement have you seen in living conditions, the business 
environment, and public services in your community? Would you attribute any of this to better 
community representation or policy in local government?  
 
How important is it to you that local cultural values be present in your government’s laws and 
constitution? Should your government be structured in a way that is culturally relevant? Would 
this include anything related to the Moravian Church and Christianity? Inuit Cultural traditions 




What role (if any) should the provincial and federal governments play in the management of any 
local affairs in Nunatsiavut? 
 
In your view, how well does NG democratically represent its constituents? Are elections fair? Do 
people in the community feel their voice is heard?  
 
What progress has been made in Nunatsiavut in the following policy areas?  
 - Inuit Culture and Language retention 
 - Food and food security.  
 - Employment?  
 - Housing?  
 




From your perspective, what are the major successes or strengths of Nunatsiavut government? 
 
What explains these successes? 
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From your perspective, what are its weaknesses or limitations?  
 
What explains these? 
 
Conclusion  
Is there something you would like to talk about that you haven’t mentioned? 
